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Abstract
Treating mental illness in primary care improves access to care, but it is unclear how to
encourage family physicians to provide adequate mental health services. One approach may be
changing how they are remunerated. The objectives of this thesis were to: 1) review the literature
on the association between physician remuneration and provision of mental health services, and
2) assess the impact of blended capitation, compared to blended fee-for-service (FFS), on mental
health services provision by family physicians using billings database in Ontario. The review
found that capitation appears to be associated with fewer services; however, studies of ED visits
for mental health reasons were limited. The impact of remuneration models of Ontario
physicians was assessed using longitudinal administrative data from ICES and analyzed using
fixed-effects linear regression models. Blended capitation was associated with fewer mental
health services provided and a slight decrease in the number of ED visits for mental health
reasons.

Keywords:
Mental health, mental illness, physician remuneration, primary care, emergency department,
health administrative data, Ontario
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Summary for Lay Audience
Many patients with mental illness are not receiving treatment. One method of addressing this gap
may be changing how physicians are remunerated, to encourage them to provide more mental
health care; research has shown that physicians change how they provide care in response to how
they are paid.
In recent years, most Ontario family physicians (FPs) are paid by blended fee-for-service (FFS)
or blended capitation. In FFS, physicians are paid based on how many services they provide;
they are incentivized to provide more care, but may provide unnecessary services to increase
their income. In blended FFS, physicians are paid mostly by FFS but also receive other bonuses.
Under capitation, physicians are paid by the number of enrolled patients they have and are
expected to provide a basket of services to these patients; they are unlikely to provide
unnecessary services, but may not provide needed care unless payments are appropriately riskadjusted. In blended capitation, physicians receive the bulk of their income from capitation
payments, and receive bonuses similar to blended FFS. Previous studies have found that
physicians paid by capitation generally provided fewer mental health services compared to FFS,
but the effect on emergency department (ED) visits for mental health reasons was not clear.
Furthermore, as most previous studies are from the US, these findings may not be applicable to
Canada.
To assess the association between physician remuneration and provision of mental health
services in Ontario, we analyzed mental health services from health administrative databases
over ten years (2007-2016). FPs who were in blended FFS and switched to blended capitation
were compared to those who were in the blended FFS throughout the study period. Mental health
services provided by the FP using billings database, and ED visits for mental health reasons were
assessed. We found that FPs paid by blended capitation tended to provide fewer mental health
services overall, but provided more mental health services during after-hours. Furthermore,
although they provided fewer mental health services, capitation was also associated with fewer
ED visits for mental health reasons. These findings may reflect better access to mental healthcare
under blended capitation.
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Chapter 1
1

Introduction

1.1 Mental illness
Mental illnesses can be defined as disorders characterized by a change in emotions, thoughts,
behaviour, and/or relationships with others.1 Due to this broad definition, it covers many
illnesses with a wide range of different symptoms. Some commonly used categories include
mood disorders (e.g. bipolar disorder and depression), anxiety disorders (e.g. phobic anxiety
disorders and obsessive compulsive disorder), psychotic disorders (e.g. schizophrenia and
delusional disorder), and substance use disorders (SUD).2 Meta-analyses studies have estimated
that the proportion of people who had a mental illness in the past twelve months to be between
13% to 18%, and that 29% of people will have a mental illness at some point in their life.3,4 In
2017, 16% of Canadians had mental illness or a substance use disorder, with 5% having an
anxiety disorder and 4% having depression.3 Due to its high prevalence, mental illness exerts a
large economic burden: in 2010, the global cost of mental illness was $2.5 trillion USD, with
$800 million spent on treatment and nearly $1.7 trillion due to indirect costs such as lost
productivity. This cost is expected to more than double by 2030.5 Canada spends $11.3 to $18.1
billion CAD annually for treating mental illness, and indirect costs are estimated at $50 billion
per annum.6,7
In addition to the economic burden, mental illnesses contribute a substantial non-fatal health
burden, primarily through the increased risk of other diseases. In a study of 195 countries, mental
illnesses were found to be a major cause of years lived with disability (YLDs): in 2016, they
accounted for 19% of all YLDs, or approximately 150 million YLDs, and were also the leading
causes of YLDs in young adults.8 For patients with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major
depressive disorder, compared to patients without mental illness, there is strong evidence that
they have increased risk of HIV, cardiovascular disease, obesity, metabolic syndrome,
hyperlipidemia, and obstetric complications, and moderate evidence for increased risk of
tuberculosis, hepatitis B/C, obesity-related cancer, osteoporosis, and diabetes.9 Having a mental
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illness also complicates the treatment of physical illness, as medications for mental illness may
adversely affect patients’ physical health.10 For example, many antipsychotic medications have a
risk of weight gain, and it has been found that for patients with psychosis or bipolar disorder,
having diabetes is associated with greater risk of complications and diabetes-related death
compared to diabetic patients without mental illness.11 Patients with schizophrenia have also
been found to be less likely to spontaneously report physical symptoms.12 This may be due to
their focus on treating their mental illness, sidelining their physical health.
Direct deaths due to mental illnesses are rare, but mental illnesses are attributed to a significant
number of indirect deaths, due to their increased risk of physical illnesses such as cardiovascular
disease, respiratory disease and cancer13,14 as well as substance use disorders, and suicide;
patients with mental illness have a 2.7 to 19.9 times greater risk of suicide depending on the
mental illness.3 When assessing all-cause mortality, mental illness is associated with a reduced
life expectancy of approximately 10 years,15 or a 2.2 times higher relative risk of mortality,
attributing to 14% of deaths worldwide.15
Many mental illnesses are treatable, though medications and therapies such as psychotherapy.16–
19

However, there are gaps in receiving treatments. Studies of Organisation for Economic Co-

operation and Development (OECD) countries suggest that approximately 30% of patients with
severe mental illness and 15% of patients with moderate mental illness have not been in
treatment over the past twelve months.20 This treatment gap may be even higher in lower income
countries.21 YLD rates have not changed by more than 10% for most mental illnesses from 1990
to 2016, aside from bulimia for which YLDs has increased by nearly 20%.8 Understanding how
to bridge this treatment gap can help to improve patients’ quality of life.

1.2 Mental Illness in Primary Care
There are several arguments in favour of treating mental illness in primary care. In many
countries, primary care providers like general practitioners or family physicians (FPs) are the
gatekeepers to mental healthcare: across OECD countries, 73% of people who reported using
mental health services saw a general practitioner or FP.22 Studies have also found a high
prevalence of mental illness in patients who present to primary care, ranging between 23% and
55%, with variations by country and method of assessing the presence of mental illness.23–27
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Patients with mental illness often have physical illnesses as well, so integrating mental healthcare
into primary care, where most physical illnesses are already treated, will help patients to be
treated in a more holistic manner. It is also a cost-effective way to deliver care for patients with
mental illness, and may enhance accessibility as it is often easier to access primary care than
specialty care.28,29 Accessible and appropriate mental health care in primary care can help to
prevent or reduce the symptoms of severe mental illness, and decrease healthcare costs by
reducing hospital and emergency department (ED) usage.21,30,31
Despite the importance of primary care in the treatment of mental illness, less than a quarter of
patients with a psychiatric diagnosis use mental health services in primary care; most come for
physical health concerns.23,32 About 65% of Canadians with a SUD did not seek any mental
health services over the past twelve months, including informal care (e.g. support from family
and friends); for those with a mood or anxiety disorder, 26% did not seek any help; those with
both a SUD and a mood/anxiety disorder, 12% did not use any services or supports. When
excluding those who only used informal care, only 85%, 41%, and 34% of those with a SUD,
mood/anxiety disorder, or both used professional mental health services, respectively.33 These
numbers may reflect patient choice to not access mental health services for reasons such as
stigma around mental illness, or lack of confidence in their FP’s ability to treat mental illness.34
Another factor contributing to this treatment gap may be difficulty accessing primary care:
although over 94% of Ontarian patients with mental illness report having a regular FP, 39% to
41% report having difficulty accessing care on the same day or next day, and 52% to 60% find it
difficult to find after-hours care without using the ED.34 FPs may choose to fill up their working
hours in advance and leave little time for same-day or next-day appointments to ensure they are
seeing many patients a day, and also may only provide very limited after-hours care. This can
make it difficult for patients who cannot take time off work during the day for a physician
appointment or have an unexpected crisis to see them on short-notice, and thus these patients
may turn to the ED as an alternative source of care. This may explain why approximately onethird of patients who go to the ED for a mental illness or addiction have no previous documented
outpatient contact for a mental health reason, and why only 36% of patients see a FP or
psychiatrist within seven days of discharge after a psychiatric hospitalization.35 Some of these
ED visits may have been avoidable if the patient had accessed primary care services. In addition
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to the ED being a more stressful environment for patients, avoidable ED usage is costly to the
healthcare system and drives up wait times for everyone, including those with unavoidable
emergencies. FPs can also provide follow-up care after a mental health hospitalization; timely
follow-up is also considered an important aspect of care, as it provides the opportunity for a
physician to determine if there are any lingering problems and can address them before the
symptoms worsen and the patient is re-admitted to the hospital.35 Low follow-up rates may lead
to more readmissions and poorer health outcomes for patients.
In summary, timely and appropriate mental health services in primary care has been highlighted
as a cost-effective method of treating mental illness,28 but research shows that treatment gaps
remain. If more patients use mental health services in primary care, this may reduce ED usage
and hospitalizations. One method used by policy makers is through changing how they are
remunerated: research has shown that the way physicians are remunerated influences their
behaviour, including how many hours they work and how many patients they choose to provide
comprehensive primary care services to.36 Thus, altering FP payment models may help improve
provision of mental healthcare in primary care.

1.3 Ontario’s Primary Care Reform
Historically, the vast majority of FPs in Canada were paid by fee-for-service (FFS), where
physicians are remunerated for each service provided. This began to change in the early 2000s,
following the release of two high-profile commissions in 2002 that stated FFS may encourage
overprovision of unnecessary services, and lead to poorer quality of care and the lack of
continuity of care.37,38 By being paid for each service rendered, FPs may be incentivized to
provide more services regardless of the actual need, which costs health care system resources
without benefiting patients. FFS worked well in the past because it was simple and easy to
deliver, particularly in the context of acute care.39 However, as more focus is put on preventative
care and monitoring for chronic diseases, it has been argued that FFS is no longer an appropriate
method of remunerating FPs, and alternative payment models like capitation, where physicians
receive a base payment for each enrolled patient, should be considered.38,39 Under capitation,
there is no financial incentive to provide unnecessary services. Instead, it should encourage
physicians to focus on preventative care and disease management. However, capitation can also
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lead to negative consequences, such as selection of rostering of healthy patients or underprovision of necessary care.40 It has been suggested that blended models, which combine aspects
of different ‘pure’ payment models, may counterbalance the negative aspects of each model and
thus lead to better quality of care at a lower cost.41
Following these commissions, reforms to the healthcare system began across Canada. The
Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) made changes to the province’s
primary care system to improve access to and quality of primary care to Ontarians. These
reforms included the introduction of new payment models for FPs. Most of these new models are
patient-enrolment models with blended remunerations, where physicians are required to enrol
patients and commit to provide comprehensive primary care and ensure continuity of care. In the
2015/2016 fiscal year, 8,810 FPs were in a patient-enrolment model, outnumbering the number
of FPs remunerated by the traditional FFS.42 Two patient-enrolment models that have become
very popular are the Family Health Group (FHG), a blended FFS model introduced in 2003, and
the Family Health Organization (FHO), a blended capitation model introduced in 2006;
approximately 7,600 FPs are in one of these two models in 2015/16. Blended FFS is similar to
the traditional FFS in that FPs receive the vast majority of their income through FFS billings for
services rendered, but also includes comprehensive care capitation payments for enrolled patients
and incentives for a variety of targeted services, including after-hours care, preventative care and
chronic disease management.43 In blended capitation, FPs are remunerated primarily through
capitated payments (age and sex-adjusted) for each enrolled patient, and are in turn expected to
provide comprehensive basket of health services to their patients. It is blended rather than pure
capitation because they also receive 15% of the FFS amount for these in-basket services and
incentives for providing the targeted services. They also receive an access bonus to encourage
providing in-basket services; this bonus is reduced if their rostered patients use in-basket services
from other physicians.14 For out-of-basket and services provided to non-enrolled patients, they
receive 100% of the FFS amount, up to a hard cap limit.44 Though the models use different
reimbursement methods, they are otherwise very similar, with the same minimum group size,
targeted financial incentives, and after-hours care requirements.45,46
Since the introduction of new models of primary care, research has been underway assessing
how these new models are affecting health care services, and if one model leads to better patient
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outcomes than the others. It is of interest to know whether blended capitation is better or worse
than blended FFS at improving patients’ health, so that appropriate changes can be made to
ensure Ontarians are receiving quality healthcare. A number of studies have been conducted on
several outcomes, indicating mixed results: for example, blended capitation relative to blended
FFS has been found to be associated with improved quality of diabetes care,48,49 but lower
follow-up rates after discharge from the ED for atrial fibrillation and heart failure.50 No
difference has been found between these models on hospitalization rates51 or cancer screening.49
There is also some evidence indicating that FPs under blended capitation may be avoiding sicker
patients by selectively rostering relatively healthy patients, also known as ‘cream-skimming’,52,53
and increasing referrals to specialists.54 As patients with mental illness are more likely to use inbasket services from outside primary care sources, FPs may selectively avoid enrolling these
patients to avoid penalties to the access bonus.55
How these new models are affecting patients with mental illness is unclear. FFS incentivizes
physicians to schedule shorter appointments and focus on providing services that do not take
much time. Since mental health services like counselling can often be time-consuming, FPs
under FFS may be discouraged to provide such services if they feel the fee they receive for these
services is inadequate relative to non-mental health services. In comparison, under capitation,
FPs are not remunerated for each service provided – under blended capitation models like FHO,
they receive only a portion of the FFS fee – so they may be comparatively less likely to focus on
maximizing the number of services provided. However, capitated FPs may choose to roster more
patients to increase their income, which in turn may lead to shorter appointments, which in turn
discourages them from providing time-consuming mental health services. FPs in capitation
practices are comparable to FPs in FFS practices in enrolling patients with serious mental
illnesses (SMI) like psychotic or bipolar disorders as they are incentivized the same way, but FPs
in capitation-based models tend to enroll fewer patients with other mental illnesses, compared to
FPs in FHGs.56
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1.4 Gaps in the Literature Regarding the Impact of Remuneration Models on the
Provision of Mental Healthcare
Ontario, as well as several states in the United States, have introduced capitation to replace FFS
with the hopes it will reduce healthcare costs while improving quality of healthcare. Some
studies, primarily from the US, have been conducted to examine whether the introduction of
capitation has led to changes in the provision of mental health services in primary care or the ED,
pointing out mixed results. Part of this variation may be due to differences between studies, such
as how they measured use of mental health services (e.g. number of services provided vs.
proportion of patients who used services,). However, studies from outside the US are limited.
Furthermore, many of these studies focus on pure remuneration models, so the effect of blended
remuneration models is unknown. In Ontario, only two studies assessed the impact of
remuneration models on patients with mental illness, and one was focused on the number of
enrolled patients with mental illness without assessing service usage.56 In the other study, mental
health service provision was assessed for patients with SMI only.57 As they focused only on
patients with SMI, it is unclear whether their findings extend to patients with other mental
illnesses. Both also used cross-sectional study design, and there is a lack of longitudinal studies
to control for confounders.
Thus, there is a gap in the literature regarding how remuneration models affect patients with
mental illnesses in the context of a publicly funded healthcare system, like Canada. Assessing
how remuneration models impact provision of mental health services can help to inform
policymakers on the effectiveness of reforms in primary care. This will not only help Ontario and
Canada, but also other countries looking to improve the provision of mental health services in the
primary care setting.

1.5 Research Objectives
The main objective of this thesis was to examine the impact of switching FPs from FHG
(blended FFS) to FHO (blended capitation) on mental health service utilization in primary care
and the ED by enrolled patients. This study was conducted using longitudinal health
administrative data from ICES from April 1st, 2007 to March 31st, 2016. FPs who were in a FHG
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model on April 1st, 2007 and then switched to a blended capitation model were compared to FPs
who remained in the blended FFS model throughout the entire study period.

1.6 Thesis Overview
This thesis will use an integrated article format. Chapter 2 presents the literature review
assessing remuneration models (capitation vs. FFS) on provision of mental health services in
primary care and ED usage for mental health reasons. A manuscript focused on the impact of
FPs switching from FHG to FHO on the provision of mental health services in primary care and
ED visits for mental health reasons based on billings data, is presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4
presents discussion of the main findings, and suggests areas for future research.
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Chapter 2
2

The Relationship Between Physician Remuneration Model and Provision of
Mental Healthcare in Primary Care and Emergency Department Settings: A
Review of the Literature

2.1 Introduction
Mental illnesses affect millions of people each year, and it is estimated that 29% of people will
experience mental illness at some point in their life.1–3 Having a mental illness is associated with
a reduced life expectancy of approximately 10 years, and it contributes to 14% of deaths
globally.4 Mental illness is also a major cause of disability worldwide, and is the leading cause of
disability among young adults.5 In 2010, the global cost of treating mental illness was $800
billion USD. Indirect costs such as lost productivity, has been estimated at approximately $1.7
trillion USD.6 Understanding how to improve treatment of mental illnesses has the potential to
improve life expectancy, and reduce disability and costs enormously.
The World Health Organization recommended that treatment of mental illnesses be integrated
into primary care.7 In primary care, patients with mental illness should be able to receive a
diagnosis, followed by treatment where possible and a referral to specialized care, if necessary.
Providing services in primary care helps keep these services accessible to patients with common
mental illnesses, and is an affordable option for both patients and the healthcare system.8,9 Even
for patients with more severe mental illnesses, FPs can help to coordinate their care and manage
their physical symptoms, as mental health problems and physical health conditions are often
comorbid. Patients who can seek mental health services in primary care are also more likely to
seek help early on, before their symptoms worsen to the point they need to seek help from the
ED or hospital.7 Existing evidence indicates that primary care for mental illnesses leads to
improved outcomes.10 Understanding which factors encourage or discourage the provision of
mental health services in primary care can help decision makers determine what policies are
needed to encourage uptake of mental health services in primary care.
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Research has shown that physicians respond to the provision of care depending on how they are
being remunerated.11,12 For example, FFS involves paying physicians for each service provided,
which may encourage physicians to provide as many services as possible in order to maximize
their income. In comparison, physicians under capitation are paid a base fee for rostering
patients, and are expected to provide care to these patients over a period of time (i.e. monthly or
annually); this model incentivizes keeping patients healthy so that they visit their FPs less
frequently.13 Historically, FFS was widely used to pay FPs in the United States and Canada, but
concerns about growing healthcare costs, overprovision of unnecessary services, and the lack of
incentive to provide preventive care has led to some jurisdictions introducing capitation payment
models.14,15 However, capitation incentivizes physicians to work fewer hours, which may lead to
patients having difficulty accessing care, and may even lead to under-provision of necessary
services.14 Thus, research is needed to determine how physician remuneration impact mental
health service provision and patient outcomes to ensure patients with mental illness are receiving
appropriate care.
A number of studies, mostly from the United States, have assessed whether different
remuneration models affects mental health service usage. To my knowledge, there are no
currently existing reviews on this topic. The objective of this review was to summarize the
existing literature on the association between physician remuneration models and mental health
service provision in primary care, and the associated impacts on ED visits for mental health
reasons.

2.2 Method
2.2.1 Search Strategy and Study Selection
I developed an electronic search strategy to identify relevant published studies. Three research
databases were used: MEDLINE using the Ovid platform, EMBASE, and Scopus. The concepts
of mental illness, primary care, remuneration model, and the outcomes of interest (primary care
and ED visits) were combined using MeSH headings and keywords. An example of the search
performed in the MEDLINE-Ovid database is presented in Appendix A2.1. From the studies
identified initially, the references were searched to identify any additional studies missed by my
electronic search. The searches were last updated in April 2019.
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Articles retrieved from the literature search were screened by title and abstract to identify
relevant papers based on a set of inclusion and exclusion criteria. The remaining articles then
underwent a full text review to ensure that they met the following inclusion criteria: (i) the study
compared different physician remuneration models; and (ii) the study assessed mental health
service use in primary care or ED. Studies were excluded if they were duplicates, were not
available in English language, or were not primary research (e.g. commentaries or opinions).
2.2.2 Main Search Results
The literature search on the relationship between physician remuneration model and mental
health service provision identified 1,067 articles. After removing duplicates and conducting title
and abstract screening, there were 167 articles left remaining for full-text review. Of those, 15
articles met the inclusion criteria for this review. The manual search of reference lists was
conducted on these articles, and two additional studies were identified and included, for a total of
17 studies included in this review.
Of the included studies, 13 assessed the association between the number of visits or patients who
accessed mental health outpatient services, four studies assessed the cost of outpatient mental
health services, and three assessed ED use for mental health reasons. Some studies assessed
multiple outcomes. A summary of the findings from each study is presented in Appendix A2.2
(Tables 2.2 and 2.3).
2.2.3 The Relationship Between Remuneration and Mental Health Services in Primary Care
2.2.3.1 Service utilization
A total of 13 studies were identified that assessed the number of visits or patients accessing
mental health services. Due to the heterogeneity across studies, the summary below is grouped
by population studied (general population or no restriction by diagnosis; patients with SMI;
chronic mental illness; and substance abuse), then further grouped by how service utilization was
measured (proportion of patients who used services; total number of services used) as needed.
General population: Volume of services. Two studies assessed the impact of physician
remuneration model on the volume or number of mental health services used: one (Stoner et al.,
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1997) found no difference between remuneration models,16 whereas the other (Xiang et al.,
2019) found a lower volume of services in capitation.17 In Utah, Stoner et al. (1997) assessed the
impact of the introduction of a prepaid mental health plan and assessed the number of mental
health outpatient visits per 1,000 eligible patients. They found no significant difference over one
year between areas that switched to capitation and areas that remained in FFS on number of
visits for mental health reasons.16 Xiang et al. (2019) assessed the introduction of capitation in
some areas of Illinois in May 2011, compared to the city of Chicago which remained in FFS.
Data from July 2010 to May 2011 (pre-capitation) were compared to data from January 2012 to
June 2012 (post-capitation). They assessed number of visits per month per 100 persons in
Illinois, and found that areas that switched to capitation had used fewer outpatient visits (2.8
fewer visits) compared to areas that remained in FFS.17 Both studies used a pre-post comparison
with two groups (one group switched from FFS to capitation, compared to a group that remained
in FFS). Notably, the two studies varied substantially in their number of outpatient visits,
perhaps due to the time period of the studies: in Stoner et al.’s study, pre-capitation there were
around 15 to 20 (FFS) or 25 to 35 (capitation) mental health outpatient visits per 100 enrolled
patients per month, whereas in Xiang et al.’s study, there were 110 to 116 visits per 100 enrolled
patients per month. Stoner et al.’s study also had differences in baseline usage across groups
which makes the findings difficult to interpret, and they also controlled for fewer covariates
compared to Xiang et al. Thus, limited evidence suggests that, capitation is associated with lower
utilization of mental health services.
Patients with SMI: Proportion of patients who used outpatient care. One study found no
difference between physician remuneration and the proportion of patients with SMI who used
outpatient care,18 while three studies found fewer patients using mental health services in
capitation models.19–21 Leff et al. (2005) assessed capitated managed behavioural health
programs compared to FFS programs across five states in the US, and measured outcomes in
terms of the proportion of patients who received mental health service over three months. They
found no difference across most outcomes, including all measures of mental health care.18
Morrissey et al. (2002) assessed the impact of randomizing patients who were originally in FFS
to a fully capitated health maintenance organization, compared to patients whose providers
continued to be paid by FFS. They found that six months after the change, those who were in the
capitated plan had lower odds of receiving counseling and contact with a psychiatrist, but higher
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odds of receiving case management.19 Bloom et al. (2002) assessed the introduction of capitation
in Colorado, with three groups: areas that continued to use FFS, areas that switched to capitation
(community mental health centres (CMHCs) would continue to provide the services directly to
patients on a not-for-profit basis, but funding was switched from FFS to capitation), and areas
that switched to a joint ventures (funding was switched to capitation, but the services were
outsourced by the CMHC to a for-profit managed behavioural health organization. They found
that when assessing patients’ probability of service use, both capitated areas had reduced
outpatient use in the second year after changing to capitation, compared to areas that continued
to use FFS.20 Busch et al. (2004) had a similar design to Bloom et al., comparing areas where
CMHCs switched to capitated payments, to areas where CMHCs continued to be paid by FFS,
though their data came from Massachusetts. Using six years of data, they found that in areas that
switched to capitation, patients were less likely to receive psychosocial rehabilitation, individual
therapy, or group therapy.21 Leff et al. only assessed three months of data, and aggregated data
from multiple areas while noting all areas may not be equivalent or comparable. In comparison,
the studies which did find a difference had longer observation periods. Overall, this suggests that
capitation may lead to patients with SMI being less likely to access mental health services in
primary care, relative to FFS. This could be due to cream-skimming under capitation, if FPs feel
the capitated fee is not sufficient to treat patients with SMI. These patients may also be seeking
care elsewhere, such as through community services and psychiatrists.
Patients with SMI: Volume of services. Five studies examined the impact of physician
remuneration model on the volume of mental health services provided to patients with SMI. One
study (Warner and Huxley, 1998) found no difference,22 and two studies (Popkin et al., 1998;
Steele et al., 2014) found a decrease in volume of services in capitation.23,24 Warner and Huxley
(1998) included patients with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder assessed before and after
the introduction of capitation (n = 100 at each time point). They found that the mean number of
outpatient contacts over six months was slightly higher before capitation was introduced (186.5
contacts versus 150.3 contacts), but this difference was not statistically significant.22 Popkin et
al. (1998) assessed the impact of the introduction of a prepaid mental health plan in Utah on
patients with schizophrenia, and found the number of psychotherapy visits per patient dropped
more in the prepaid group compared to areas that continued to use FFS.23 In Ontario, Steele et al.
(2014) found that patients with SMI in capitation models had fewer mental health related visits
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to their FPs compared to blended FFS.24 The two remaining studies were based on the same data
from Colorado but using different statistical methods, comparing direct capitation (not-for-profit)
and MBHOs (capitated, but for-profit; described in the previous section, the study by Bloom et
al. (2008)). Both Chou et al. (2005) and Grieve et al. (2008) found a greater decrease in the forprofit capitation group compared to FFS, and no difference was found between FFS and the notfor-profit capitation group.25,26 Chou et al. (2005) also found differences in trends for other types
of mental health services: the for-profit group reported lower usage of therapy, day treatment,
and case management, while the not-for-profit group only saw a reduction in medication
monitoring. In Utah, Liu et al. (1999) and Bianconi et al. (2006) assessed the impact of the
introduction of a capitated plan on patients with schizophrenia by comparing areas that
implemented the new plan to areas that chose to remain in FFS. The capitated areas saw a larger
decrease in day treatment, but greater increases in medication and individual therapy compared
to FFS areas, with no difference found for group therapy or crisis visits.27,28
Warner and Huxley did observe a decrease in service use after the introduction of capitation: this
difference was statistically non-significant, possibly due to the small sample size of just 100
patients per time point. Popkin et al. assessed 377 patients at both baseline and post-capitation,
which may have helped to remove some individual-level variation and thus led to a statistically
significant finding. Both studies relied on pre-post comparisons without controlling for
covariates. Finally, Steele et al. (2014) assessed over 125,000 Ontarian patients who had billings
for psychotic or bipolar disorders, and used a regression analysis that controlled for various
patient and physician characteristics. As their study was cross-sectional, it is possible that the
patients under capitation were different from the patients under FFS and this may not have been
completely controlled for by the inclusion of covariates in their regression model. The existing
evidence suggests that patients with SMI tend to use fewer mental health services in primary care
when their physicians are under capitation models, relative to FFS.
Substance use disorders. Two studies focused on patients being treated for substance use
disorders. Alterman et al. (2000) assessed patients in Philadelphia who were receiving either
capitated or FFS funding for their treatment, and found no difference in proportion of patients
who used mental health services over the first two weeks.29 Bigelow et al. (2004) assessed
patients in Oregon during the conversion of Medicaid from FFS to capitation, and found no
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difference over time in the proportion of patients who used mental health services, up to three or
four years post-conversion.30 Thus, the literature indicates that for substance use disorders
specifically, capitation does not appear to lead to substantial differences in service use compared
to FFS.
Summary. Overall, capitation appears to be associated with decreased volume of services both in
the general population as well as patients with SMI when compared to FFS; SMI patients appear
to be less likely to use outpatient mental healthcare. Conflicting findings between studies may be
attributed to factors such as the differences in adjustment for covariates, the geographical area
being studied, and the follow-up time after the switching to a capitation model. For example,
stigma against mental illness may be higher in some areas or in older studies, resulting in little
change in service utilization.
2.2.3.2 Cost of services
Four studies assessed the impact of physician remuneration model on costs of outpatient mental
health services.16,20,25,31 All studies were conducted in the United States.
General population. Stoner et al. (1997) compared areas that introduced capitation to areas that
remained in FFS over two and a half years and found no difference in outpatient costs.16
However, as discussed previously, the groups had different levels of baseline service usage and
thus costs, which may be masking the effect of switching to capitation.
Patients with SMI. Three studies examined the association between physician remuneration
model on cost of services for people with SMI. Reed et al. (1994) assessed patients with SMI
who had spent at least 45 days over the last three years in a state hospital for psychiatric reasons,
and found no difference in costs of outpatient MH services; with one exception, case
management was higher for capitation compared to FFS.31 In the two studies of Colorado
patients with SMI, Bloom et al. (2002) found that only for-profit capitated programs had reduced
outpatient costs compared to FFS, whereas the not-for-profit capitated programs did not differ
from FFS;20 Using a non-parametric statistical method, Grieve et al. (2008) found the for-profit
capitated model to have similar outpatient costs compared to FFS, whereas not-for-profit
capitation had higher costs than FFS.25 The for-profit capitation model may be more incentivized
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to lower costs, which may be reflected in how prior to the introduction of capitation, the not-forprofit areas expanded outpatient services in a bid to reduce the more costly inpatient services,
while the for-profit areas did not.
Summary. Overall, capitation does not appear to lead to reduced costs for the population with
mental illness or for patients with SMI, though this may vary depending on factors such as what
services are available under capitation or other structural factors (e.g. for-profit versus not-forprofit).
2.2.4 The Relationship Between Physician Remuneration Model and Use of Emergency
Department Services for Mental Health Reasons
Three studies were identified that looked at the association between physician remuneration
model and ED visits for mental health reasons.18,24,32
General population. Catalano et al. (2005) assessed the introduction of capitation in Colorado,
comparing areas that switched from FFS to capitation to areas that remained in FFS, with two
years of data: one year before the introduction of capitation and up to one year after the
introduction of capitation. They found capitation to be associated with a decrease in the ED visits
per week for mental health reasons compared to areas that continued to be under FFS.32
Patients with SMI. Leff et al. (2005) compared capitated and FFS programs across five US
states: while slightly fewer SMI patients utilized emergency mental health services under
capitation (5.3%) compared to FFS (9.2%) this difference was not statistically significant. The
authors also warned the groups may not be comparable due to variation across sites.18 In Ontario,
Steele et al. (2014) examined ED visits for mental health reasons among patients with SMI using
two years of data. They also found no difference between capitation and FFS on number of ED
visits for a mental health reason, except for patients who were in team-based capitation models
with mental health workers, who were found to be more likely to have an ED visit for a mental
health reason compare to patients in FFS models.24
Summary. Existing evidence suggests that capitation may lead to a decrease in the use of the ED
visits for mental health reasons,32 but not for patients with SMI.18,24 It is possible that capitation
may be leading to a decrease in ED visits for patients with less severe mental illness, who may
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be seeing improved access to primary care under capitation; however, FPs may not be able to
manage patients with SMI well and thus these patients continue to use the ED regardless of the
physician remuneration.

2.3 Summary of Literature Review and Gaps in the Literature
The literature review found considerable variation in the conclusions, likely driven at least in
part due to study heterogeneity. Existing studies suggest that capitation may be associated with a
reduced volume of services for both the general population and for patients with SMI, and with a
lower likelihood of using outpatient care for patients with SMI. Prior studies also suggest that
capitation is associated with a decrease in the use of the ED for mental health reasons for the
general population, but not for patients with SMI.
In general, the current evidence base suggests that capitation is associated with a decrease in the
volume of mental health services provided in primary care setting. However, most studies did not
find that this decrease led to a corresponding increase in use of the ED for mental health reasons.
These trends may be due to improved efficiency in primary care, patients seeking care from other
providers, or selective rostering of patients with less severe mental illness. Only Steele et al.
(2014) found patients under team-based capitation models, which included a mental health
worker, to have greater use of the ED for mental health reasons, compared to blended FFS; nonteam-based capitation practices did not differ from blended FFS. It is not clear what is causing
the difference between the team-based and non-team-based capitation practices.
It is noteworthy that the vast majority of studies have come from the United States, and it is
unclear to what extent American studies can be generalized to other countries due to differences
in the healthcare systems. Many Americans rely primarily on private insurance for much of their
healthcare, and some of these studies were focused on the insurance payment (e.g. FFS-based
insurance versus capitated insurance plans) rather than how the physicians are paid. Studies that
compared insurers who received capitated fees but did not put providers are at financial risk for
service overprovision (i.e., paying them by FFS or salary) to insurers that received FFS fees
largely found no difference on usage of outpatient mental health services.33–35 One study did find
that capitation payments to the insurer who paid providers by FFS led to a decrease in mental
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health hospitalizations compared to FFS, though this decrease was to a smaller extent compared
to capitated providers.36
In comparison to the US, many other countries including Canada primarily use a publicly
funded healthcare system with private insurance playing a limited role.37 Only one study using
data from non-US data was found, and it was focused on patients in Ontario with SMI.24 Thus, it
is unclear whether these findings are generalizable to patients in Ontario with other mental
illnesses. Assessing the impact of remuneration models for access to and utilization of mental
health services in primary care setting and its link to ED visits is an active topic of ongoing
research.
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Appendices
Appendix A2.1: Literature search table
Table 2.1: Literature search performed in MEDLINE-Ovid for remuneration model (fee
for service or capitation) and mental health services in primary care or emergency
department.
#
1

2
3

4
5

6

7

8

Searches

Results

exp Mental Disorders/ or exp Mental Health Services/ or (mental ill* or
1247337
mental disorder*).mp.
- Search term for mental illness and related topics.
Community Health Centers/ or community health centres.mp. or
105951
Community Health Services/ or Primary Health Care/
primary health care/ or General Practitioners/ or physicians, family/ or
268204
physicians, primary care/ or general practice/ or family practice/ or Family
Doctor*.mp. or Family Physician*.mp. or Family Practice.mp. or General
Practice.mp. or Primary medical care.mp. or Primary health care
delivery.mp. or Primary health care.mp. or Primary healthcare.mp. or
Family medicine.mp. or General practi*.mp. or Primary care physician*.mp.
or Primary care.mp.
Community Mental Health Services/ or Community Mental Health Centers/
23204
or community mental health.mp.
outpatient*.mp. or Outpatients/ or psychiatric hospitalization.mp. or
167986
Hospitals, Psychiatric/ or Emergency Services, Psychiatric/ or Emergency
Service, Hospital/ or psychiatric emergency.mp.
2 or 3 or 4 or 5
556314
- Search term for outcomes: primary care usage, psychiatric
hospitalizations, or psychiatric ED usage.
exp capitation fee/ or exp fee-for-service plans/ or (Fee for service or
17233
capitat*).mp
- Search term for remuneration models: capitation or fee for service.
1 and 6 and 7
267
- Final search.

-Comments added describing the specific sections of the search are italicized
* Truncations used to broaden the search
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Appendix A2.2: Literature review summary tables
Table 2.2: Literature review table for papers that assessed the relationship between physician remuneration (FFS vs
capitation) on MH outpatient service use or costs
Author &
Year

Exposure
Variable(s)

Alterman et al. •
(2000)

Bianconi et al.
(2006)

•

MC treatment
funding (vs
standard FFS)
for addiction
treatment
(cocaine or
alcohol)
Capitated MC
programs vs
FFS, for rural
Medicaid
patients with
severe mental
illness (SMI)
in Oregon

Outcome
Variable(s)
•

Service usage in
first two weeks
of treatment

Methods
•
•

Used ASI to measure patient status at baseline,
then at a two-week follow-up
Logistic regression and Mann-Whitney U-test
to analyze outcome use (received vs did not
receive service)

Study Findings
•

•

Conversion of
Medicaid
from FFS to
capitation in
Oregon

•
•

•
•

Use of MH
services from
administrative
data

•
•

•

Interviews at baseline and at 6-month followup
Stepwise linear/ logistic regressions conducted
with demographics, history measures to predict
initial outcomes as well as to predict initial and
follow-up outcomes
Covariates: sex, age, race, education, marital
status, disability, clinical history (diagnosis,
medications, psychiatric hospitalizations,
suicide attempts), ever arrested

•

•

•
Bigelow et al.
(2004)

No differences found in MH
service usage

Strengths/ Limitations

•
•

ASI to assess
severity
At six-month
interview, asked
if they obtained
MH services in
past six months

•

•

•

Three cohorts assessed at beginning of
treatment and post- 6 months: one cohort
before implementing capitation, another
interviewed 2 years after, and another 3-4 years
after
Logistic regression used to determine if any
variables (pre- vs post-MC, demographics, ASI
score) predicted whether MH services were
received
Covariates: age, sex, race, if patient lived in
controlled environment in last 30 days,
composite ASI score

•

•

At baseline and 6-month
follow-up, MC patients use
more MH residential services;
FFS patients report more
partial/day treatment, selfhelp outpatient services
At follow-up only, MC
patients reported using fewer
MH outpatient services, more
group therapy
No difference in crisis/
emergency outpatient use
No difference: pre- versus
post-MC status did not predict
if MH services were received
Only ASI psychiatric score at
baseline predicted if patient
would receive MH services
during first 6 months

•
•
•

•
•

•

•

Patient level data
Same patients
assessed at
baseline and
follow-up
Small sample size
(n=294)
Patient-level data
Cross-sectional
study
Small sample size
(n = 305 at start,
n=294 for followup interview)

Patient-level data
Three cohorts
(before and two
after MC)
Small sample sizes
(n=168, each
cohort had 49-66
patients)
Pre-post design, no
comparison group
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Author &
Year
Bloom et al.
(2002)

Busch et al.
(2004)

Exposure
Variable(s)
•

•

Outcome
Variable(s)

Capitation
contracts
(direct
capitation
(DC), or joint
ventures
between
CMHCs and
MC firms
(MBHOs))
compared to
FFS in
Colorado

•

Switching to
capitation
payments
from FFS
(compared to
areas that
remained
FFS)

•

Methods

MH service
•
utilization and
costs for patients
with SMI
•
•
•

•
Receiving
psychosocial
rehabilitation,
individual
therapy, group
therapy

•
•
•
•

•

Random selection of patients with SMI
(schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or one 24hour inpatient stay with a primary MH
diagnosis); FFS controls matched by poverty,
degree of rurality, comparable industrial bases
Data collected in year before introduction of
capitation policy and two years after
Administrative data used to assess service
utilization and costs
Two-part model: probability of service use
(dichotomous outcome, all subjects) and
utilization amount (patients who used services)
Covariates: age, sex, ethnicity, diagnosis, prior
costs
Medicaid enrolees with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia (at least two billings)
Data collected from July 1 1994 to June 30
2000; switch to capitation occurred in 1996
Administrative data
Covariates: age, sex, race, Medicaid eligibility
category (social security insurance, aid to
family with dependent children, or otherwise),
social security insurance status, presence of
substance use disorder comorbidity, months
enrolled in the program in a given fiscal year
Analysis: enrolees in the before period (19941996) matched to enrolees in the after period
(1996-2000) on Medicaid eligibility category
and race, then logit regression on matched
groups

Study Findings
•

•

•

Strengths/ Limitations

Reduced outpatient use in
capitated areas compared to
FFS by second post-period
MBHOs saw reduced MH
outpatient costs in second
year; DC no change

•
•
•

Patient-level data
Three years of data
Modest sample
size (N=522)

Enrolees in areas that
switched to capitation had
significantly lower odds of
receiving psychosocial
rehabilitation (OR = 0.313),,
any individual and/or group
therapy (OR = 0.195), any
individual therapy (OR =
0.266), and any group therapy
(OR = 0.188); all p < 0.001

•
•

Patient-level data
N = 2000 patients
in pre-switch
period, N=2041
patients in postswitch period for
each region
(capitation vs FFS)
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Author &
Year
Chou et al.
(2005)

Exposure
Variable(s)
•

•

Grieve et al.
(2008)

•

Outcome
Variable(s)

Capitated
CMHCs
(compared to
FFS) in
Colorado
DC and
MBHO
analyzed
separately

•

Capitation
(DC or
MBHO) vs
FFS in
Colorado

•

Use of MH
outpatient
services

Methods
•
•
•
•
•

Outpatient MH
service use

•
•
•

•

•
Leff et al.
(2005)

•

Capitated
managed
behavioural
health
programs
(compared to
FFS
programs)

•

•

Access (% who
received MH
services in past 3
months)
Services under
‘less intensive
MH care’

•

•
•
•
•

Sample of patients with SMI who reported at
least one inpatient visit
Pre-post design: one year before capitation and
two years after
Control variables: diagnosis, age, gender, cost
risks, ethnicity
Stratified by low vs high cost (previous year)
Analysis using two-part model: logistic
analysis for probability of service use and OLS
regression for quantity of service use (logtransformed), both compared to FFS
Random sample of Medicaid beneficiaries with
SMI
Census data used to obtain area-level poverty,
rurality, industrial base
Cost and outpatient data collected from
administrative databases for 1 year precapitation and two years post-capitation (19951998)
Genetic matching used to match DC and
MBHO to FFS on age, gender, ethnicity,
diagnosis, pre-capitation utilization, QALYs,
cost
Analysis: non-parametric KolmogorovSmirnov test
Combination of sample survey data,
interviews, claims and encounter data of
patients with SMI
Data from five sites (five US states)
Covariates: gender, marital status, education,
race, disabled, age at first treatment
Adjustments made for each site separately
Analysis: meta-analytic random-effects model
and equivalence testing

Study Findings
•

•

•

•

•

•

MBHO model less likely to
use day treatment and
individual psychotherapy in
both post-years
Baseline levels (precapitation) of service
utilization were higher in
capitated groups than FFS,
before declining to FFS levels

Strengths/ Limitations
•
•

MBHO had a significantly
•
larger drop in outpatient
service use compared to FFS;
no difference between DC and •
FFS
•
MBHO had comparatively
lower costs post-capitation
than FFS; DC had higher
costs than FFS

No difference in use of less
intensive MH care, outpatient
SA services
However, sites are not
equivalent on all outcomes
except treatment services (too
much variability)

•
•
•

Patient-level data
Relatively small
sample (N=522)

Matching methods
reduced differences
between groups
Pre-post design
Relatively small
sample size
(N=453)

Patient-level data
Good sample size
(N=1969)
Considerable
variation between
sites makes effect
size difficult to
interpret for most
outcomes
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Author &
Year
Liu et al.
(1999)

Exposure
Variable(s)
•

Outcome
Variable(s)

Introduction
•
of the Utah
Prepaid
Mental Health
Plan, a
capitated plan
(compared to
areas that did
not participate
and remained
in FFS)

Outpatient
service use (selfreport of day
treatment,
medication
visits, individual
therapy, group
therapy, crisis
visits)

Methods
•
•

•

•
•

•

Morrissey et
al. (2002)

Popkin et al.
(1998)

•

•

Capitation
•
payment to
managed care
organization
(compared to
another region
which paid for
mental health
care using
FFS)

Introduction
of prepaid
mental health
plan (Utah)
for
community
mental health
centres

•

Proportion of
patients who
received key
psychiatric
services (contact
with psychiatrist,
case
management,
counseling,
vocational
training,
psychiatric
admission)
Management
(number of
psychotherapy
visits)

•
•

•

•

•
•
•

•

Study Findings

Sampled patients with schizophrenia
Data collected by in-person interviews: one at
baseline and follow-up after 1, 2, 3, and 3.5
years
Capitated providers were not at risk until 3
years, so focus on comparisons between
baseline-3 and baseline-3.5
Outpatient measures computed as change
scores (compared to baseline)
Covariates: age, gender, race, income, rurality,
education, marital status, employment, baseline
MH and physical health status
Sampling weights used to adjust for
disproportionate sampling, sample loss, item
non-response
Analysis: regression
Assessed patients with severe mental illness
(not defined how, though appears to include
schizophrenia)
Data collected at baseline, six months postbaseline, then appx. ~1.5 years post-baseline
via interviews with patients
Analysis: logistic regression to estimate an
adjusted OR for each key psychiatric,
controlling for symptom severity and physical
health status at time 1

•

Adult Medicaid beneficiaries with
schizophrenia
Administrative data from CMHCs
CMHCs that switched to capitation were
compared to CMHCs that remained in FFS,
with data pre- and post-introduction of
capitation up to three years post
Analysis: t-test

•

•

•

•

Strengths/ Limitations

Capitated areas saw greater
decrease in day treatment use
compared to FFS group at all
post-time points
Capitated areas had greater
increases in medication and
individual therapy visits at 3
and 3.5 years
No significant differences
between capitated areas and
FFS in group therapy or crisis
visits

•
•
•

Patients in capitated areas
have lower adjusted odds of
receiving contact with a
psychiatrist (AOR = 0.36) or
counselling (AOR = 0.48)

•
•

•

•

Patients’ number of
•
psychotherapy visits dropped •
more in prepaid group than
FFS by third year compared to •
baseline

Patient-level data
~4.5 years of data
Focus on
schizophrenia
patients
Potential of false
recall or failure to
recall

Patient-level data
Small sample size
(N=204)
Potential of false
recall or failure to
recall

Patient-level data
Modest sample
(N=377)
Not adjusted

34
Author &
Year
Reed et al.
(1994)

Steele et al.
(2014)

Stoner et al.
(1997)

Exposure
Variable(s)
•

•

•

Outcome
Variable(s)

Capitation
payment
system
(compared to
traditional
FFS) (New
York)

•

Primary care
model (teambased
capitation
(TBC),
blended
capitation,
enhanced
FFS)
Introduction
of prepaid
mental health
plan in Utah

•

Cost of
outpatient MH
services

Methods
•
•
•

•

Use of MH
services by
patients with
SMI over two
years (20092011)

Outpatient MH
visits and
expenditures

•
•
•
•

•
•
•

•
•

Warner and
Huxley (1998)

•

Introduction
of capitation
in a mental
health center
in Boulder,
Colorado
(previously
FFS)

•

Mean # of
outpatient
treatment
contacts

•

•
•
•

Patients with SMI pre-randomized to either
experimental capitation or traditional FFS
Administrative data for costs during first and
second year after implementation
Separate analyses for continuous (>270 days in
state hospital before enrolment) and
intermittent (45-270 days); only continuous
patients were completely capitated
Analysis: t-tests
Cross-sectional studying using administrative
databases
Analysis: negative binomial regressions, GEEs
accounting for clustering
Covariates: patient factors (age group, sex,
rurality, recent registrants, ADGs, RUBs,
diabetes, hypertension, congestive heart failure,
income quintile), physician factors (gender,
years since graduation, IMG, practice size)
Administrative data (Medicaid claims)
CMHCs that switched to capitation were
compared to CMHCs that remained in FFS
Comparisons over three time periods: precapitation, transition period, and later (one
year)
Analysis: linear regression
Covariates: time, rural, % of population that
was: blind/aged/ disabled, medically needy,
pregnant/child, on financial aid for families
with dependent children
Randomly selected patients with schizophrenia
or schizoaffective disorder (age 18-50) one
year before capitation and one year after
capitation (44/100 were in both)
Patients interviewed for demographic data
Administrative databases used to capture
outpatient use
Analysis: t-test

Study Findings
•

•

•

•

•

Strengths/ Limitations

For both continuous and
intermittent patients, perperson costs in capitated
groups higher for case
management in first and
second year compared to FFS;
no outpatient service costs
were significantly different

•
•

Patients in TBC or blended
capitation used fewer MH
services compared to
enhanced FFS
Those in blended capitation
had slightly higher rates of
psychiatrist visits compared to
enhanced FFS; TBC had
lower rates
No significant difference over
time in the capitated vs FFS
group in number of visits or
expenditures

•
•

No significant difference in
outpatient treatment contacts
pre- or post-capitation

•
•

•
•

Patient-level data
Randomization to
groups
Modest sample
(N=201)
Large attrition of
experimental group
(>50%)
Patient-level data
Large sample
(N=125,233)

•

•
•
•

•
•

Aggregated data
Sample size not
provided
Other differences
between counties
not adjusted for
may be
contributing to
results

Patient-level data
Relatively small
sample (N=100 at
each time point)
Outpatient services
not clearly defined
Analysis not
adjusted
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Author &
Year
Xiang et al.
(2019)

Exposure
Variable(s)
•

Introduction
of a capitated
program in
suburban
Illinois

Outcome
Variable(s)
•

Utilization of
behavioural
health-specific
outpatient
services

Methods
•
•

•
•

•

Administrative data
Compared suburban group that began in FFS
and switched to capitation to urban group that
stayed in FFS over same time
Inverse propensity score (PS) weighting used
to match groups
Covariates for PS weighting: age, ethnicity,
sex, type of Medicaid home and communitybased services waivers, nursing home resident
status, total months enrolled in Medicaid,
behavioural health category, physical health
conditions, baseline monthly number of visits
and expenditures
Analysis: weighted regression; covariates:
time, time x group interactions

Study Findings
•

During 6-12 months after
introducing capitation,
significant reduction in
utilization of behavioural
health-specific outpatient
visits in capitation relative to
FFS (-34.6 visits per 100
people per month)

Strengths/ Limitations
•

•

•

Large sample size
(N=18798 control,
N=9329
experimental)
Use of PS to make
groups more
statistically
comparable, using
many covariates
Relatively short
time of analysis
due to policy
changes made a
year after
introduction of
capitation

MC: managed care; FFS: fee-for-service; ASI: Addiction Severity Index; MH: mental health; SMI: serious mental illness; CMHC: Community Mental
Health Centers; DC: direct capitation; MBHO: Managed Behavioural Health Organization; OR: odds ratio; OLS: ordinary least squares; QALYs: qualityadjusted life years; SA: substance abuse; AOR: adjusted odds ratio; GEE: generalized estimating equation; ADG: Aggregated Diagnostic Groups; RUB:
Resource Utilization Band; IMG: international medical graduate; PS: propensity score
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Table 2.3: Literature review table for papers that assessed the relationship between remuneration (FFS vs capitation) on ED
usage for mental health reasons
Author &
Year
Catalano et al.
(2005)

Exposure Variable(s)
•

Introduction of
capitation in
specific areas of
Colorado (others
remain in FFS)

Outcome
Variable(s)
•

Number of
psychiatric
ED visits by
adults

Methods
•
•

•
Leff et al.
(2005)

Steele et al.
(2014)

•

•

Capitated
managed
behavioural
health programs
(compared to FFS
programs)

Primary care
model (teambased capitation
(TBC), blended
capitation,
enhanced FFS)

•

•

•

Access (%
who received
MH services
in past 3
months)
Emergency
services

•

Number of
MH ED
visits

•

•
•
•
•

•
•

Administrative data of visits to EDs by adults
with a primary MI or SA diagnosis
Weekly number of psychiatric emergencies
over 105 weeks beginning in July 1994:
capitation implemented at week 53
Analysis: interrupted time-series analysis
comparing capitated areas to FFS areas
Combination of sample survey data,
interviews, claims and encounter data of
patients with SMI
Data from five sites (five US states)
Covariates: gender, marital status, education,
race, disabled, age at first treatment
Adjustments made for each site separately
Analysis: meta-analytic random-effects
model and equivalence testing
Cross-sectional studying using administrative
databases
Analysis: negative binomial regressions,
GEEs accounting for clustering
Covariates: patient factors (age group, sex,
rurality, recent registrants, ADGs, RUBs,
diabetes, hypertension, congestive heart
failure, income quintile), physician factors
(gender, years since graduation, IMG,
practice size)

Study Findings

Strengths/ Limitations

•

After implementation of
capitation, use of
psychiatric ED services
decreased lower than
areas using FFS

•
•

Detailed weekly data
No adjustment for
covariates

•

No difference between
MC and FFS
Non-equivalent groups

•
•
•
•

Patient-level data
Good sample size
(N=1969)
SMI patients only
Considerable variation
between sites makes effect
size difficult to interpret
for most outcomes

•
•

Large sample (N=125,233)
Focus on SMI patients

•

•

•

Patients in blended
capitation or TBC with no
MH workers did not
significantly differ from
FFS in # of MH ED visits
Patients in TBC with MH
workers were more likely
to have MH ED visits

FFS: fee-for-service; ED: emergency department; MI: mental illness; SA: substance abuse; MH: mental health; SMI: serious mental illness
(schizophrenia or bipolar disorder); MC: managed care; TBC: team-based capitation; GEE: generalized estimating equations; ADG: aggregated
diagnostic groups; RUB: Resource Utilization Band; IMG: international medical graduate
Leff et al. (2005), and Steele et al. (2014) assessed outpatient usage and ED usage, and thus are included in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
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Chapter 3
3

Analysis of Billings Data to Evaluate Patterns of Mental Health Services in
Primary Care and Emergency Departments by Blended Fee-For-Service and
Blended Capitation Models in Ontario, Canada

3.1 Introduction
Globally, the prevalence of mental illnesses is estimated to be in the range of 13% to 18%, which
is likely to be underestimated because of the stigma, under-diagnosis, and under-reporting of
mental illnesess.1,2 In OECD countries, about 20% of the working age population meets the
clinical threshold for a mental disorder, and approximately 25% to 50% of the population will
have a mental disorder at some point in their life. 3 Mental illness places a huge burden on
countries: the estimated total cost in 2010 was $2.5 trillion USD. For OECD countries, the
estimated cost of mental illness is 2% to 5% of the gross domestic product. 4 The direct costs for
treating mental illnesses range from 5% to 18% of total health expenditures.4 Indirect costs such
as absenteeism, presenteeism, unemployment, and underemployment make up two-thirds of the
total costs of mental illnesses.5 In Canada, it is estimated that one in five have a mental illness at
any given time, and that by age 40 approximately 40% of Canadians have had a mental illness. 6
The direct cost of treating mental illnesses in Canada is estimated to be between $11.2 and $18.1
billion per annum, and the cost of lost productivity is estimated at $50 billion per annum. 7
As mental illness is a leading cause of disability8 and is associated with increased risk for other
illnesses and mortality,9,10 improved diagnosis and treatment at the early stage of mental illness
is critical. Evidence suggests that under-treatment is still a major issue in many countries. Across
OECD countries, a large proportion of patients with mental illness do not receive treatment:
about one-third of patients with schizophrenia do not receive treatment, while for patients with
milder mental illnesses like anxiety and depression, more than half do not receive treatment. 4,11
Treatment gaps are also found in Canada: in 2012, only 16% with a substance use disorder saw
a medical professional for mental health reasons in the past year, and even among those with
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both substance use disorder and a mood/anxiety disorder, only 66% sought professional mental
health services.12
Numerous reports and commissions have emphasized the importance of improving treatment of
mental illness in primary care setting.4,13 Treating mild to moderate mental illness in primary
care setting through accurate diagnoses, initiating and managing appropriate treatment, and
coordinating with other health professionals, including referrals to psychiatrists, may not only
reduce the costs of mental illnesses14,15 but also improve the health of this population. 14,16 Indeed,
some evidence suggests that integrating mental health services into primary care enhances access
to these services in a cost-effective manner.13 Treatment in primary care also provides an
opportunity for a more holistic care by coordinating referrals to necessary specialists and other
providers.
FPs are in the best position to provide the bulk of mental health services to their patients before
their mental illnesses reaches a crisis point requiring emergency or inpatient care. Many
developed countries have reformed primary care in order to improve access to comprehensive
primary care, including mental health services. Many of these reforms involved introducing
blended remuneration for FPs combined with formal patient enrollment and pay-for-performance
incentives.17–19 The limited research to date assessing how physician remuneration affects supply
of mental health services has produced mixed results (see section 3).
No study has explicitly examined the impact of blended remuneration on the provision of mental
health services. We filled this gap by studying the provision of mental health services (focusing
on psychiatric illnesses such as schizophrenia and other psychoses, mood disorders, anxiety
disorders, and substance use disorders) in Ontario’s blended FFS and blended capitation models.
Because there is the potential for physician selecting into different remuneration models, we
accounted for the systematic differences between switchers and non-switchers using inverse
probability weighting and fixed-effects regressions. The number of mental health services
provided by FPs per 1000 patients and the value of these services (2006 dollars) were assessed to
determine if and the extent to which the remuneration models influence the volume of mental
health services provided by FPs. We also investigated whether these services were provided
during regular-hours and after-hours periods. Finally, as an indirect measure of quality of care,
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ED visits for mental health reasons was compared between groups. We found that blended
capitation was associated with a decrease in the total number of mental health services provided
and the value of these services, but an increase in the number and value of mental health services
provided during after-hours. Despite providing fewer services, blended capitation was also
associated with a decrease in mental health-related ED visits, primarily during regular-hours.

3.2 Institutional Context
Canadian FPs have historically been paid by a FFS remuneration system, in which they were
paid for each unit of service provided to their patients. In the early 2000s, Ontario, which is
Canada’s most populous province, introduced new payment models for FPs.20 Two new
remuneration models that have become very popular are the Family Health Group (FHG), a
blended FFS model introduced in 2003, and the Family Health Organization (FHO), a blended
capitation model introduced in 2006.21 In FHO, FPs receive the base capitation payment for their
enrolled patients, adjusted for the patient’s age and sex to provide a defined basket of services;
they also receive 15% of the FFS amount for each in-basket service provided to enrolled patients.
They receive 100% of the FFS amount for services provided outside the basket with no limit, as
well as for all services to non-enrolled patients up to the annual hard cap limit. 22 FHO physicians
are also eligible to claim targeted financial incentives in the area of illness prevention (influenza
vaccination, pap smear, mammography, childhood immunization, colorectal screening), chronic
disease management (diabetes management, smoking cessation counselling fee, heart failure
management incentive), and after-hours care (specific services rendered after 5PM on weekdays,
or at any time on weekends and statutory holidays; the premium was originally 10% but
increased to 15% in April 2005, then was increased to 20% in April 2006, and then increased to
30% in April 2011).20 In contrast, blended FFS is similar to the traditional FFS in terms of the
base payment, but also includes the same targeted financial incentives as in FHOs;20,21 thus, FHG
and FHO have different base remunerations. As of March 31st 2016, approximately 54% of
Ontario’s FPs were in one of these two models, covering 92% of enrolled patients. 23 The main
characteristics of FHG and FHO models are presented in Table 3.1.
One of the reasons blended remuneration models were introduced is that pure FFS encourages
physicians to over-provide services, some of which may be unnecessary in terms of improvement

40
in patients’ health.24,25 Capitation, on the other hand, eliminates provision of unnecessary
services, but may also lead to withholding of necessary services unless payments are
appropriately risk-adjusted. Evidence suggests that compared to FPs paid by FFS, capitated FPs
tend to provide fewer services,26 which may be partly due to reduction in elective procedures and
unnecessary prescriptions.27 It is unclear whether overprovision of mental health services occurs
under FFS.1 Capitation may also result in physicians avoiding high-needs patients, known as
cream-skimming.28 In Ontario, the capitation fee is only adjusted for age and sex. Thus, between
two patients who are the same age and sex but have differing levels of health, capitation
incentivizes enrolling the healthier patient. 24 Capitation has also been found to be associated with
increased referrals to specialists compared to FFS, suggesting potential offloading of care. 26,29
It has been suggested that blended models, which combine aspects of retrospective and
prospective payments, may help to attenuate some of the negative effects of FFS and capitation,
and thus lead to higher quality of care compared to ‘pure’ payment systems. 24 For example,
although capitation may encourage cream-skimming, incorporating some FFS payments may
provide incentive for physicians to take on and treat complex patients. It is still unclear what
exact ‘blend’ is best: if models should be more like FFS, or more like capitation, for highest
quality of care. Ontario’s experiment with blended remuneration models provides an opportunity
to understand how different types of blended models impact mental health service provision.
Since the introduction of these new models, a number of studies have assessed their impact on
service usage and patient outcomes, such as diabetes care and cancer screening. 30,31 However, the
impact on the provision of mental health services for patients with mental illness remains
unclear, and hence is the focus of this paper.

3.3 Related Literature
Although several countries have introduced new payment models, there is a lack of research
assessing how payment models affect patients with mental illness. The vast majority of studies

1

Under-diagnosis and over-diagnosis of certain mental disorders are documented in Canada. Up to half of
Canadians with a mood disorder are not diagnosed. 71 Approximately one-third of Ontarians who visited the ED for a
mental health reason during 2006 to 2013 had not previously seen a physician for mental health reasons. 72 On the
other hand, over-diagnosis mental illnesses like bipolar disorder and depression has been noted and may lead to
patients receiving unnecessary and potentially harmful pharmacologica l treatments.73,74
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comparing different types of remuneration methods and their effect on mental health service
utilization come from the United States, though some work has been conducted on people with
SMI (psychosis or bipolar disorder) in Ontario.
A few studies have assessed capitation versus FFS on volume of mental health services using
pre-post data. Stoner et al. (1997) found no difference, whereas Xiang et al. (2019) found it was
lower in capitation.32,33 Xiang et al.’s study had similar baseline measures between groups and
controlled for more covariates; however, Stoner et al. covered a slightly longer follow-up after
introduction of capitation. In studies of patients with SMI, two found a decrease in number of
services used,34,35 while one found a statistically non-significant decrease, although this could be
due to their study design and small sample size.36 Thus, capitation appears to be associated with
use of fewer mental health services in both the general population and for patients with SMI.
Patients who are not receiving adequate care from their FP may turn to the ED for their mental
health needs instead;37 thus, one measure of quality and accessibility of mental health care
provision in primary care is ED usage for mental health reasons. Only one study from the US
assessed ED usage for mental health reasons in the general population, and found capitation to be
associated with lower ED usage compared to FFS. 38 Two studies assessing patients with SMI
were found: one US study using survey data found no difference between capitation and FFS in
ED usage over three months,39 and an Ontario study assessing two years of health administrative
data also did not find a difference.35
As much of the existing literature comes from the US, and thus are based on enrolment into
different types of private insurance plans, it is unclear whether these findings can be generalized
to other countries where the majority of health care is covered under public insurance plans. 40 A
study comparing multiple European countries with different physician payment models argued
that how physicians are paid may be an important factor for referral and/or treatment of mental
illness.41 In the Netherlands, a case-mix remuneration model for mental healthcare has been
introduced to replace salaried payment, and has led to mixed results for efficiency and costs. 42
Some limited work has been done in Ontario on patients with SMI, finding blended capitation to
be associated with reduced mental health service provision compared to blended FFS, although
no difference in ED usage for mental health reasons was found. 35 However, whether these
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findings apply to patients with common mental disorders is not known. Moreover, they did not
account for the selection of physicians into different remuneration models and did not utilize
longitudinal data; thus, they were not able to control for unobserved differences between
physicians that may otherwise confound the results.

3.4 Methods
3.4.1 Study Design
A retrospective cohort study design using data from April 1 st 2007 to March 31st 2016 (i.e. fiscal
years 2007/08 to 2015/16) was used to compare mental health service provision by FPs in
blended capitation and blended FFS models. We identified FPs who were practicing in FHGs as
of April 1st 2007 and they either remained in FHG (i.e. non-switchers) or switched to FHO and
continued to practice in FHO (i.e. switchers) until March 31 st 2016. As our analysis was at the
physician level, patients’ outcomes and covariates were aggregated to their FP for each year.
Physicians were excluded if they had less than 200 rostered patients in any year to exclude FPs
who may have been working part-time at any point during this period. Patients were also
excluded if they met any of the following exclusion criteria: (a) missing or invalid identifying
key number; (b) missing or invalid age; (c) age <16 or >105 years old; and (d) missing or invalid
sex.
3.4.2 Data Sources and Variables
This study used health administrative data from ICES (formerly known as the Institute for
Clinical Evaluative Sciences). These datasets were linked using unique encoded identifiers and
analyzed at ICES. Physician characteristics were obtained from the ICES Physician Database,
and included age, sex, IMG status, and rurality. The Corporate Provider Database was used to
obtain data on physician’s remuneration model and the number of FPs in each practice, while the
number of enrolled patients were obtained from the Client Agency Program Enrolment database.
The Ontario Registered Persons Database (RPDB) was used to obtain information on patients’
age and sex: average patient age, proportion of patients over 65 years old, and proportion of
female patients were used as covariates. Census dissemination area-level data were used to
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calculate patients’ area-level material deprivation score and ethnic concentration score,2 which
were then used to sort patients into quintiles. An ICES-derived cohort – Primary Care Population
– was used to obtain data on whether patients had been diagnosed with a chronic mental
illnesses, defined as two outpatient or one inpatient visit for a mental health reason over the past
two years.43 John Hopkins Adjusted Clinical Groups version 10.0 was used to derive patients’
Aggregated Diagnostic Groups (ADGs) based on patients’ diagnostic codes, which reflects
comorbidity in primary care.44,45 An ADG score is based on 32 diagnostic groups, which are
used as indicator variables and then summed, so a patient may have an ADG score of any integer
between zero and 32. An ADG score was calculated for each enrolled patient based on diagnosis
codes from ICES databases, and the mean ADG score for all patients enrolled to each physician
was calculated. Using postal codes from the RPDB and the Postal Code Conversion File (PCCF),
patients living in rural areas were identified, with towns of less than 10,000 people considered
rural.46 The proportion of FP’s patients living in rural areas was used in the analysis. All
covariates were defined for each fiscal year.
We used the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) database to obtain information on mental
health services provided by FPs for each fiscal year, including fee codes and the claim amount.
After-hours services are provided on weekdays after 5:00PM, on weekends, and statutory
holidays, and services provided outside of these times are considered regular-hours services.
Mental health services provided during after-hours were captured through a premium code
(Q012) along with the OHIP billing codes for mental health services; it was assumed that
services that did not have the after-hours premium code were rendered during regular hours. The
list of codes used to capture mental health services can be found in Appendix A (Table A.1). The
mental health service codes were derived from a prior validation study with high specificity and
adequate sensitivity, with the addition of one code that was introduced after the validation study
was published.47 The number of services as well as the value of the services (based on 2006
prices) were obtained from the OHIP database. The value of the services was calculated by

2

Material deprivation is a composite score based on the proportion aged 25+ years old without a certificate,
diploma, or degree; the proportion of single-parent families; the proportion receiving government transfer payments,
the proportion those aged 15+ who are unemployed, the proportion considered low-income, and the proportion
living in homes of in need of major repair; ethnic concentration is a composite score based on neighbourhood level
proportions, including the proportion who are recent immigrants (within 5 years) and the proportion of those who
identify as self-minorities.78
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multiplying the number of mental health services provided by its billing value (in 2006 dollars),
which was then summed to produce the total OHIP claims for mental health services for each
physician for each fiscal year. Information on referrals to psychiatrists was also obtained from
the OHIP. Information on SMI was based on combination of diagnostic and billing codes. In
FHG, any enrolled patient with a diagnostic code 295 (schizophrenia) or billing code Q020
(tracking code for bipolar disorder) was considered to have SMI, whereas in FHO, any enrolled
patient that used billing code Q020 or Q021 (tracking code for schizophrenia) was considered to
have SMI.48,49
Expected gain in income from switching from FHG to FHO was calculated based on the services
that physician provided during the previous fiscal year (2006/07) for enrolled and non-enrolled
patients, using an algorithm derived by the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care
(MOHLTC).50 This algorithm uses the following assumptions: (1) a capitation rate of $144.08
multiplied by the age-sex modifier for each enrolled patient; (2) 10% of FFS value for in-basket
services to enrolled patients; (3) 100% of FFS value for in-basket services to non-enrolled
patients up to the hard cap limit; (4) 100% of FFS value for out-of-basket services to any patient;
and (5) special payment eligibility rules.
Data on ED visits for mental health reasons were obtained from the National Ambulatory Care
Reporting System (NACRS). ED visits were stratified by regular-hours and after-hours. The list
of diagnostic codes used to identify ED visits for mental health reasons can be found in
Appendix A (Table A2).
3.4.3 Statistical Analysis
Given that Ontario FPs choose their remuneration model, there is the potential for selection bias:
FPs in the switcher group may be systematically different from FPs in the non-switcher group in
ways that may affect how they provide care. The decision to switch or remain in FHG is likely
influenced by a variety of factors: for example, it is expected that FPs would be more likely to
switch from FHG to FHO if they have a relatively high expected gain in income. To address this
issue, we employed a two-step estimation strategy. In the first stage, we accounted for the
differences between switchers and non-switchers using an inverse probability weighted (IPW)
technique based on a propensity score (PS) model using logistic regression. This approach
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ensures that switchers and non-switchers were comparable in terms of the variables included in
the PS model at baseline:
•

Provision of mental health services: number of mental health services provided, the
number of enrolled patients with SMI;

•

Physician characteristics: physicians’ age and its square, sex, rurality, IMG status, group
size;

•

Patient characteristics, aggregated per FP: average age of enrolled patients, proportion
of senior patients, proportion of female patients, average ADG score of patients,
proportion of patients living in areas that were in the lowest two quintiles on the material
deprivation score, proportion of patients living in areas that were the lowest two quintiles
on the ethnic concentration score), proportion of patients living in rural areas, and the
proportion of patients with chronic mental illness in the practice; and

•

Expected gain in income from switching to FHO in the previous fiscal year (2006/07).

In the second stage, we estimated the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) using inverse
probability weighted regression models. ATT provides an estimate of the benefit of those who
received the treatment, which is of interest in this paper as the goal is to determine the impact of
switching from FHG to FHO on outcomes.
Covariate balancing between two groups was checked using t-tests for equality of means,
standardized bias (i.e. the difference of sample means as a percentage of the square root of the
average of the sample variances), and percentage reduction in bias before and after matching.
There is currently no universally-agreed upon standard for how much standardized bias is
appropriate, but some have proposed a maximum standardized bias of 10% to 25%. 52,53 Even if
the standardized bias for all covariates is less than 10%, the findings may still be biased.
Therefore, matching was also performed using the entropy balancing (EB) method, which is
based on a maximum entropy reweighting scheme that ensures exact balancing on the moments
of covariate distributions in both groups.54 The EB method has been demonstrated to be robust to
propensity score mis-specification.55 In this paper, we used the first three moments (mean,
variance, and skewness) for all continuous covariates and the first moment for all binary
covariates. Using these estimated propensity scores (𝑝̂ ) from PS or EB method, IPW was applied
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to adjust the outcomes of the non-switcher group by weighting them with the ratio

𝑝̂
1−𝑝̂

, whereas

the weight for each switcher observation is one.
3.4.4 Regression Models
Weighted regression models were used to assess the effect of switching on the provision of
mental health services (the number and value of mental health services, the number of enrolled
patients with SMI, and ED visits for mental health reasons and the corresponding number of
patients) using the following equation at the physician level:
ln𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿FHO 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝜏 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,
where subscripts i and t represent physicians and time, respectively; lnS is the natural logarithm
of the outcome (number/value of services provided by the FP, patients with SMI, and ED visits
for mental health reasons; all outcomes were standardized to per 1,000 patients), however, we
added one to adjust for some zeros in the data; αi is a physician-specific idiosyncratic term
representing time-invariant factors; FHO is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the physician
practices in the FHO and 0 if s/he practices in the FHG; X includes age, age squared, sex,
rurality, IMG status, group size, average age of patients in the physician’s practice, proportion of
senior patients, proportion of female patients, average ADG score of patients, proportion of
patients in quintiles 1 or 2 on the material deprivation score, proportion of patients in quintiles 1
or 2 on the ethnic concentration score, proportion of patients living in rural areas, and proportion
of patients with chronic mental illness; τ is a time trend; and ε is the error term.
Regression models were estimated using a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
ignoring αi, a fixed-effects (FE) regression, and a high-dimensional fixed-effects (HDFE)
regression that allows for change in αi over time using IPW estimator based on PSM matching
and EB matching. All regressions were run using robust standard errors clustered at the
physician level. The OLS regression does not take into account the repeated measurements and
hence physician-specific differences in outcomes. The FE estimator does account for repeated
measurements over the same physicians and controls for time-invariant physician-specific factors
such as altruism, diagnostic ability, and other personal preferences. 55 The HDFE estimator not
only controls for physician-specific time-invariant factors as in the FE model, but also allows for

47
these characteristics to vary over time. Using multiple estimators provides insight into
differences in outcomes when more confounders are controlled for.
Subgroup analyses were also carried out to examine whether the impact of switching from FHG
to FHO differed among different subpopulations of FPs. These analyses were conducted for the
following physician subgroups: (1) sex, (2) age group (younger versus older), and (3) time of
switch (early versus late switchers). Subgroup analyses were only conducted for mental health
services provided in primary care and psychiatric ED usage. All analyses were conducted in
Stata 13.1.

3.5 Results
3.5.1 Matching Results
A total of 2,656 FPs were assessed (switchers: N = 1,420; non-switchers: N = 1,256). Table 3.2
reports difference in means for variables at baseline before and after PSM, the p value for t-tests
for equality of means between switchers and non-switchers, standardized bias between groups
before and after PSM, and the reduction in bias after matching. The before matching results are
based on an unweighted regression, and the after matching results are based on propensity score
weighted regression. The t-tests on the before matching data indicate that there were statistically
significant differences between switchers and non-switchers for all variables, with the
standardized bias ranging from 3.9% to 49.8%. Physicians who switched tended to be younger,
female, practicing in a rural area, have graduated from a Canadian medical school, have smaller
physician group size, have fewer enrolled patients, and have a higher expected gain in income
relative to non-switchers. On average, the patients of physicians who switched tended to be older
and have a lower ADG score. Switcher physicians also had higher proportions of senior patients,
female patients, patients living in less-deprived areas, patients living in areas of low ethnic
concentration, and patients living in rural areas. Switchers also tended to provider fewer mental
health services and have fewer patients with SMI at baseline. Following matching and reweighting of the non-switcher physicians, the re-weighted group became comparable to the
switcher group: t-tests indicate that for all variables, after weighting, the difference in means was
no longer statistically significant, and the amount of bias was below 10%. Bias did increase for
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proportion of patients with chronic mental illness, but still remained below 10% and was likely
due to the small magnitude of the pre-weighting difference.
The standardized mean difference and variance ratios are presented in Figure 3.1, which shows
that after matching, the standardized mean difference and variance ratio for nearly all variables
were closer to 0 and one, respectively. This indicates that the matching procedure was reasonably
successful in eliminating the baseline covariate differences between switchers and non-switchers.
Thus, any changes in outcomes over time are likely due to switching of FPs from blended FFS to
blended capitation.
3.5.2 Regression Results
3.5.2.1 Mental health services provision in primary care
Figure 3.2 presents the PS-weighted mean number and value of mental health services provided
per 1,000 enrolled patients, per FP for each fiscal year for both switchers and non-switchers. As
expected, switchers and non-switchers provided similar numbers of services across the total,
regular-, and after-hours in the first year. For total and regular-hours services, non-switchers
continued to provide similar number of services, whereas switchers steadily decreased the
number of services over time. During after-hours, both groups increased the number of services
as well as the value of services over time.
The estimated impact of switching from blended FFS to blended capitation on number and value
of mental health services per 1,000 enrolled patients are presented in Table 3.3. Switching from
FHG to FHO was associated with a 12.4%, 13.8%, and 13.5% decrease in the number of mental
health services provided to enrolled patients based on the OLS, FE, and HDFE estimates,
respectively.3 A similar relationship is seen on the value of mental health services, with
switching to FHO associated with a 14.9%, 17.8%, and 17.2% decrease in the value of mental
health services based on the OLS, FE, and HDFE estimates, respectively.
Switching was associated with an increase in the number of mental health services provided
during after-hours, with increases of 30.2%, 39.6%, and 21.0% for the OLS, FE, and HDFE
3

This interpretation is based on the Ha lvorsen-Palmquist adjustment for interpreting a dummy variable in a semilogarithmic model.79,80
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estimates. Switching was also associated with an increase in the corresponding value of these
services, with increases of 64.9%, 73.8%, and 35.7% respectively. The effect of switching on
mental health services during regular-hours was very similar to the effect seen on total services:
switching was associated with a decrease in the number of services by 12.3%, 15.3%, and 14.3%
based on the OLS, FE, and HDFE estimates, and a corresponding decrease in the value of
services provided by 14.4%, 18.2%, and 17.4%. In summary, switching from FHG to FHO was
associated with a decrease in mental health services, driven primarily by a decrease in services
provided during regular-hours. However, the opposite trend was seen for after-hours services.
3.5.2.2 Number of patients with serious mental illness (psychosis or bipolar disorder)
To determine whether switching from FHG to FHO was associated with reduced enrollment of
patients with SMI, the number of these patients (standardized to per 1,000 enrolled patients) per
group was assessed. Descriptive analyses using t-tests for each year were conducted, and
significant differences for eight of the nine years were found (see Appendix A3.4: Table A3.19),
so regression analyses were conducted.
The estimated impact of switching from FHG to FHO on the number of enrolled patients with
SMI per 1000 enrolled patients is presented in Table 3.3. PS-weighted OLS, FE, and HDFE
estimates indicate a 5.2% increase, 8.0% decrease, and 3.9% decrease, respectively; however,
only the FE estimate was statistically significant. This suggests that switching to FHO did not
lead to a change in rostering patients with SMI.
3.5.2.3 Referrals to a psychiatrist
Analysis using t-tests of proportions of FPs who referred at least one patient to a psychiatrist
suggested that in later years, non-switchers were more likely to refer at least one patient to a
psychiatrist compared to switchers (see Appendix A3.4, Table A3.20). However, only two
percent of FPs made a referral, making this outcome a relatively rare event. Furthermore, the
magnitude of the differences was small, with the largest difference being 3.4% in 2015/2016.
Thus, it was concluded that this data did not support the hypothesis that switchers tend to refer
more patients to psychiatrists compared to non-switchers.
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3.5.2.4 Use of the emergency department for mental health reasons
Figure 3.3 presents the PS-weighted mean number of ED visits for mental health reasons and
number of patients who visited the ED for a mental health reason per 1,000 enrolled patients, per
FP for each year, by group. The figures indicate that for non-switchers, the number of ED visits
appeared to be slightly increasing over time beginning around 2009, while remaining stable for
switchers. Similar patterns were seen across total ED visits, regular-hours ED visits, and afterhours ED visits, as well as for patients presenting to the ED.
The estimated impact of switching from FHG to FHO on ED visits is presented in Table 3.4. The
results indicate that switching was associated with a decrease in the number of ED visits for
mental health reasons by 5.6%, 7.5%, and 4.6% based on the OLS, FE, and HDFE estimates.
There was a small decrease in the number of patients using the ED for mental health reasons
(3.2%, 3.9%, and 2.1% respectively), and this was not statistically significant in the HDFE
model.
During regular-hours, switching was associated with a decrease in ED visits by 6.3%, 5.8%, and
6.5% based on OLS, FE, and HDFE estimates. Switching was associated with a decrease in the
number of patients by 3.8%, 1.8%, and 3.4%, but the FE model was not statistically significant.
During after-hours, switching was associated with a decrease in after-hours ED visits by 5.4%,
7.1%, and 1.2% based on the OLS, FE, and HDFE estimates, and a decrease in the number of
patients using the ED by 3.4%, 3.9%, and 0.9%. Only the OLS and FE estimates were
statistically significant. Overall, switching from FHG to FHO was associated with a slight
decrease in ED visits for mental health, and this seems to be driven largely by a decrease in
regular-hours ED visits. However, switching did not appear to significantly impact the number of
patients using the ED.
3.5.3 Subgroup Analyses
Subgroup analyses were conducted to determine whether provision of mental health services in
primary care or ED visits for mental health reasons differ based on physician sex, physician age
(< 50 or > 50 years old as of April 1st 2007), or timing of switch (April 1st 2007 to March 31st
2009, or April 1st 2009 to March 31st 2016). The PS-weighted results are presented in percentage
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ranges. Unweighted and EB-weighted coefficients are available in Appendix A3.3. No
statistically significant differences were found between subgroups, based on overlapping 95%
confidence intervals, but some differences in magnitude of the effects were found and are
discussed.
Sex. The PS-weighted estimates on switching from FHG to FHO for male and female physicians
are presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. Overall, male and female switchers, compared to the
respective non-switchers, have comparable changes in the provision of overall mental health
services and regular-hours mental health services. Female switchers tended to have a larger
increase in the number of services provided during after-hours (31.3% to 57.5%) compared to
male switchers (10.2% to 30.6%). This gap was also seen for value of mental health services
provided during after-hours (female physicians: 53.6% to 119.8%; male physicians: 22.7% to
57.6%). As previously discussed, switchers may provide more after-hours care because they are
more incentivized by the premium than non-switchers. It is possible that female switchers are
responding to incentives to a greater extent than male switchers, given that female switchers
were providing slightly fewer after-hours services at baseline (in 2007/2008) compared to male
switcher. As seen in Table 3.6, switching to FHO is associated with a slightly larger decrease in
ED visits for male switchers (5.2% to 9.9%) compared to female switchers (4.0% to 5.2%), with
similar differences seen in regular-hours and after-hours ED visits.
Age. Younger physicians who switched to FHO had a slightly larger change in the number and
value of mental health services provided compared to older physicians who switched, though the
ranges overlap and thus this difference is likely non-significant (see Tables 3.7 and 3.8). On
average, younger switchers provided 12.9% to 16.3% fewer total mental health services
compared to younger non-switchers; for older physicians, switchers provided 9.3% to 14.9%
fewer total mental health services. Similar trends are seen for after-hours and regular-hours
services, as well as the value of mental health services. Younger FPs may be more likely to
drastically change their practice patterns upon switching, whereas older FPs may be less prone to
such changes. They did not differ substantially in overall or after-hours ED visits for mental
health reasons by patients, although older physicians who switch had a larger decrease in number
of patients who present to the ED during regular-hours (3.6% to 6.3%), compared to younger
physicians who switch (0.6% to 3.6%). One possible explanation may be that older switchers
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may be relatively more motivated and may work more hours compared to older non-switchers
who may have chosen to not switch because they are preparing for retirement and thus choose to
work fewer hours. In comparison, younger switchers may not differ as much from younger nonswitchers in this regard, and hence have a smaller difference.
Timing of switch. In this subgroup analysis, all non-switchers were compared to either those
who switched in the first two fiscal years (early switchers; N = 662) or those who switched in the
last seven years (late switchers; N = 758) to determine whether the effect sizes were different
between the groups. Early switchers appeared to be largely comparable to later switchers in total
and regular-hours mental health services; however, the increase in number of after-hours services
was smaller for early switchers (15.0% to 26.7%) compared to late switchers (23.6% to 49.7%),
with value following a similar pattern. It is possible that later switchers may be more
incentivized to provide after-hours care compared to early switchers. Both groups had similar
coefficients for ED visits, as seen in Table 3.10; early switchers had slightly larger decreases in
the number of patients using the ED during regular-hours (4.6% to 5.1%) compared to late
switchers (0.07% to 2.4%).
3.5.4 Findings From Other Covariates
Detailed regression results, including coefficients from the covariates, can be found in Appendix
B. Some covariates were significantly associated with the outcomes. Covariates that were
consistently associated with outcomes in FE and HDFE regressions are discussed below.
Mental health service provision in primary care. FPs were likely to provide a higher quantity of
mental health services (total, as well as during regular-hours and after-hours) if they were
female, Canadian medical graduates, their patients were on average sicker (as measured by the
average ADG score in the practice), and if they had more patients with chronic mental illness.
After-hours service provision tended to be higher with smaller group sizes. The value of mental
health services provided followed the same trends as the results of number of mental health
services.
Female FPs may be more comfortable with treating mental illnesses, particularly in providing
counselling services, compared to male FPs who may prefer treating solely through
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pharmacotherapy.56 International medical graduates may be provided less training regarding
mental illness, or be less comfortable in treating mental illnesses due to cultural differences. It is
possible that the higher ADG score also reflects a higher proportion of patients with co-morbid
mental illness who use more mental health services. Lower after-hours service provision in larger
physician groups may be due to fewer members providing most of the after-hours care. Each
physician group is expected to provide a minimum number of after-hours care; however, it is not
necessary for all FPs within the group to work after-hours.
Enrolling patients with SMI. FPs were more likely to have a greater number of patients with
SMI if they had a higher average ADG score among their patients, more patients in the bottom
two quintiles on the Ethnic Concentration Score, and had a greater proportion of patients with
chronic mental illness. Mental disorders are included in ADG scores and patients with SMI are
also more likely to have physical health illnesses, so it is unsurprising that higher average ADG
score is associated with more enrolled patients with SMI. Interpretation of the ethnic
concentration score is slightly difficult, as it is based on area-level measures. One interpretation
could be that having more patients in the bottom two quintiles of the Ethnic Concentration Score
indicates having fewer ethnic minorities as enrolled patients. Different ethnic groups have been
found to have different rates of incidence for schizophrenia: for example, Canadian migrants
from East Asia tend to have lower incidence rates compared to the general population. However,
this trend is not consistent for other ethnic groups, such as migrants from the Caribbean and
Bermuda who tend to have a higher incidence. Furthermore, refugees from certain groups tend to
have a higher rate of psychotic disorders.57 Since the ethnic concentration variable is a broad
composite measure based on area-level data, it is unclear if this finding is due to minority
groups’ differences in incidence of serious mental illnesses. A study found that immigrant status,
particularly those living in an area with a high ethnic concentration score was associated with
lower incidence of mental illnesses, including schizophrenia. 58
ED visits for mental health reasons. ED visits for mental health reasons was higher among FPs
with: smaller group sizes, with a younger average patient age, higher average ADG scores,
patients in the bottom two quintiles of the Material Deprivation Score, patients in the bottom two
quintiles of the Ethnic Concentration Score, and patients with chronic mental illness. This was
consistent across analyses of total, regular-hours and after-hours, with one exception: the
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proportion of patients with chronic mental illness was not statistically significant in the HDFE
for after-hours ED visits. When the number of patients was assessed, the covariates were
significant in the same directions. In addition, FPs with a greater proportion of patients over 65
years old also tended to have more patients who used the ED for mental health reasons.
Proportion of patients over 65 was not significant for the regular-hours ED visit regression, but
was significant for the after-hours ED visit regression.
Previous research on ED visits has also found that non-ethnic minorities, as well as sicker
patients, tend to use the ED more frequently, which aligns with the results of our study. 59 It is not
clear why ethnic minorities tend to less likely use the ED; some potential reasons could be
stigma, worries about language barrier, or the cultural acceptability of ED care. Having a smaller
physician group size may suggest access to relatively fewer FPs in the practice, which may lead
to increased use of the mental health-related ED visits. Greater material deprivation was
associated with lower use of the ED for mental health reasons, which aligns with previous
research on overall ED usage.60 These patients may be using the ED, rather than primary care,
for a variety of reasons, such as lack of having a FP or real or perceived difficulties in accessing
their FP. In general, older patients tend to use the ED more than younger patients. 61 In an
Australian study that interviewed older patients who used the ED, 59% expressed difficulties
accessing after-hours primary care without using the ED.62 It is possible that Canadian seniors
also have a real or perceived difficulty in seeing their FP during after-hours, and thus turn to the
ED.

3.6 Discussion
We found that FPs who switched from FHG to FHO tended to provide fewer mental health
services compared to FPs who remained in FHG. Previous research has documented that FHO
physicians provide fewer overall health services compared to physicians in FHGs, 63,64 and our
results found that this result holds true for mental health services. The previous studies found
decreases of 9% to 15% in capitated services and increases of 10% to 22% in FFS and afterhours services. Although an earlier study found capitation to be associated with lower provision
of after-hours care compared to FFS,65 this may be due to the fact that this study was conducted
when capitation was relatively new – the FPs then may have been unfamiliar with capitation and
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were still adjusting. The after-hours premium is also now higher in value, which may have
increased FPs’ provision of after-hours care. Mental health services are within the capitated
basket, and we found an overall decrease of around 12% to 14%, and an increase in after-hours
services of 21% to 40%.
Service provision may decrease during regular hours but increase during after-hours because of
differences in incentive. FPs in FHO will only earn 15% of the FFS payment for providing
capitated services during regular-hours, but can earn additional 20 to 30% more if they provide
these same services during after-hours: therefore, they may choose to provide greater quantity of
those services during after-hours. In comparison, FPs in FHGs already earn 100% FFS value of
services provided during regular-hours. Thus, although FHGs and FHOs have the same
requirements and incentives for after-hours care, it is possible that FPs in FHOs respond more
strongly to the incentives; FPs under blended capitation have been found to be more responsive
to incentives than FPs under blended FFS for other premiums, such as the diabetes management
incentive66 and for cancer screening.50 Differences in team composition may also play a factor,
as some FHO practices are team-based and patients may be receiving mental health services
from non-physician providers, such as nurses or mental health workers. Thus, patients with FHO
FPs may be obtaining mental health services from these non-physician providers during regular
hours. After-hours availability may be used as a measure of accessibility, and Canada is notably
below average compared to many other developed countries; however, this has been improving
in recent years, and Ontario now has the highest proportion of FPs who report having after-hours
availability compared to other provinces, possibly due in part to these new payment models. 67
Furthermore, this increase in after-hours service provision may be related to the reduction in ED
visits, as discussed below.
Our results are consistent with some previous studies, 33–35 but are inconsistent with others.32,36 A
decrease in mental health service provision under capitation was found in the general population
by Xiang et al.,33 and patients with SMI by Popkin et al. and Steele et al.34,35 Stoner et al. found
no difference in the general population, but notably had differences in baseline number of mental
health outpatient visits (those who switched from FFS to capitation had more visits than FFS in
the pre-switch period) which may be confounding their results. 32 Warner and Huxley also did not
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find a significant difference in their study of SMI patients, but this could have been due to their
relatively small sample size and study design. 36
The analysis of enrolled patients with SMI found that switchers tended to roster relatively fewer
patients with SMI, though this finding was not statistically significant in the HDFE model. This
is similar to a previous study by Steele et al., who found the proportion of patients with SMI in
blended capitation to be slightly lower than blended FFS but was non-significant at the 5%
level.68 FPs in blended capitation may tend to enroll healthier patients, but this may be partially
offset by a premium FPs can receive if they roster a minimum number of patients with
SMI.20,22,48 Whether FPs in FHOs are sending their patients to psychiatrists as a means of offloading high-needs patients was also examined. Our results indicate that this is not occurring,
which is in contrast to previous research on overall referrals to specialists by switchers compared
to non-switchers.29 This may be due to a shortage of psychiatrists available to refer patients. In
Ontario, the median wait time for a psychiatrist is 73 days with a 75 th percentile of 231.5 days,69
and both physicians and patients report being frustrated by long waiting lists for psychiatrists. 70
It is thus possible that FPs in FHOs may not be referring more than FPs in FHGs because of
access difficulties.
Finally, ED use for mental health reasons was also assessed, as an alternative form of mental
healthcare that patients may use if their needs are not being met in primary care. Despite
capitation FPs providing fewer mental health services, their patients did not use the ED more
frequently: in fact, there was a slight decrease in the number of ED visits, though only by a few
percentage points. This is similar to the previous study by Catalano et al., who also found
capitation to be associated with a decrease in psychiatric ED use in the general population. 38 In
comparison, studies assessing patients with SMI have found no difference in ED use for mental
health reasons between capitation and FFS. 35,39 It is possible that capitation may lead to better
quality of care for patients with milder mental illnesses, leading them to utilize the ED less often;
but this benefit may not apply to patients with more severe mental illnesses, and thus their usage
of the ED does not decline. One explanation for our findings may be that under FHG, FPs are
incentivized to provide unnecessary mental health services to increase their income; though they
provide more services, their patients still turn to the ED because they may not be receiving the
treatment they need. In comparison, FHO FPs provide only the necessary treatment because they

57
are not incentivized to over-provide, and patients who receive their needed treatment are less
likely to come in again, leading to less work for the FP. We also found that this decrease appears
to primarily occur during regular hours, as there was no statistically significant difference
between remuneration models on the number of ED visits during after-hours. This may reflect
improved access in FHO primarily during regular hours, or mental health workers in team-based
FHOs providing mental health services during regular hours rather than the FPs. There was also
no statistically significant effect of remuneration model on the number of patients who utilized
ED services. It is possible that under FHO, patients may still use ED services but may make
fewer visits compared to patients under FHG. Switcher FPs may be providing better quality of
mental health services, and thus their patients go to the ED for mental health reasons less often.
Switchers may also have better accessibility, such as allowing patients to come in on shorter
notice or being more likely to provide after-hours care, which would also encourage patients to
come to them first rather than go to the ED. Previous studies have found that 54% of Ontarians
report difficulty accessing care during after-hours without going to the ED, and 42% state their
most recent ED visit could have been avoided if they could have seen their provider. 71 It is thus
possible that because switcher FPs are providing more after-hours services, they are reducing the
number of avoidable ED visits by their patients.
These analyses were based on the assumption that having at least 200 enrolled patients indicated
the physician was working full-time as a FP. To assess the sensitivity of this assumption,
analyses using different minimum number of enrolled patients were conducted: (1) at least 100
enrolled patients in all years, and (2) at least 500 enrolled patients in all years. The results of
these sensitivity analyses were largely consistent with the main results, with a few exceptions.
When only physicians who had at least 500 patients were analyzed, switchers had significantly
fewer patients with SMI based on the PS-weighted FE and HDFE analyses (decreased by 9.8%
and 5.5% respectively), while the OLS regression was statistically non-significant (decreased by
4.3%). They also had significantly fewer patients who went to the ED for a mental health reason:
the PS-weighted OLS, FE, and HDFE regressions found statistically significant decreases of
3.7%, 3.5%, and 2.9% respectively.
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3.6.1 Comparisons Across Models
Multiple analyses were employed for each outcome to examine the effects of controlling for
various confounders. From unweighted to PS-weighted results, one can see the effect of
controlling for selection bias, while comparing PS-weighted to EB-weighted results indicates the
effect when differences between groups on these baseline covariates are forced to zeros. The PSweighted results were usually substantially different from the unweighted results, highlighting
the importance of accounting for selection bias. The EB-weighted regressions produced very
similar results to the PS-weighted regressions, indicating the robustness of our conclusions.
The OLS regression shows the results if repeated measures are not taken into account; the FE
regression controls for repeated measures by controlling for the time-invariant physician-specific
factors, and the HDFE regression goes a step further by controlling for time-variant physicianspecific factors. In general, the FE results were considerably different from the OLS. For mental
health services in primary care, the FE model resulted in larger magnitudes of effect, indicating
that unobservable time-invariant physician factors influence these outcomes and if not controlled
for may partially mask the effect of FHO. The HDFE regressions were usually very similar to the
FE results, with a few exceptions. One was after-hours mental health services in primary care
and after-hours ED visits: the magnitude of the HDFE coefficients were much smaller than the
corresponding FE results. Another exception was enrolling patients with SMI, which also
decreased the magnitude of the effect to the point the difference between switchers and nonswitchers was statistically non-significant. This may indicate the impact of time-varying
physician-specific factors on after-hours care and enrolling of patients with SMI.
3.6.2 Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research
This study adds to the literature assessing the relationship between blended physician
remuneration models and mental health service utilization in the general population in a publicly
funded health care system. This is the first study to use longitudinal data from Ontario and quasiexperimental methods that control for confounding. As the analysis covered nine years of data,
this provides time for switchers to adjust to their new model. The quasi-experimental design
ensures that switchers and non-switchers were more similar at baseline, and thus these findings
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provide stronger evidence for a potential causal relationship between blended remuneration
models and provision of mental health services.
This study has some limitations. Although baseline characteristics of patients and physicians as
well as outcomes were controlled for using PS weighting, there may still be some unmeasured
differences between two groups that could be impacting these findings; thus, a definite causal
conclusion cannot be made. The conclusions drawn are also based on the assumptions that the
propensity score model was correctly specified, and that the untested conditional independence
assumption holds true. These statistical methods also required us to only include physicians who
had data for every year; therefore, these findings may not apply to other FPs. Furthermore, we
can only account for observable characteristics that are available in the ICES databases. Other
non-observable characteristics that may influence physician switching and/or service provision
were not accounted for; for example, physicians may be more likely to switch if their peers have
switched. We applied a log transformation for simplicity and because it allowed us to use the
HDFE analysis and easier interpretation of the regression results; however, it is possible that a
different transformation would have fitted the data better but cumbersome to interpret the
coefficients. The number and value of services were assessed, but it is not clear if the efficiency
and/or quality of the services provided by switchers versus non-switchers is the same, which is
an area for future research. Descriptive analyses of the proportion of patients with chronic mental
illness do suggest FHO FPs are under-rostering such patients compared to FHG FPs (Appendix
A3.4, Table A3.21). We controlled for the proportion of patients with chronic mental illness and
average ADG score in the practice in our PS model as well as the regressions, but these may not
be perfect for adjusting for patient complexity. The proportion of patients with chronic mental
illness does not take into account patient severity, which is another limitation of this
measurement: it would not distinguish between a patient group that has a 20% prevalence of
mild depression, from a patient group that has a 20% prevalence of severe schizophrenia.
Though this would likely be at least partially adjusted through the SMI and/or ADG covariates, it
may not be a sufficient adjustment. Though the finding that there was no increase in ED visits for
mental health reasons under capitation is promising, further research on patient outcomes is
needed to determine whether capitation leads to more efficient care for patients with mental
illness. Another potential source of confounding is the issue of team-based capitation.
Approximately half of physicians in FHO work in groups known as Family Health Teams, and
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some groups include a mental health worker. 72 It is possible that the decline in mental health
services found in switchers is because some mental health services are provided by the mental
health workers instead of the FPs. Being in a team-based model with a mental health worker may
have an impact, especially patients with SMI. 35 As more than three million Ontarians are
enrolled across over 180 Family Health Teams, it is important to understand the impact of teambased models.73 This study only assessed services provided by the FP due to our use of billings
data. Finally, there is the possibility that physicians under FHO may not be submitting all
shadow billings, especially for patient visits with multiple problems. Thus, we may not have
captured all mental health services provided by FHO FPs.
Despite these limitations, this study provides evidence towards how different blended
remuneration models may influence overall mental health service provided by FPs. Our results
suggest that blended capitation may be one way to reduce mental health service overprovision by
FPs without causing patients to turn to the ED as a source of care. Developing a clearer
understanding of how these remuneration models impact FPs’ provision of mental health
services can help not only Canadian policymakers make informed decisions about how to pay
doctors to achieve better healthcare, but also provide potentially applicable lessons to other
OECD countries with publicly funded healthcare systems. Future studies should assess
differences between remuneration models in more detail, such as between different mental
illnesses, provision different types of treatment (e.g. counselling, pharmaceutical treatment), and
the impact of other health care providers such as other members of teams in team-based FHOs
and psychiatrists.

3.7 Conclusions
Our findings suggest that FPs in blended capitation tend to provide fewer mental health services,
but provide more after-hours care relative to FPs in blended FFS. Despite this decrease in service
provision, FPs in blended capitation model are not referring their patients to psychiatrists more
often, and their patients are not using the ED for mental health reasons relative to blended FFS.
This indicates that their patients are not turning to psychiatrists or the ED as a substitute for
primary care, which may reflect a reduction in service overprovision rather than a reduction in
needed services.
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3.8 Table and Figures
Table 3.1: Characteristics of Family Health Groups and Family Health Organization (modified
from Hutchison and Glazier (2013)).

Year introduced
Physician remuneration
Formal patient enrolment
Minimum group size
Governance
Interprofessional team
members
After-hours care requirements
Preventative care codes (pap
smear, mammogram,
influenza vaccination,
immunization, colorectal
cancer screening)
Fecal occult blood testing fee
Chronic disease management
(diabetes management
incentive, smoking cessation
counselling fee, heart failure
management incentive)
Premiums for providing
services to rostered patients
diagnosed with serious
mental illness (bipolar
disorder or schizophrenia)

Family Health Group
2003
Blended fee-for-service
Yes
3 physicians
Physician-led
Yes, limited
Yes
Yes

Family Health Organization
2006
Blended capitation
Yes
3 physicians
Physician-led
Yes, limited unless part of the
Family Health Team
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
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Table 3.2: t-test and standardized bias before and after propensity score (PS) weighting.
Before PS weighting
Switcher
(FHO)
Physician characteristics
Age

After PS weighting
p value of ttest before
PSM

% bias

Switcher
(FHO)

Nonswitcher
(FHG)

p value of
t-test after
PSM

% bias

% reduction
in |bias| after
PSM

51.561

<0.001

-27.4

49.020

49.369

0.309

-3.8

86.2

2486.90
2745.80
Sex (% female)
0.416
0.375
Rural (%)
0.057
0.027
IMG (%)
0.130
0.270
Group size
50.334
63.967
Expected gain in income (1000 $)
109.840
67.230
Patient characteristics (averaged per FP)
Average age
46.382
45.119
Senior (%)
17.420
15.349
Average ADG score
3.479
3.591
Female (%)
56.645
55.205
% in Q1 or Q2 of Deprivation
48.738
44.320
Score (ONMARG)
% in Q1 or Q2 of Ethnic
33.732
22.237
Concentration Score (ONMARG)
% living in rural area
9.537
4.716
% with CMI
27.763
27.370
Baseline services (2007/2008) per 1000 enrolled patients
# of MH services
372.35
419.5
# enrolled patients with SMI
6.953
5.732

<0.001
0.032
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

-27.4
8.3
15.2
-35.5
-16.7
43.0

2486.90
0.416
0.057
0.130
50.334
109.840

2521.2
0.4216
0.0740
0.1252
54.282
107.23

0.321
0.769
0.069
0.685
0.164
0.463

-3.6
-1.1
-8.5
1.3
-4.8
2.6

86.8
86.7
44.3
96.4
71.0
93.9

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.010
<0.001

28.8
25.6
-22.6
10.0
25.7

46.382
17.420
3.479
56.645
48.738

46.432
17.388
3.5
56.892
48.699

0.755
0.915
0.214
0.648
0.952

1.1
0.4
-4.4
-1.7
0.2

96.1
98.4
80.8
82.8
99.1

<0.001

49.8

33.732

34.755

0.271

-4.4

91.1

<0.001
0.321

28.2
3.9

9.537
27.763

10.345
28.327

0.315
0.123

-4.7
-5.5

83.2
-43.4

0.002
0.001

44.2
47.8

372.35
6.953

395
7.291

0.070
0.430

-5.6
-3.7

52.0
72.3

Age2

49.020

Nonswitcher
(FHG)

ADG: Aggregated Diagnostic Groups, from Johns Hopkins ACG Case-Mix System, version 10; IMG: international medical graduate; Q1: quintile 1; Q2:
quintile 2; ONMARG: Ontario Marginalization Index; CMI: chronic mental illness, defined as having had at least two outpatient or one inpatient visit for
mental health reasons in the past two years; MH: mental health; SMI: serious mental illness, defined as psychosis or bipolar disorder
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Figure 3.1. Standardized mean difference and variance ratio before and after matching.

MH serv.: mental health services; SMI: serious mental illness; IMG: international medical graduate; pats.:
patients; avg ADG: average Aggregated Diagnostic Groups; % low depriv.: proportion in Q1 or Q2 on the
Material Deprivation score; % low ethnic: proportion in Q1 or Q2 on the Ethnic Concentration score; CMI:
chronic mental illness. Full definitions are provided in the Methods.
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Figure 3.2. Average number and value of mental health services per 1,000 enrolled patients, per
FP (PS-weighted).
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Table 3.3: Coefficient of FHO on the number and value of mental health services provided, and
number of rostered patients with SMI, per 1000 enrolled patients (PS-weighted)
OLS
FE
Log of number of services
Total MH services
-0.133***
-0.149***
(-0.172, -0.093)
(-0.178, -0.119)
Regular-hours MH services
-0.137***
-0.162***
(-0.177, -0.097)
(-0.191, -0.133)
After-hours MH services
0.242***
0.345***
-0.122, -0.362)
(0.244, 0.445)
Log of value of services
Total MH services
-0.160***
-0.195***
(-0.213, -0.108)
(-0.237, -0.154)
Regular-hours MH services
-0.160***
-0.198***
(-0.214, -0.107)
(-0.240, -0.156)
After-hours MH services
0.473***
0.572***
(0.298, 0.647)
(0.421, 0.723)
Log of number of patients with SMI
Number of patients with
0.054
-0.083**
SMI
(-0.0304, 0.138)
(-0.138, -0.0275)

HDFE
-0.145***
(-0.171, -0.120)
-0.154***
(-0.179, -0.128)
0.186***
(0.097, 0.274)
-0.189***
(-0.220, -0.158)
-0.190***
(-0.221, -0.159)
0.299***
(0.163, 0.436)
-0.040
(-0.102, 0.0226)

Observations = 23,904; Physicians = 2,656
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects; MH:
mental health.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Figure 3.3. Average number of visits and number of patients who had emergency department
visits for mental health reasons per 1000 rostered patients, per FP (PS-weighted)
Total ED visits for mental health reasons

Pa tients who used the ED

15

10

12

8

9

6

6

4

3

2

0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Switcher

0

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Non-switcher

Switcher

Regular-hours ED visits for mental health
rea s ons

Non-switcher

Pa ti ents who used the ED during regular-hours

7

5

6

4

5
4

3

3

2

2
1

1

0

0

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Switcher

Non-switcher

Switcher

After-hours ED vi sits for mental health reasons
8

Non-switcher

Pa tients who used the ED during after-hours
6

7

5

6
4

5
4

3

3

2

2
1

1
0

0

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Switcher

Non-switcher

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Switcher

Non-switcher

67
Table 3.4: Coefficient of FHO on ED visits for mental health reasons (total visits and number of
patients) per 1000 enrolled patients (PS-weighted)

All ED visits
Regular-hours ED
visits
After-hours ED visits

All ED visits
Regular-hours ED
visits
After-hours ED visits

OLS
FE
Log of number of visits
-0.056**
-0.078***
(-0.094, -0.021)
(-0.108, -0.048)
-0.065***
-0.060***
(-0.099, -0.030)
(-0.094, -0.026)
-0.056**
-0.073***
(-0.092, -0.020)
(-0.107, -0.039)
Log of number of patients
-0.033*
-0.040**
(-0.062, -0.004)
(-0.065, -0.016)
-0.039**
-0.018
(-0.067, -0.010)
(-0.048, 0.012)
-0.035*
-0.040**
(-0.062, -0.007)
(-0.069, -0.011)

HDFE
-0.046*
(-0.086, -0.007)
-0.066**
(-0.112, -0.021)
-0.012
(-0.057, -0.032)
-0.022
(-0.054, 0.011)
-0.035^
(-0.074, 0.005)
0.009
(-0.031, 0.049)

Observations = 23,904; Physicians = 2,656
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
Tables present IRR and 95% confidence intervals.
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Table 3.5: Coefficient of FHO on the number and value of mental health services per 1000 rostered patients: by physician sex (PSweighted)

Total MH
services
MH services
during regularhours
MH services
during afterhours

-0.139***
(-0.195, -0.083)

Male physicians
Female physicians
FE
HDFE
OLS
FE
HDFE
Log of number of services
-0.143***
-0.136***
-0.123***
-0.154***
-0.155***
(-0.187, -0.101)
(-0.171, -0.101)
(-0.174, -0.071)
(-0.191, -0.117)
(-0.193, -0.118)

-0.141***
(-0.198, -0.083)

-0.156***
(-0.198, -0.113)

0.101
(-0.055, 0.257)

0.270***
(0.133, 0.406)

Total MH
services
MH services
during regularhours
MH services
during afterhours
Observations
Physicians

OLS

-0.144***
(-0.168, -0.109)

-0.132***
(-0.183, -0.081)

-0.170***
(-0.208, -0.133)

-0.164***
(-0.201, -0.127)

0.451***
(0.309, 0.594)

0.275***
(0.137, 0.413)

-0.156***
(-0.233, -0.079)

0.127*
0.459***
(0.010, 0.243)
(0.277, 0.640)
Log of value of services
-0.0181***
-0.180***
-0.158***
(-0.247, -0.116)
(-0.225, -0.135)
(-0.220, -0.096)

-0.215***
(-0.257, -0.173)

-0.200***
(-0.243, -0.157)

-0.155***
(-0.233, -0.077)

-0.184***
(-0.249, -0.119)

-0.181***
(-0.226, -0.136)

-0.159***
(-0.222, -0.097)

-0.218***
(-0.260, -0.175)

-0.201***
(-0.244, -0.158)

0.259*
(0.033, 0.485)
14,409
1,601

0.460***
(0.257, 0.664)
14,409
1,601

0.208*
(0.031, 0.386)
14,409
1,601

0.797***
(0.530, 1.063)
9,495
1,055

0.727***
(0.511, 0.943)
9,495
1,055

0.435***
(0.222, 0.648)
9,495
1,055

MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for clusters (number of physicians).
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Table 3.6: Coefficient of FHO on ED visits for mental health reasons (total visits and number of patients): by physician sex (PSweighted)

OLS
All ED visits
Regular-hours
ED visits
After-hours
ED visits
All ED visits
Regular-hours
ED visits
After-hours
ED visits
Observations
Physicians

-0.076**
(-0.125, -0.026)
-0.074**
(-0.121, -0.027)
-0.078**
(-0.128, -0.029)
0.038^
(-0.076, 0.0006)
-0.041*
(-0.079, -0.003)
-0.043*
(-0.079, -0.006)
14,409
1,601

Male physicians
Female physicians
FE
HDFE
OLS
FE
Log of number of visits
-0.104***
-0.053*
-0.054^
-0.049^
(-0.139, -0.068)
(-0.099, -0.007)
(-0.107, 0.001)
(-0.102, 0.004)
-0.091***
-0.079**
-0.062*
-0.021
(-0.131, -0.051)
(-0.130, -0.030)
(-0.113, -0.011)
(-0.080, 0.038)
-0.095***
-0.017
-0.049^
-0.049
(-0.134, -0.056)
(-0.071, 0.036)
(-0.104, 0.005)
(-0.111, 0.012)
Log of number of patients
-0.057***
-0.014
-0.043^
-0.021
(-0.085, -0.029)
(-0.051, 0.023)
(-0.088, 0.002)
(-0.065, 0.023)
-0.047**
-0.040^
-0.043*
0.019
(-0.082, -0.011)
(-0.086, 0.005) (-0.087, -0.0001) (-0.034, 0.072)
-0.052**
-0.021
-0.046*
-0.026
(-0.084, -0.019)
(-0.025, 0.067)
(-0.090, -0.001)
(-0.080, 0.026)
14,409
14,409
9,495
9,495
1,601
1,601
1,055
1,055

HDFE
-0.040
(-0.108, 0.028)
-0.052
(-0.132, 0.027)
-0.007
(-0.083, 0.069)
-0.032
(-0.089, 0.025)
-0.027
(-0.096, 0.042)
-0.008
(-0.079, 0.062)
9,495
1,055

ED: emergency department; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed -effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for clusters (number of physicians).
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Table 3.7: Coefficient of FHO on the number and value of mental health services per 1000 rostered patients: by physician age (PSweighted)

Total MH
services
MH services
during regularhours
MH services
during afterhours
Total MH
services
MH services
during regularhours
MH services
during afterhours
Observations
Physicians

Younger physicians (≤ 50 in 2007)
Older physicians (> 50 in 2007)
OLS
FE
HDFE
OLS
FE
HDFE
Number of services
-0.0167***
-0.178***
-0.138***
-0.097**
-0.125***
-0.161***
(-0.216, -0.118) (-0.209, -0.147) (-0.170, -0.107) (-0.157, -0.037) (-0.175, -0.076) (-0.204, -0.118)
-0.177***
(-0.227, -0.128)

-0.191***
(-0.222, -0.160)

-0.148***
(-0.179, -0.117)

-0.098**
(-0.159, -0.037)

-0.139***
(-0.187, -0.091)

-0.167***
(-0.210, -0.124)

0.370***
(0.209, 0.531)

0.387***
(0.260, 0.513)

0.131
(-0.040, 0.302)

0.260**
(0.097, 0.423)

0.098
(-0.039, 0.235)

-0.202***
(-0.264, -0.141)

-0.234***
(-0.269, -0.199)

0.252***
(0.135, 0.369)
Value of services
-0.182***
(-0.218, -0.147)

-0.119**
(-0.199, 0.039)

-0.167***
(-0.240, -0.094)

-0.208***
(-0.265, -0.151)

-0.204***
(-0.266, -0.142)

-0.236***
(-0.271, -0.201)

-0.184***
(-0.219, -0.148)

-0.118**
(-0.199, -0.036)

-0.170***
(-0.243, -0.097)

-0.208***
(-0.266, -0.151)

0.658***
(0.424, 0.893)
12,312
1,368

0.644***
(0.449, 0.838)
12,312
1,368

0.390***
(0.211, 0.570)
12,312
1,368

0.310*
(0.061, 0.559)
11,592
1,288

0.431***
(0.193, 0.668)
11,592
1,288

0.181^
(-0.029, 0.389)
11,592
1,288

MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for clusters (number of physicians).
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Table 3.8: Coefficient of FHO on ED visits for mental health reasons (total visits and number of patients): by physician age (PSweighted)

All ED visits
Regular-hours
ED visits
After-hours ED
visits
All ED visits
Regular-hours
ED visits
After-hours ED
visits
Observations
Physicians

Younger physicians (≤ 50 in 2007)
Older
OLS
FE
HDFE
OLS
Log of number of visits
-0.030
-0.077**
-0.037
-0.089**
(-0.081, 0.021) (-0.121, -0.033)
(-0.092, 0.018) (-0.141, -0.037)
-0.052^
-0.057*
-0.050
-0.090***
(-0.091, 0.007) (-0.106, -0.008)
(-0.115, 0.015) (-0.139, -0.041)
-0.031
-0.079**
-0.010
-0.084**
(-0.082, 0.019) (-0.129, -0.029)
(-0.072, 0.051) (-0.137, -0.031)
Log of number of patients
-0.011
-0.034^
-0.010
-0.057**
(-0.052, 0.031)
(-0.070, 0.002)
(-0.056, 0.036) (-0.097, -0.017)
-0.020
-0.006
-0.011
-0.058**
(-0.061, 0.020)
(-0.050, 0.038)
(-0.067, 0.045) (-0.098, -0.019)
-0.016
-0.040^
0.011
-0.056**
(-0.055, 0.024)
(-0.083, 0.002)
(-0.044, 0.067) (-0.095, -0.016)
12,312
12,312
12,312
11,592
1,368
1,368
1,368
1,288

physicians (> 50 in 2007)
FE
HDFE
-0.081***
(-0.122, -0.040)
-0.067**
(-0.114, -0.021)
-0.068**
(-0.114, -0.021)

-0.062*
(-0.117, -0.007)
-0.091**
(-0.153, -0.030)
-0.019
(-0.084, 0.046)

-0.049**
(-0.081, -0.016)
-0.036^
(-0.075, 0.003)
-0.040*
(-0.08, -0.0002)
11,592
1,288

-0.036
(-0.082, 0.010)
-0.065*
(-0.119, -0.011)
0.005
(-0.053, 0.062)
11,592
1,288

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects; ED: emergency department.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,368 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Table 3.9: Coefficient of FHO on the number and value of mental health services per 1000 rostered patients: by physician time of
switch (PS-weighted)

Total MH
services
MH services
during regularhours
MH services
during after-hours
Total MH
services
MH services
during regularhours
MH services
during after-hours
Observations
Physicians

Early switchers (switched before April 2009)
Late switchers (switched during/after April 2009)
OLS
FE
HDFE
OLS
FE
HDFE
Number of services
-0.141***
-0.172***
-0.133***
-0.125***
-0.152***
-0.162***
(-0.193, -0.088) (-0.213, -0.131) (-0.170, -0.095) (-0.168, -0.082) (-0.191, -0.112) (-0.195, -0.129)
-0.141***
(-0.195, -0.088)
0.180*
(0.031, 0.329)

-0.178***
(-0.218, -0.137)
0.239**
(0.102, 0.375)

-0.134***
(-0.178, -0.090)
0.355***
(0.214, 0.495)

-0.168***
(-0.207, -0.129)
0.405***
(0.280, 0.531)

-0.169***
(-0.202, -0.136)
0.214***
(0.101, 0.326)

-0.158***
(-0.227, -0.089)

-0.141***
(-0.178, -0.103)
0.142*
(0.0008, 0.284)
Value of services
-0.211***
-0.168***
(-0.269, -0.153) (-0.214, -0.122)

-0.154***
(-0.211, -0.096)

-0.197***
(-0.256, -0.138)

-0.205***
(-0.246, -0.163)

-0.158***
(-0.226, -0.087)
0.410***
(0.193, 0.628)
17,082
1,898

-0.212***
(-0.270, -0.154)
0.457***
(0.249, 0.666)
17,082
1,898

-0.154***
(-0.212, -0.096)
0.617***
(0.413, 0.822)
17,946
1,994

0.200***
(-0.259, -0.142)
0.660***
(0.473, 0.848)
17,946
1,994

-0.206***
(-0.247, -0.164)
0.366***
(0.183, 0.527)
17,946
1,994

-0.168***
(-0.214, -0.122)
0.216^
(-0.001, 0.433)
17,082
1,898

MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for clusters (number of physicians).
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Table 3.10: Coefficient of FHO on ED visits for mental health reasons (total visits and number of patients): by physician time of
switch (PS-weighted)

All ED visits
Regular-hours
ED visits
After-hours
ED visits
All ED visits
Regular-hours
ED visits
After-hours
ED visits
Observations
Physicians

Early switchers (switched before April 2009)
Late switchers (switched during/after April 2009)
OLS
FE
HDFE
OLS
FE
HDFE
Log of number of visits
-0.070**
-0.090***
-0.054^
-0.039^
-0.073***
-0.040^
(-0.112, -0.027)
(-0.137, -0.093)
(-0.116, 0.008)
(-0.085, 0.006)
(-0.109, -0.037)
(-0.089, 0.008)
-0.0708***
-0.075**
-0.069^
-0.043^
-0.045*
-0.058*
(-0.120, -0.037)
(-0.128, -0.022) (-0.137, -0.0001) (-0.085, 7.9e-06) (-0.086, 0.005) (-0.116, -0.0004)
-0.070**
-0.087**
-0.029
-0.040
-0.076***
-0.006
(-0.112, -0.028)
(-0.140, -0.034)
(-0.101, 0.043)
(-0.085, 0.005)
(-0.117, -0.035)
(-0.060, 0.048)
Log of number of patients
-0.043*
-0.067**
-0.039
-0.018
-0.034*
-0.014
(-0.077, -0.008)
(-0.106, -0.027)
(-0.091, 0.013)
(-0.053, 0.017)
(-0.063, -0.005)
(-0.052, 0.025)
-0.053**
-0.047^
-0.051
-0.017
-0.0005
-0.024
(-0.088, -0.018) (-0.095, 0.0007)
(-0.111, 0.010)
(-0.051, 0.017)
(-0.036, 0.035)
(-0.073, 0.026)
-0.045**
-0.064**
-0.010
-0.025
-0.043*
0.014
(-0.078, -0.012)
(-0.110, -0.017)
(-0.074, 0.055)
(-0.059, 0.009)
(-0.077, -0.008)
(-0.033, 0.061)
17,082
17,082
17,082
17,946
17,946
17,946
1,898
1,898
1,898
1,994
1,994
1,994

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects; ED: emergency department.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for clusters (number of physicians).
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Appendices
Appendix A3.1: Billing and diagnosis codes
Table A3.1: Billing and diagnosis codes used to capture mental health services in primary care
The OHIP database was used to capture primary care service provision. Services provided by
FPs were included if they fell into either of the following categories:
•

Any of the listed A feecodes in combination with any of the listed diagnostic codes, OR

•

Any of the listed K feecodes, regardless of diagnosis code.

Fee codes
A001
A003
A004
A007
A008
A888
A901
A005
A006
A905
A957
K005
K007
K623

Description
Minor Assess. -F.P./G.P.
Gen. Assess. -F.P./G.P.
Gen.Re-Assess-F.P./G.P.
Intermed.Assess/Well Baby Care-F.P./G.P./Paed.
Mini Assessment-F.P./G.P.
Partial Assessment Em.Dept Equivalent
Individual Care per 1/2 hr
Consultation -F.P./G.P.
Re-consultation-F.P./G.P.
General/family practice-limited consultation
Focused practice assessment - addiction medicine
Individual care per 1/2 hr
Ind. Psychotherapy per half these - GP
Cert.mental.ill.appl.psych.assess.history exam.form 1

Diagnostic code
Description
295
Schizophrenia
296
Manic depressive psychosis, involutional melancholia
297
Paranoid states
298
Other psychoses
300
Anxiety neurosis, hysteria, neurasthenia, obsessive compulsive neurosis,
reactive depression
301
Personality disorders (e.g., paranoid personality, schizoid personality,
obsessive compulsive personality)
302
Sexual deviations
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306
309
311
303
304
897
898
899
900
901
902
904
905
906
909

Psychosomatic disturbances
Adjustment reaction
Depressive or other non-psychotic disorders, not elsewhere classified
Alcoholism
Drug dependence, drug addiction
Economic problems
Marital difficulties
Parent-child problems (e.g., child-abuse, battered child, child neglect)
Problems with aged parents or in-laws
Family disruption, divorce
Educational problems
Social maladjustment
Occupational problems, unemployment, difficulty at work
Legal problems, litigation, imprisonment
Other problems of social adjustment
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Table A3.2: Diagnosis codes used to capture emergency department visits for mental health
reasons
The NACRS database was used to capture emergency department usage. A visit was included if:
• DX10CODE1 = F04 to F69, or F99, or
• X or Y codes in DX10CODE2 to DX10CODE10, and DX10CODE1 is not between F04
to F99 (captures self-harm visits)
Any codes ending with x indicate that all codes that begin with that prefix should be included;
e.g. F1x includes F10, F100, F101, etc. up until F199. Visits with suspect diagnoses were
included. Visits were excluded if they were scheduled visits or if they were transfers from
another ED.

DX10CODE1
Description
F04x
Organic amnesic syndrome, not induced by alcohol and other psychoactive
substances
F05x
Delirium, not induced by alcohol and other psychoactive substances
F06x
Other mental disorders due to brain damage and dysfunction and to physical
disease
F07x
Personality and behavioural disorders due to brain disease, damage and
dysfunction
F09x
Unspecified organic or symptomatic mental disorder
F1x
Mental and behavioural disorders due to use of substances
F2x
Schizophrenia, schizotypal disorder, psychotic disorders, schizoaffective
disorders, other nonorganic psychotic disorders
F3x
Mania, bipolar, depressive disorders, other mood disorders
F4x
Anxiety disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder, stress/adjustment disorders,
dissociative disorders, somatoform disorders
F5x
Eating disorders, nonorganic sleep disorders, sexual dysfunctions, disorders
associated with the puerperium, factors associated with other disorders classified
elsewhere, abuse of non-dependence-producing substances
F6x
Personality disorders
F99
Mental disorder, not otherwise specified
DX10CODE2
to
DX10CODE10
X6x
X7x
X80
X81

Description

Intentional self-poisoning
Intentional self-harm
Intentional self-harm by jumping from a high place
Intentional self-harm by jumping or lying before moving object
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X82
X83
X84
Y1x
Y28

Intentional self-harm by crashing of motor vehicle
Intentional self-harm by other specified means
Intentional self-harm by unspecified means
Poisoning
Contact with sharp object, undetermined intent
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Appendix A3.2: Unweighted, PS-weighted, and EB-weighted main analyses
Table A3.3a: Log of total number of mental health services per 1,000 patients (unweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.161***
(-0.198, -0.125)
0.008***
(0.004, 0.012)
0.003
(-0.012, 0.018)
-0.00007
(-0.0002, 0.00007)
0.120**
(0.0480, 0.193)
-0.119^
(-0.243, 0.005)
-0.179***
(-0.230, -0.129)
-0.0002
(-0.0005, 0.0001)
0.011
(-0.005, 0.027)
-0.009*
(-0.017, -0.0002)
0.075**
(0.028, 0.122)
-0.007***
(-0.009, -0.004)
0.003***
(0.002, 0.004)
0.004**
(0.003, 0.005)
0.002^
(-0.0001, 0.004)
0.058***
(0.056, 0.061)
-12.92**
(-20.69, -5.138)
0.617
2656
23904

FE
-0.130***
(-0.155, -0.106)
0.037***
(0.019, 0.054)
-

HDFE
-0.138***
(-0.162, -0.114)

-0.0003***
(-0.0005, -0.0002)

-0.0003
(-0.001, 0.0008)

0.011
(-0.067, 0.089)

0.094
(-0.075, 0.263)

-0.00003
(-0.0002, 0.0002)
-0.0049
(-0.021, 0.011)
0.002
(-0.005, 0.011)
0.256***
(0.191, 0.322)
-0.008*
(-0.015, -0.0003)
0.002
(-0.001, 0.006)
-0.002*
(-0.004, -0.0003)
0.005*
(0.0002, 0.010)
0.040***
(0.037, 0.044)
-68.78***
(-103.6, -33.99)
0.352
2656
23904

-0.00008
(-0.0003, 0.0001)
-0.007
(-0.030, 0.016)
0.012^
(-0.0008, 0.024)
0.258***
(0.204, 0.311)
-0.001*
(-0.019, -0.00009)
0.0006
(-0.004, 0.005)
-0.002*
(-0.004, -0.0001)
0.005
(-0.001, 0.011)
0.036***
(0.033, 0.039)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.217
2656
23904
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Table A3.3b: Log of total number of mental health services per 1,000 patients (PS-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. din Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.133***
(-0.172, -0.093)
0.012***
(0.008, 0.016)
0.017*
(0.0009, 0.034)
-0.0002*
(-0.0004, -0.00004)
0.102**
(0.027, 0.177)
-0.097
(-0.240, 0.046)
-0.163***
(-0.217, -0.108)
-0.00009
(-0.0004, 0.0002)
0.003
(-0.012, 0.018)
-0.007
(-0.016, 0.002)
0.122***
(0.068, 0.177)
-0.006***
(-0.009, -0.003)
0.003***
(0.002, 0.004)
0.004***
(0.003, 0.005)
0.001
(-0.001, 0.003)
0.0550***
(0.052, 0.058)
-19.91***
(-27.83, -12.00)
0.619
2656
23904

FE
-0.149***
(-0.178, -0.119)
0.052***
(0.031, 0.074)

HDFE
-0.145***
(-0.171, -0.120)

-0.0004***
(-0.0006, -0.0002)

-0.0007
(-0.002, 0.0005)

0.036
(-0.0585, 0.130)

0.108
(-0.068, 0.284)

-0.00006
(-0.0003, 0.0001)
-0.005
(-0.021, 0.011)
0.0003
(-0.009, 0.009)
0.290***
(0.191, 0.389)
-0.005
(-0.012, 0.002)
0.003^
(-0.0002, 0.007)
-0.002*
(-0.003, -0.00008)
0.002
(-0.005, 0.008)
0.0380***
(0.034, 0.042)
2.484***
(1.432,3.535)
0.348
2656
23904

-0.00005
(-0.0003, 0.0002)
-0.011
(-0.034, 0.013)
0.012^
(-0.002, 0.025)
0.262***
(0.195, 0.328)
-0.003
(-0.014, 0.008)
-0.0001
(-0.004, 0.004)
-0.002*
(-0.003, -0.0001)
0.002
(-0.005, 0.009)
0.0342***
(0.031, 0.038)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.212
2656
23904
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Table A3.3c: Log of total number of mental health services per 1,000 patients (EB-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.141***
(-0.180, -0.101)
0.011***
(0.007, 0.015)
0.011
(-0.007, 0.0296)
-0.0001
(-0.0003, 0.00003)
0.098*
(0.0148, 0.180)
-0.200^
(-0.437, 0.036)
-0.153***
(-0.206, -0.100)
-0.0001
(-0.0004, 0.0002)
0.004
(-0.013, 0.021)
-0.008
(-0.018, 0.002)
0.132***
(0.078, 0.186)
-0.006***
(-0.009, -0.003)
0.003***
(0.002, 0.004)
0.003***
(0.002, 0.005)
0.003
(-0.0009, 0.006)
0.053***
(0.050, 0.055)
-18.66***
(-26.95, -10.37)
0.607
2656
23904

FE
-0.145***
(-0.172, -0.118)
0.052***
(0.032, 0.0719)

HDFE
-0.140***
(-0.166, -0.114)

-0.0004***
(-0.0006, -0.0002)

-0.0003
(-0.001, 0.0009)

0.017
(-0.062, 0.096)

0.104
(-0.071, 0.279)

-0.00005
(-0.0003, 0.0001)
-0.007
(-0.024, 0.010)
0.001
(-0.007, 0.010)
0.304***
(0.232, 0.375)
-0.006^
(-0.014, 0.0009)
0.003
(-0.0009, 0.006)
-0.001
(-0.003, 0.0005)
0.004^
(-0.00004, 0.009)
0.038***
(0.034, 0.042)
-99.60***
(-138.7, -60.45)
0.358
2656
23904

-0.00008
(-0.0003, 0.0001)
-0.007
(-0.0307, 0.017)
0.009
(-0.004, 0.022)
0.291***
(0.235, 0.347)
-0.004
(-0.015, 0.007)
-0.0006
(-0.005, 0.004)
-0.001^
(-0.003, 0.0003)
0.003
(-0.004, 0.010)
0.034***
(0.030, 0.038)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.222
2656
23904
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Table A3.4a: Log of number of regular-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (unweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.167***
(-0.204, -0.130)
0.004*
(0.00003, 0.008)
0.003
(-0.012, 0.018)
-0.00007
(-0.0002, 0.00008)
0.133***
(0.0597, 0.205)
-0.138*
(-0.262, -0.015)
-0.188***
(-0.240, -0.137)
-0.0001
(-0.0004, 0.0002)
0.017*
(0.001, 0.033)
-0.010*
(-0.019, -0.001)
0.051*
(0.004, 0.099)
-0.006***
(-0.009, -0.003)
0.003
(0.002, 0.004)
0.004***
(0.003, 0.005)
0.002*
(0.0001, 0.004)
0.059***
(0.057, 0.062)
-4.537
(-12.40,3.330)
0.62
2656
23904

FE
-0.143***
(-0.167, -0.119)
0.035***
(0.017, 0.052)
-

HDFE
-0.147***
(-0.172, -0.123)
-

-0.0003***
(-0.0005, -0.0002)
-

-0.0003
(-0.001, 0.0008)
-

0.021
(-0.051, 0.092)
-

0.094
(-0.068, 0.255)
-

0.00004
(-0.0002, 0.0002)
-0.004
(-0.020, 0.012)
0.002
(-0.006, 0.010)
0.252***
(0.187, 0.318)
-0.007^
(-0.014, 0.0004)
0.002
(-0.002, 0.005)
-0.002*
(-0.004, -0.00004)
0.005*
(0.0002, 0.010)
0.041***
(0.037, 0.044)
-64.43***
(-98.97, -29.89)
0.371
2656
23904

-0.00003
(-0.0002, 0.0002)
-0.005
(-0.028, 0.018)
0.011^
(-0.002, 0.024)
0.256***
(0.202, 0.310)
-0.010^
(-0.019, 0.00008)
0.0006
(-0.004, 0.005)
-0.002^
(-0.003, 0.0001)
0.005
(-0.001, 0.011)
0.036***
(0.033, 0.040)
-

-

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.224
2656
23904
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Table A3.4b: Log of number of regular-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (PS-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.137***
(-0.177, -0.097)
0.008***
(0.004, 0.012)
0.019*
(0.003, 0.036)
-0.0002**
(-0.0004, -0.00006)
0.119**
(0.043, 0.194)
-0.121^
(-0.263, 0.020)
-0.174***
(-0.231, -0.117)
-0.00002
(-0.0003, 0.0003)
0.009
(-0.006, 0.024)
-0.00841^
(-0.017, 0.0004)
0.105***
(0.051, 0.160)
-0.006***
(-0.009, -0.003)
0.003***
(0.002, 0.004)
0.004***
(0.003, 0.005)
0.001
(-0.0006, 0.004)
0.056***
(0.053, 0.058)
-12.96**
(-20.97, -4.943)
0.621
2656
23904

FE
-0.162***
(-0.191, -0.133)
0.051***
(0.030, 0.073)

HDFE
-0.154***
(-0.179, -0.128)

-0.0004***
(-0.0006, -0.0002)

-0.0006
(-0.002, 0.0006)

0.0474
(-0.041, 0.136)

0.108
(-0.061, 0.277)

0.000004
(-0.0002, 0.0002)
-0.00339
(-0.020, 0.013)
-0.00008
(-0.009, 0.009)
0.286***
(0.188, 0.384)
-0.004
(-0.011, 0.003)
0.003
(-0.0006, 0.006)
-0.002*
(-0.003, -0.00002)
0.002
(-0.005, 0.009)
0.038***
(0.035, 0.042)
2.427***
(1.361,3.493)
0.365
2656
23904

0.00001
(-0.0002, 0.0002)
-0.00741
(-0.031, 0.016)
0.011
(-0.003, 0.024)
0.260***
(0.195, 0.326)
-0.003
(-0.014, 0.008)
0.0001
(-0.004, 0.004)
-0.002^
(-0.003, 0.00008)
0.002
(-0.005, 0.009)
0.035***
(0.031, 0.038)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.219
2656
23904
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Table A3.4c: Log of number of regular-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (EB-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.144***
(-0.184, -0.105)
0.007***
(0.003, 0.012)
0.0132
(-0.005, 0.031)
-0.0002^
(-0.0003, 0.00001)
0.111**
(0.028, 0.193)
-0.213^
(-0.442, 0.016)
-0.162***
(-0.215, -0.108)
-0.00006
(-0.0004, 0.0003)
0.009
(-0.009, 0.026)
-0.009^
(-0.019, 0.001)
0.115***
(0.061, 0.168)
-0.006***
(-0.009, -0.003)
0.003***
(0.001, 0.004)
0.004***
(0.003, 0.005)
0.003
(-0.0005, 0.006)
0.053***
(0.050, 0.056)
-11.39**
(-19.75, -3.033)
0.61
2656
23904

FE
-0.158***
(-0.184, -0.132)
0.050***
(0.032, 0.069)

HDFE
-0.148***
(-0.174, -0.122)

-0.0004***
(-0.0006, -0.0003)

-0.0002
(-0.001, 0.001)

0.0269
(-0.044, 0.098)

0.106
(-0.063, 0.274)

0.00001
(-0.0002, 0.0002)
-0.005
(-0.022, 0.011)
0.0007
(-0.008, 0.009)
0.298***
(0.227, 0.369)
-0.006
(-0.013, 0.002)
0.003
(-0.001, 0.006)
-0.001
(-0.003, 0.0004)
0.004*
(0.0002, 0.009)
0.038***
(0.034, 0.042)
-95.96***
(-133.3, -58.60)
0.376
2656
23904

-0.00002
(-0.0002, 0.0002)
-0.005
(-0.030, 0.019)
0.008
(-0.005, 0.0218)
0.288***
(0.232, 0.344)
-0.004
(-0.015, 0.007)
-0.0004
(-0.005, 0.004)
-0.001
(-0.003, 0.00052
0.003
(-0.004, 0.009)
0.034***
(0.030, 0.038)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.229
2656
23904
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Table A3.5a: Log of number of after-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (unweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
0.231***
(0.126, 0.337)
0.085***
(0.072, 0.098)
0.027
(-0.019, 0.072)
-0.0003
(-0.0007, 0.0002)
-0.093
(-0.304, 0.118)
0.363
(-0.083, 0.809)
0.107
(-0.031, 0.245)
-0.0009*
(-0.002, -0.00003)
-0.083***
(-0.127, -0.039)
0.015
(-0.007, 0.038)
0.468***
(0.338, 0.598)
-0.015***
(-0.022, -0.007)
0.006***
(0.002, 0.009)
0.0009
(-0.002, 0.004)
-0.012***
(-0.018, -0.006)
0.023***
(0.017, 0.029)
-167.2***
(-193.5, -140.9)
0.089
2656
23904

FE
0.372***
(0.281, 0.463)
0.135***
(0.079, 0.191)

HDFE
0.222***
(0.138, 0.307)

-0.0008**
(-0.001, -0.0003)

-0.003^
(-0.006, 0.0001)

-0.340
(-0.772, 0.092)

-0.090
(-0.570, 0.391)

-0.001**
(-0.002, -0.0003)
-0.062*
(-0.111, -0.014)
0.023^
(-0.002, 0.047)
0.325***
(0.191, 0.458)
-0.022**
(-0.039, -0.006)
0.008
(-0.003, 0.019)
-0.002
(-0.007, 0.003)
0.002
(-0.022, 0.026)
0.012**
(0.003, 0.021)
-265.7***
(-376.0, -155.4)
0.053
2656
23904

-0.001***
(-0.002, -0.0006)
-0.029
(-0.090, 0.032)
0.008
(-0.023, 0.038)
0.150*
(0.0282, 0.271)
-0.008
(-0.027, 0.011)
0.003
(-0.010, 0.015)
-0.007*
(-0.012, -0.001)
0.004
(-0.027, 0.034)
0.015**
(0.005, 0.025)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.013
2656
23904
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Table A3.5b: Log of number of after-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (PS-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
0.242***
(0.122, 0.362)
0.083***
(0.068, 0.099)
0.005
(-0.047, 0.0573)
-0.00003
(-0.0005, 0.0004)
-0.278*
(-0.516, -0.040)
0.328
(-0.216, 0.872)
0.177*
(0.026, 0.328)
-0.002**
(-0.003, -0.0006)
-0.101***
(-0.147, -0.055)
0.025*
(0.0009, 0.048)
0.449***
(0.296, 0.602)
-0.010*
(-0.018, -0.002)
0.005**
(0.002, 0.009)
0.001
(-0.003, 0.005)
-0.013***
(-0.021, -0.006)
0.023***
(0.016, 0.030)
-163.9***
(-195.0, -132.7)
0.242***
2656
23904

FE
0.345***
(0.244, 0.445)
0.125***
(0.055, 0.195)

HDFE
0.186***
(0.097, 0.274)

-0.0006^
(-0.001, 0.00002)

-0.005**
(-0.009, -0.002)

-0.386^
(-0.830, 0.058)

-0.115
(-0.587, 0.357)

-0.001**
(-0.002, -0.0004)
-0.074*
(-0.133, -0.0142)
0.025^
(-0.005, 0.0549)
0.363***
(0.209, 0.518)
-0.023^
(-0.046, 0.0002)
0.0003
(-0.014, 0.015)
0.002
(-0.004, 0.008)
0.007
(-0.024, 0.038)
0.013*
(0.002, 0.024)
-0.881
(-3.876, 2.115)
0.345***
2656
23904

-0.002***
(-0.003, -0.001)
-0.028
(-0.103, 0.046)
0.001
(-0.035, 0.037)
0.194**
(0.0477, 0.341)
-0.006
(-0.030, 0.017)
-0.004
(-0.019, 0.012)
-0.007*
(-0.013, -0.0006)
0.009
(-0.022, 0.040)
0.013*
(0.001, 0.024)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.015
2656
23904
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Table A3.5c: Log of number of after-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (EB-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
0.185*
(0.035, 0.335)
0.087***
(0.068, 0.107)
-0.005
(-0.075, 0.065)
0.00009
(-0.0005, 0.007)
-0.263^
(-0.544, 0.019)
0.016
(-0.886, 0.918)
0.144
(-0.030, 0.318)
-0.001*
(-0.003, -0.0002)
-0.086**
(-0.143, -0.028)
0.017
(-0.011, 0.046)
0.428***
(0.261, 0.594)
-0.010^
(-0.020, 0.0003)
0.008***
(0.004, 0.013)
-0.0004
(-0.005, 0.005)
-0.006
(-0.018, 0.007)
0.025***
(0.016, 0.033)
-172.1***
(-211.4, -132.7)
0.085
2656
23904

FE
0.330***
(0.215, 0.445)
0.138**
(0.0450, 0.231)

HDFE
0.185***
(0.088, 0.281)

-0.0007
(-0.001, 0.0002)

-0.005*
(-0.009, -0.001)

-0.361
(-0.813, 0.090)

-0.147
(-0.604, 0.310)

-0.001*
(-0.002, -0.00009)
-0.084*
(-0.156, -0.012)
0.031^
(-0.005, 0.067)
0.367***
(0.183, 0.550)
-0.008
(-0.035, 0.019)
-0.005
(-0.022, 0.012)
0.006^
(-0.001, 0.012)
0.003
(-0.031, 0.038)
0.013*
(0.001, 0.025)
-271.7**
(-455.2, -88.12)
0.059
2656
23904

-0.002***
(-0.003, -0.0009)
-0.007
(-0.091, 0.077)
-0.009
(-0.053, 0.035)
0.227**
(0.078, 0.377)
-0.0003
(-0.026, 0.025)
0.0001
(-0.016, 0.017)
-0.007*
(-0.015, -0.0001)
0.017
(-0.02, 0.055)
0.013*
(0.0007, 0.025)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.016
2656
23904
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Table A3.6a: Log of total value of mental health services per 1,000 patients (unweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.198***
(-0.243, -0.152)
0.011***
(0.006, 0.015)
0.008
(-0.011, 0.026)
-0.0001
(-0.0003, 0.00003)
0.236***
(0.150, 0.323)
-0.234**
(-0.396, -0.072)
-0.241***
(-0.301, -0.181)
-0.0001
(-0.0005, 0.0003)
0.0300**
(0.011, 0.049)
-0.015**
(-0.026, -0.005)
0.063*
(0.005, 0.122)
-0.006***
(-0.010, -0.003)
0.006***
(0.004, 0.007)
0.003***
(0.002, 0.005)
0.004***
(0.002, 0.007)
0.063***
(0.060, 0.066)
-15.17**
(-24.41, -5.940)
0.581
2656
23904

FE
-0.178***
(-0.209, -0.148)
0.043***
(0.022, 0.065)

HDFE
-0.182***
(-0.211, -0.153)

-0.0003***
(-0.0005, -0.0002)

-0.0007
(-0.002, 0.0009)

0.001
(-0.091, 0.094)

0.133
(-0.028, 0.293)

0.00003
(-0.0002, 0.0003)
0.004
(-0.016, 0.024)
0.0002
(-0.011, 0.011)
0.282***
(0.184, 0.380)
-0.007
(-0.016, 0.002)
0.002
(-0.002, 0.007)
-0.002^
(-0.004, 0.0001)
0.006*
(0.0001, 0.012)
0.043***
(0.039, 0.047)
-78.92***
(-122.4, -35.46)
0.318
2656
23904

0.00003
(-0.0002, 0.0003)
0.001
(-0.029, 0.032)
0.016
(-0.004, 0.036)
0.281***
(0.214, 0.348)
-0.008
(-0.020, 0.005)
-0.001
(-0.007, 0.005)
-0.002
(-0.004, 0.0004)
0.005
(-0.002, 0.012)
0.038***
(0.034, 0.041)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.202
2656
23904
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Table A3.6b: Log of total value of mental health services per 1,000 patients (PS-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.160***
(-0.213, -0.108)
0.015***
(0.010, 0.019)
0.024*
(0.002, 0.046)
-0.0003**
(-0.0005, -0.00009)
0.210***
(0.120, 0.300)
-0.266**
(-0.437, -0.096)
-0.231***
(-0.297, -0.165)
0.00008
(-0.0003, 0.0004)
0.021*
(0.002, 0.039)
-0.013*
(-0.023, -0.002)
0.113**
(0.039, 0.187)
-0.006***
(-0.009, -0.002)
0.006***
(0.004, 0.007)
0.004***
(0.002, 0.005)
0.004***
(0.002, 0.007)
0.059***
(0.056, 0.062)
-23.26***
(-32.83, -13.69)
0.575
2656
23904

FE
-0.195***
(-0.237, -0.154)
0.062***
(0.031, 0.093)

HDFE
-0.189***
(-0.220, -0.158)

-0.0005***
(-0.0007, -0.0002)

-0.001
(-0.003, 0.0007)

0.028
(-0.074, 0.130)

0.150^
(-0.0183, 0.319)

-0.00004
(-0.0003, 0.0002)
0.004
(-0.015, 0.024)
-0.003
(-0.016, 0.010)
0.334***
(0.170, 0.498)
-0.004
(-0.013, 0.005)
0.004^
(-0.0003, 0.008)
-0.002^
(-0.003, 0.0003)
0.003
(-0.005, 0.011)
0.041***
(0.036, 0.045)
5.038***
(3.444,6.633)
0.308
2656
23904

0.00006
(-0.0002, 0.0003)
-0.001
(-0.030, 0.028)
0.016
(-0.004, 0.035)
0.285***
(0.201, 0.368)
0.0005
(-0.014, 0.015)
-0.001
(-0.007, 0.004)
-0.002
(-0.004, 0.0004)
0.002
(-0.007, 0.011)
0.036***
(0.032, 0.040)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.195
2656
23904
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Table A3.6c: Log of total value of mental health services per 1,000 patients (EB-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.168***
(-0.217, -0.119)
0.014***
(0.009, 0.019)
0.023*
(0.002, 0.045)
-0.0003**
(-0.0005, -0.00008)
0.201***
(0.102, 0.300)
-0.349**
(-0.608, -0.090)
-0.215***
(-0.277, -0.153)
0.00004
(-0.0004, 0.0004)
0.021^
(-0.002, 0.043)
-0.013*
(-0.026, -0.0004)
0.117***
(0.049, 0.186)
-0.006***
(-0.010, -0.003)
0.005***
(0.004, 0.007)
0.00337***
(0.002, 0.005)
0.005**
(0.002, 0.008)
0.056***
(0.053, 0.060)
-21.56***
(-31.53, -11.60)
0.565
2656
23904

FE
-0.191***
(-0.225, -0.158)
0.060***
(0.035, 0.085)

HDFE
-0.183***
(-0.213, -0.153)

-0.0005***
(-0.0007, -0.0002)

-0.0006
(-0.002, 0.001)

0.007
(-0.080, 0.095)

0.143^
(-0.023, 0.310)

0.00002
(-0.0002, 0.0003)
0.003
(-0.017, 0.022)
-0.002
(-0.013, 0.009)
0.337***
(0.227, 0.446)
-0.005
(-0.014, 0.003)
0.00321
(-0.001, 0.007)
-0.0012
(-0.003, 0.0007)
0.005*
(0.0002, 0.011)
0.040***
(0.036, 0.044)
-112.5***
(-161.8, -63.23)
0.324
2656
23904

0.00003
(-0.0002, 0.0003)
-0.0001
(-0.031, 0.031)
0.013
(-0.006, 0.032)
0.316***
(0.248, 0.383)
-0.002
(-0.015, 0.012)
-0.002
(-0.008, 0.004)
-0.001
(-0.003, 0.0007)
0.003
(-0.004, 0.010)
0.036***
(0.032, 0.040)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.208
2656
23904
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Table A3.7a: Log of value of regular-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (unweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.198***
(-0.244, -0.152)
0.010***
(0.005, 0.015)
0.008
(-0.011, 0.027)
-0.0001
(-0.0003, 0.00004)
0.241***
(0.153, 0.328)
-0.241**
(-0.405, -0.078)
-0.244***
(-0.306, -0.183)
-0.00009
(-0.0005, 0.0003)
0.031**
(0.012, 0.051)
-0.016**
(-0.026, -0.005)
0.059*
(0.0004, 0.119)
-0.006***
(-0.010, -0.003)
0.006***
(0.004, 0.007)
0.003***
(0.002, 0.005)
0.005***
(0.002, 0.007)
0.063***
(0.060, 0.066)
-13.94**
(-23.31, -4.566)
0.578
2656
23904

FE
-0.181***
(-0.211, -0.151)
0.043***
(0.021, 0.065)

HDFE
-0.184***
(-0.213, -0.154)

-0.0003***
(-0.0005, -0.0002)

-0.0007
(-0.002, 0.0009)

0.00291
(-0.090, 0.096)

0.133
(-0.027, 0.293)

0.00005
(-0.0002, 0.0003)
0.005
(-0.015, 0.025)
0.0002
(-0.011, 0.011)
0.282***
(0.183, 0.380)
-0.007
(-0.016, 0.002)
0.002
(-0.002, 0.006)
-0.002^
(-0.004, 0.0002)
0.006*
(0.00009, 0.012)
0.043***
(0.039, 0.047)
-78.02***
(-121.6, -34.46)
0.318
2656
23904

0.00004
(-0.0002, 0.0003)
0.002
(-0.028, 0.033)
0.016
(-0.004, 0.036)
0.280***
(0.214, 0.347)
-0.008
(-0.020, 0.005)
-0.001
(-0.007, 0.005)
-0.002
(-0.004, 0.0004)
0.005
(-0.002, 0.012)
0.038***
(0.034, 0.042)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.199
2656
23904
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Table A3.7b: Log of value of regular-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (PS-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.160***
(-0.214, -0.107)
0.014***
(0.009, 0.019)
0.025*
(0.003, 0.047)
-0.0003**
(-0.0005, -0.00009)
0.215***
(0.124, 0.305)
-0.275**
(-0.447, -0.103)
-0.236***
(-0.305, -0.167)
0.0001
(-0.0003, 0.0005)
0.022*
(0.003, 0.0401
-0.013*
(-0.024, -0.002)
0.110**
(0.036, 0.185)
-0.006***
(-0.009, -0.002)
0.006***
(0.004, 0.007)
0.004***
(0.002, 0.005)
0.005***
(0.002, 0.007)
0.059***
(0.056, 0.063)
-22.31***
(-32.06, -12.55)
0.572
2656
23904

FE
-0.198***
(-0.240, -0.156)
0.062***
(0.031, 0.093)

HDFE
-0.190***
(-0.221, -0.159)

-0.0005***
(-0.0007, -0.0002)

-0.0009
(-0.003, 0.0008)

0.030
(-0.072, 0.132)

0.151^
(-0.0172, 0.318)

-0.00002
(-0.0003, 0.0002)
0.005
(-0.015, 0.024)
-0.003
(-0.016, 0.010)
0.334***
(0.170, 0.498)
-0.004
(-0.013, 0.005)
0.004^
(-0.0004, 0.008)
-0.002^
(-0.003, 0.0003)
0.003
(-0.005, 0.0108)
0.041***
(0.036, 0.045)
5.033***
(3.431, 6.634)
0.307
2656
23904

0.00007
(-0.0002, 0.0003)
-0.00001
(-0.029, 0.029)
0.015
(-0.004, 0.035)
0.284***
(0.201, 0.368)
0.0006
(-0.0142, 0.0153)
-0.001
(-0.007, 0.004)
-0.002
(-0.003, 0.0004)
0.002
(-0.007, 0.011)
0.036***
(0.032, 0.040)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.192
2656
23904
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Table A3.7c: Log of value of regular-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (EB-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.169***
(-0.218, -0.119)
0.013***
(0.008, 0.018)
0.024*
(0.003, 0.046)
-0.0003**
(-0.0005, -0.00008)
0.204***
(0.105, 0.303)
-0.354**
(-0.613, -0.094)
-0.218***
(-0.280, -0.155)
0.00005
(-0.0004, 0.0005)
0.022^
(-0.0008, 0.044)
-0.014*
(-0.026, -0.0007)
0.114**
(0.045, 0.183)
-0.006**
(-0.010, -0.002)
0.005***
(0.004, 0.007)
0.003***
(0.002, 0.005)
0.005**
(0.002, 0.008)
0.056***
(0.053, 0.060)
-20.42***
(-30.47, -10.38)
0.563
2656
23904

FE
-0.194***
(-0.227, -0.160)
0.060***
(0.035, 0.085)

HDFE
-0.184***
(-0.215, -0.154)

-0.0005***
(-0.0007, -0.0002)

-0.0005
(-0.002, 0.001)

0.009
(-0.079, 0.097)

0.144^
(-0.022, 0.309)

0.00003
(-0.0002, 0.0003)
0.003
(-0.017, 0.023)
-0.002
(-0.013, 0.009)
0.336***
(0.226, 0.446)
-0.005
(-0.01, 0.003)
0.003
(-0.001, 0.007)
-0.001
(-0.003, 0.0007)
0.005*
(0.0002, 0.011)
0.040***
(0.036, 0.045)
-112.0***
(-161.1, -62.89)
0.325
2656
23904

0.00004
(-0.0002, 0.0003)
0.0005
(-0.031, 0.032)
0.013
(-0.006, 0.032)
0.316***
(0.248, 0.383)
-0.002
(-0.015, 0.012)
-0.002
(-0.008, 0.004)
-0.001
(-0.003, 0.0008)
0.003
(-0.004, 0.010)
0.036***
(0.032, 0.040)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.207
2656
23904
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Table A3.8a: Log of value of after-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (unweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
0.465***
(0.312, 0.618)
0.119***
(0.100, 0.138)
0.0461
(-0.020, 0.112)
-0.0005
(-0.001, 0.0001)
-0.0947
(-0.399, 0.210)
0.625^
(-0.063,1.313)
0.178^
(-0.021, 0.378)
-0.001*
(-0.003, -0.00004)
-0.101**
(-0.164, -0.038)
0.015
(-0.018, 0.047)
0.637***
(0.451, 0.823)
-0.021***
(-0.032, -0.010)
0.008***
(0.004, 0.013)
0.004^
(-0.0005, 0.009)
-0.023***
(-0.032, -0.013)
0.026***
(0.017, 0.0349)
-235.0***
(-273.5, -196.4)
0.082
2656
23904

FE
0.607***
(0.473, 0.741)
0.218***
(0.137, 0.300)

HDFE
0.355***
(0.226, 0.484)

-0.001***
(-0.002, -0.0006)

-0.006*
(-0.010, -0.001)

-0.657^
(-1.407, 0.093)

-0.179
(-0.988, 0.631)

-0.002**
(-0.003, -0.0005)
-0.079*
(-0.152, -0.006)
0.029
(-0.008, 0.067)
0.428***
(0.231, 0.624)
-0.032*
(-0.057, -0.007)
0.01
(-0.006, 0.026)
-0.002
(-0.010, 0.005)
0.003
(-0.036, 0.042)
0.013*
(0.0005, 0.025)
-430.1***
(-591.8, -268.4)
0.058
2656
23904

-0.002***
(-0.003, -0.0009)
-0.028
(-0.124, 0.067)
0.008
(-0.039, 0.055)
0.162^
(-0.020, 0.345)
-0.009
(-0.038, 0.020)
0.003
(-0.014, 0.021)
-0.009*
(-0.017, -0.0015)
0.00004
(-0.049, 0.049)
0.020**
(0.006, 0.035)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.012
2656
23904
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Table A3.8b: Log of value of after-hours mental health services per 1,000 patients (PS-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
0.473***
(0.298, 0.647)
0.119***
(0.096, 0.141)
0.020
(-0.057, 0.096)
-0.0002
(-0.0009, 0.0005)
-0.364*
(-0.715, -0.014)
0.446
(-0.425,1.316)
0.279*
(0.060, 0.498)
-0.002**
(-0.004, -0.0009)
-0.128***
(-0.196, -0.061)
0.028
(-0.006, 0.063)
0.608***
(0.389, 0.827)
-0.015*
(-0.027, -0.003)
0.008**
(0.003, 0.014)
0.004
(-0.001, 0.010)
-0.022***
(-0.035, -0.010)
0.027***
(0.017, 0.037)
-233.5***
(-279.5, -187.5)
0.097
2656
23904

FE
0.572***
(0.421, 0.723)
0.196***
(0.0932, 0.299)

HDFE
0.299***
(0.163, 0.436)

-0.001*
(-0.002, -0.00008)

-0.009***
(-0.015, -0.004)

-0.762^
(-1.551, 0.026)

-0.238
(-1.030, 0.553)

-0.002**
(-0.003, -0.0006)
-0.097*
(-0.186, -0.009)
0.033
(-0.011, 0.077)
0.476***
(0.248, 0.705)
-0.031^
(-0.065, 0.003)
0.001
(-0.020, 0.022)
0.004
(-0.005, 0.013)
0.016
(-0.040, 0.072)
0.016*
(0.0006, 0.031)
-1.821
(-6.382,2.740)
0.062
2656
23904

-0.003***
(-0.004, -0.001)
-0.029
(-0.140, 0.081)
-0.003
(-0.056, 0.051)
0.233*
(0.0196, 0.446)
-0.006
(-0.040, 0.028)
-0.003
(-0.026, 0.019)
-0.011*
(-0.021, -0.002)
0.014
(-0.040, 0.067)
0.018*
(0.0009, 0.034)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.015
2656
23904
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Table A3.8c: Log of value of after-hours mental health services, per 1,000 patients (EB-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
0.401***
(0.179, 0.624)
0.123***
(0.095, 0.152)
0.005
(-0.100, 0.110)
-0.000003
(-0.0009, 0.0009)
-0.344
(-0.763, 0.075)
0.107
(-1.207,1.421)
0.223^
(-0.036, 0.482)
-0.002*
(-0.004, -0.0002)
-0.102*
(-0.186, -0.019)
0.016
(-0.026, 0.058)
0.569***
(0.326, 0.811)
-0.015^
(-0.030, 0.00007)
0.011***
(0.005, 0.018)
0.002
(-0.006, 0.010)
-0.013
(-0.031, 0.006)
0.029***
(0.018, 0.041)
-243.4***
(-300.8, -185.9)
0.079
2656
23904

FE
0.555***
(0.380, 0.730)
0.210**
(0.076, 0.345)

HDFE
0.305***
(0.158, 0.452)

-0.001^
(-0.002, 0.0001)

-0.008**
(-0.015, -0.002)

-0.714^
(-1.500, 0.0713)

-0.286
(-1.063, 0.492)

-0.002*
(-0.003, -0.00001)
-0.113*
(-0.217, -0.008)
0.042
(-0.009, 0.094)
0.456**
(0.177, 0.736)
-0.010
(-0.050, 0.029)
-0.006
(-0.030, 0.019)
0.008
(-0.002, 0.018)
0.009
(-0.048, 0.066)
0.016^
(-0.001, 0.033)
-414.9**
(-681.7, -148.1)
0.062
2656
23904

-0.003***
(-0.004, -0.001)
0.006
(-0.120, 0.132)
-0.020
(-0.085, 0.045)
0.256*
(0.033, 0.479)
0.003
(-0.034, 0.041)
0.002
(-0.022, 0.027)
-0.011
(-0.022, -0.0006)
0.024
(-0.039, 0.088)
0.017^
(-0.0009, 0.035)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.015
2656
23904

104
Table A3.9a: Log of number of patients with SMI, per 1,000 patients (unweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
0.131***
(0.061, 0.201)
-0.00972*
(-0.017, -0.002)
0.0371*
(0.008, 0.066)
-0.0004**
(-0.0007, -0.0002)
0.106
(-0.035, 0.246)
0.324^
(-0.038, 0.686)
-0.249***
(-0.335, -0.163)
-0.0006*
(-0.001, -0.00009)
0.046***
(0.019, 0.073)
-0.013^
(-0.027, 0.002)
0.002
(-0.079, 0.084)
-0.007**
(-0.012, -0.002)
-0.007***
(-0.010, -0.005)
0.001
(-0.001, 0.003)
-0.006*
(-0.010, -0.0006)
0.021***
(0.017, 0.025)
18.55*
(3.479, 33.62)
0.089
2656
23904

FE
-0.0884***
(-0.140, -0.036)
0.0337*
(0.005, 0.063)

HDFE
-0.0413
(-0.101, 0.018)

-0.0003*
(-0.0006, -0.00005)

0.001
(-0.0008, 0.003)

-0.121
(-0.469, 0.226)

0.241
(-0.111, 0.593)

0.0001
(-0.0003, 0.0006)
0.014
(-0.013, 0.042)
-0.009
(-0.022, 0.004)
0.193***
(0.118, 0.268)
-0.018***
(-0.028, -0.008)
-0.007*
(-0.013, -0.00004)
0.003*
(0.0005, 0.006)
-0.003
(-0.020, 0.015)
0.009***
(0.004, 0.014)
-65.53*
(-122.8, -8.233)
0.017
2656
23904

0.0009**
(0.0003, 0.001)
0.011
(-0.030, 0.051)
-0.003
(-0.024, 0.018)
0.142***
(0.064, 0.221)
-0.016*
(-0.031, -0.002)
-0.006
(-0.015, 0.002)
0.004^
(-0.00003, 0.007)
-0.016
(-0.035, 0.004)
0.005^
(-0.0004, 0.011)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.008
2656
23904
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Table A3.9b: Log of number of patients with SMI, per 1,000 patients (PS-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
0.054
(-0.030, 0.138)
-0.005
(-0.014, 0.004)
0.0470**
(0.012, 0.082)
-0.0005**
(-0.0009, -0.0002)
0.118
(-0.051, 0.287)
0.248
(-0.337, 0.832)
-0.212***
(-0.316, -0.108)
-0.0006*
(-0.001, -0.00002)
0.053**
(0.016, 0.089)
-0.016^
(-0.035, 0.003)
0.042
(-0.0636, 0.147)
-0.008**
(-0.014, -0.002)
-0.007***
(-0.009, -0.004)
0.002
(-0.0007, 0.005)
-0.004
(-0.011, 0.003)
0.024***
(0.018, 0.030)
8.38
(-9.628,26.39)
0.09
2656
23904

FE
-0.083**
(-0.138, -0.028)
0.033^
(-0.0005, 0.067)

HDFE
-0.040
(-0.102, 0.023)

-0.0003^
(-0.0006, 0.00001)

0.001
(-0.0009, 0.004)

-0.070
(-0.432, 0.291)

0.263
(-0.095, 0.622)

0.0001
(-0.0004, 0.0006)
0.017
(-0.015, 0.049)
-0.011
(-0.026, 0.004)
0.199***
(0.111, 0.287)
-0.013*
(-0.025, -0.0006)
-0.012*
(-0.023, -0.002)
0.004*
(0.001, 0.008)
-0.011
(-0.031, 0.009)
0.008**
(0.003, 0.014)
0.438
(-1.217,2.092)
0.018
2656
23904

0.001***
(0.0004, 0.002)
0.013
(-0.042, 0.068)
-0.009
(-0.036, 0.018)
0.160***
(0.069, 0.252)
-0.013
(-0.032, 0.005)
-0.011^
(-0.024, 0.001)
0.005*
(0.001, 0.009)
-0.021*
(-0.042, -0.001)
0.004
(-0.002, 0.010)

0.009
2656
23904
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Table A3.9c: Log of number of patients with SMI, per 1,000 patients (EB-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
0.030
(-0.073, 0.133)
-0.011*
(-0.021, -0.0008)
0.051**
(0.0145, 0.088)
-0.0005**
(-0.0009, -0.0002)
0.175^
(-0.013, 0.363)
0.122
(-0.349, 0.593)
-0.196***
(-0.304, -0.089)
-0.0006^
(-0.001, 0.00005)
0.042*
(0.007, 0.077)
-0.012
(-0.030, 0.0072
0.055
(-0.067, 0.176)
-0.008*
(-0.014, -0.002)
-0.007***
(-0.010, -0.004)
0.003^
(-0.00002, 0.006)
-0.005
(-0.011, 0.0010
0.021***
(0.015, 0.026)
20.07*
(0.410, 39.73)
0.076
2656
23904

FE
-0.069*
(-0.126, -0.011)
0.0245
(-0.0120, 0.0610)

HDFE
-0.038
(-0.103, 0.027)

-0.0002
(-0.0006, 0.0001)

0.002^
(-0.0003, 0.004)

-0.104
(-0.450, 0.242)

0.247
(-0.111, 0.605)

0.00009
(-0.0004, 0.0006)
0.013
(-0.019, 0.045)
-0.009
(-0.025, 0.007)
0.177***
(0.087, 0.268)
-0.010
(-0.023, 0.002)
-0.011*
(-0.020, -0.0005)
0.004*
(0.0004, 0.007)
-0.005
(-0.023, 0.013)
0.009**
(0.004, 0.015)
-47.32
(-119.6, 24.99)
0.018
2656
23904

0.001**
(0.0004, 0.002)
0.005
(-0.043, 0.053)
-0.005
(-0.029, 0.019)
0.154**
(0.060, 0.248)
-0.013
(-0.031, 0.004)
-0.008
(-0.020, 0.003)
0.004*
(0.0006, 0.008)
-0.018^
(-0.038, 0.001)
0.005
(-0.001, 0.012)

0.009
2656
23904
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Table A3.10a: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients (unweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.0206
(-0.055, 0.013)
0.032***
(0.028, 0.036)
-0.014*
(-0.029, -0.0002)
0.0001^
(-0.00001, 0.0002)
0.043
(-0.026, 0.112)
-0.109
(-0.253, 0.034)
-0.098***
(-0.142, -0.054)
-0.0008***
(-0.001, -0.0005)
0.007
(-0.011, 0.024)
-0.012**
(-0.021, -0.003)
0.146***
(0.102, 0.190)
-0.010***
(-0.012, -0.007)
-0.008***
(-0.009, -0.007)
0.006***
(0.005, 0.007)
0.003**
(0.001, 0.005)
0.012***
(0.010, 0.015)
-61.20***
(-69.21, -53.18)
0.191
2656
23904

FE
-0.092***
(-0.121, -0.063)
0.037***
(0.0196, 0.0551)

HDFE
-0.048*
(-0.086, -0.009)

0.00003
(-0.0001, 0.0002)

-0.0001
(-0.001, 0.001)

-0.240**
(-0.399, -0.081)

0.032
(-0.197, 0.261)

-0.0005***
(-0.0007, -0.0003)
-0.047***
(-0.066, -0.029)
0.007
(-0.002, 0.016)
0.162***
(0.112, 0.211)
-0.004
(-0.012, 0.003)
-0.007**
(-0.011, -0.002)
0.006***
(0.004, 0.008)
0.007*
(0.001, 0.014)
0.006***
(0.004, 0.009)
-71.20***
(-106.3, -36.08)
0.038
2656
23904

-0.0002
(-0.0005, 0.0001)
-0.046**
(-0.076, -0.016)
0.014^
(-0.001, 0.030)
0.158***
(0.100, 0.217)
-0.003
(-0.014, 0.009)
-0.014***
(-0.021, -0.007)
0.003*
(0.0005, 0.006)
-0.0004
(-0.007, 0.006)
0.003
(-0.0006, 0.007)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.007
2656
23904
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Table A3.10b: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients (PS-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.058**
(-0.094, -0.021)
0.031***
(0.027, 0.036)
-0.006
(-0.021, 0.009)
0.00005
(-0.00009, 0.0002)
0.031
(-0.041, 0.103)
-0.023
(-0.250, 0.204)
-0.058*
(-0.107, -0.010)
-0.001***
(-0.001, -0.0006)
0.008
(-0.013, 0.029)
-0.013*
(-0.024, -0.002)
0.155***
(0.106, 0.204)
-0.010***
(-0.013, -0.007)
-0.009***
(-0.010, -0.008)
0.005***
(0.004, 0.006)
0.002^
(-0.000006, 0.005)
0.012***
(0.009, 0.015)
-60.34***
(-69.17, -51.51)
0.223
2656
23904

FE
-0.078***
(-0.108, -0.048)
0.031**
(0.009, 0.052)

HDFE
-0.046*
(-0.086, -0.007)

0.00008
(-0.0001, 0.0003)

0.0005
(-0.001, 0.002)

-0.246**
(-0.402, -0.090)

0.028
(-0.200, 0.257)

-0.0005***
(-0.0007, -0.0003)
-0.045***
(-0.065, -0.024)
0.005
(-0.006, 0.017)
0.115***
(0.0612, 0.168)
-0.003
(-0.0111, 0.00448)
-0.012***
(-0.017, -0.006)
0.006***
(0.004, 0.009)
0.007*
(0.00116, 0.0126)
0.008***
(0.004, 0.011)
2.398***
(1.468, 3.328)
0.036
2656
23904

-0.0003
(-0.0006, 0.00009)
-0.044**
(-0.076, -0.012)
0.014
(-0.003, 0.031)
0.122***
(0.0516, 0.192)
0.002
(-0.013, 0.016)
-0.019***
(-0.030, -0.009)
0.004**
(0.001, 0.008)
-0.003
(-0.012, 0.005)
0.002
(-0.002, 0.006)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.007
2656
23904
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Table A3.10c: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients (EB-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.061**
(-0.103, -0.020
0.033***
(0.028, 0.039)
0.0008
(-0.017, 0.018)
-0.00002
(-0.0002, 0.0001)
0.027
(-0.056, 0.109)
-0.243^
(-0.512, 0.026)
-0.060*
(-0.109, -0.010)
-0.0008***
(-0.001, -0.0005)
0.001
(-0.020, 0.022)
-0.010^
(-0.021, 0.001)
0.176***
(0.127, 0.226)
-0.010***
(-0.013, -0.007)
-0.009***
(-0.010, -0.0074
0.005***
(0.004, 0.006)
0.004*
(0.0006, 0.008)
0.009***
(0.007, 0.012)
-64.43***
(-75.28, -53.58)
0.202
2656
23904

FE
-0.085***
(-0.117, -0.054)
0.039**
(0.014, 0.064)

HDFE
-0.054**
(-0.094, -0.014)

0.00001
(-0.0002, 0.0002)

-0.0001
(-0.002, 0.002)

-0.238**
(-0.394, -0.0825)

0.028
(-0.208, 0.264)

-0.0006***
(-0.0008, -0.0004)
-0.049***
(-0.072, -0.025)
0.009
(-0.004, 0.022)
0.135***
(0.0799, 0.190)
-0.005
(-0.014, 0.003)
-0.014***
(-0.020, -0.008)
0.006***
(0.004, 0.009)
0.005
(-0.001, 0.012)
0.008***
(0.004, 0.012)
-74.12**
(-123.9, -24.36)
0.04
2656
23904

-0.0004*
(-0.0008, -0.000003)
-0.057**
(-0.09, -0.021)
0.026**
(0.007, 0.045)
0.115**
(0.043, 0.188)
-0.003
(-0.019, 0.013)
-0.020***
(-0.030, -0.010)
0.004*
(0.0005, 0.007)
-0.003
(-0.013, 0.006)
0.002
(-0.003, 0.007)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.008
2656
23904
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Table A3.11a: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons during regular-hours per 1,000 patients
(unweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.027^
(-0.060, 0.005)
0.024***
(0.021, 0.028)
-0.011
(-0.025, 0.002)
0.00008
(-0.00004, 0.0002)
0.025
(-0.040, 0.090)
-0.085
(-0.231, 0.061)
-0.093***
(-0.134, -0.053)
-0.0007***
(-0.0009, -0.0004)
0.0179*
(0.002, 0.034)
-0.0143***
(-0.022, -0.006)
0.121***
(0.0811, 0.161)
-0.008***
(-0.010, -0.005)
-0.008***
(-0.009, -0.007)
0.006***
(0.005, 0.007)
0.003***
(0.001, 0.005)
0.010***
(0.008, 0.012)
-48.13***
(-55.95, -40.30)
0.158
2656
23904

FE
-0.072***
(-0.104, -0.040)
0.029**
(0.00942, 0.0476)

HDFE
-0.069**
(-0.113, -0.025)

0.00003
(-0.0001, 0.0002)

-0.0009
(-0.002, 0.0006)

-0.209*
(-0.410, -0.007)

-0.046
(-0.399, 0.306)

-0.0004**
(-0.0006, -0.0002)
-0.0311**
(-0.051, -0.012)
0.0045
(-0.005, 0.014)
0.154***
(0.103, 0.206)
-0.005
(-0.012, 0.002)
-0.008***
(-0.012, -0.004)
0.005***
(0.003, 0.008)
0.009**
(0.004, 0.0154
0.005**
(0.001, 0.008)
-54.65**
(-92.41, -16.89)
0.019
2656
23904

-0.0002
(-0.0006, 0.0002)
-0.027
(-0.061, 0.007)
0.007
(-0.011, 0.024)
0.170***
(0.102, 0.237)
0.0004
(-0.013, 0.013)
-0.015***
(-0.023, -0.007)
0.003^
(-0.0001, 0.006)
0.002
(-0.007, 0.011)
0.003
(-0.002, 0.007)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.005
2656
23904
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Table A3.11b: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons during regular-hours per 1,000 patients (PSweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.065***
(-0.099, -0.030)
0.026***
(0.021, 0.030)
-0.004
(-0.019, 0.010)
0.00003
(-0.0001, 0.0002)
0.020
(-0.047, 0.088)
-0.015
(-0.220, 0.189)
-0.055*
(-0.101, -0.008)
-0.0009***
(-0.001, -0.0006)
0.018^
(-0.0003, 0.037)
-0.015**
(-0.024, -0.005)
0.138***
(0.093, 0.183)
-0.008***
(-0.011, -0.005)
-0.009***
(-0.010, -0.007)
0.005***
(0.004, 0.006)
0.003**
(0.001, 0.006)
0.010***
(0.007, 0.013)
-50.14***
(-59.02, -41.25)
0.196
2656
23904

FE
-0.060***
(-0.094, -0.026)
0.023^
(-0.00008, 0.045)

HDFE
-0.067**
(-0.112, -0.021)

0.00008
(-0.0001, 0.0003)

-0.0001
(-0.002, 0.002)

-0.216*
(-0.422, -0.010)

-0.042
(-0.391, 0.307)

-0.0003**
(-0.0006, -0.0001)
-0.029*
(-0.051, -0.006)
0.003
(-0.008, 0.015)
0.111***
(0.054, 0.167)
-0.003
(-0.011, 0.006)
-0.011***
(-0.017, -0.006)
0.006***
(0.003, 0.008)
0.010**
(0.003, 0.017)
0.007***
(0.003, 0.011)
1.362*
(0.319,2.404)
0.019
2656
23904

-0.0002
(-0.0007, 0.0002)
-0.020
(-0.059, 0.019)
0.003
(-0.017, 0.023)
0.120**
(0.038, 0.203)
0.009
(-0.008, 0.026)
-0.021***
(-0.032, -0.009)
0.004*
(0.0007, 0.008)
-0.003
(-0.013, 0.007)
0.002
(-0.002, 0.007)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.005
2656
23904
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Table A3.11c: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons during regular-hours per 1,000 patients (EBweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.071***
(-0.112, -0.030)
0.028***
(0.0224 0.034)
0.001
(-0.017, 0.019)
-0.00002
(-0.0002, 0.0001)
0.018
(-0.061, 0.096)
-0.201
(-0.469, 0.067)
-0.056*
(-0.105, -0.008)
-0.0007***
(-0.001, -0.0004)
0.012
(-0.008, 0.031)
-0.011*
(-0.021, -0.002)
0.155***
(0.109, 0.201)
-0.008***
(-0.010, -0.005)
-0.009***
(-0.010, -0.007)
0.005***
(0.004, 0.006)
0.005**
(0.001, 0.008)
0.008***
(0.005, 0.010)
-55.29***
(-66.68, -43.89)
0.174
2656
23904

FE
-0.072***
(-0.108, -0.036)
0.033*
(0.007, 0.059)

HDFE
-0.068**
(-0.114, -0.022)

0.000004
(-0.0002, 0.0002)

-0.0003
(-0.002, 0.002)

-0.185^
(-0.383, 0.013)

-0.026
(-0.385, 0.333)

-0.0004**
(-0.0006, -0.0001)
-0.039**
(-0.064, -0.014)
0.010
(-0.003, 0.023)
0.130***
(0.0698, 0.190)
-0.004
(-0.014, 0.005)
-0.013***
(-0.019, -0.007)
0.005***
(0.003, 0.008)
0.005
(-0.003, 0.013)
0.006**
(0.002, 0.011)
-62.65*
(-113.6, -11.74)
0.022
2656
23904

-0.0003
(-0.0008, 0.0001)
-0.036
(-0.083, 0.011)
0.015
(-0.009, 0.040)
0.116**
(0.0344, 0.198)
0.004
(-0.014, 0.022)
-0.020***
(-0.031, -0.009)
0.003^
(-0.0004, 0.007)
-0.006
(-0.018, 0.006)
0.001
(-0.004, 0.006)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.005
2656
23904
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Table A3.12a: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons during after-hours per 1,000 patients
(unweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.021
(-0.054, 0.012)
0.032***
(0.028, 0.0363
-0.010
(-0.025, 0.004)
0.00009
(-0.00004, 0.0002)
0.018
(-0.050, 0.087)
-0.089
(-0.239, 0.060)
-0.076***
(-0.118, -0.035)
-0.0007***
(-0.001, -0.0005)
0.001
(-0.0162, 0.019)
-0.011*
(-0.020, -0.002)
0.138***
(0.095, 0.182)
-0.009***
(-0.012, -0.007)
-0.008***
(-0.009, -0.007)
0.005***
(0.004, 0.006)
0.002^
(-0.0002, 0.004)
0.011***
(0.009, 0.014)
-62.58***
(-70.83, -54.33)
0.144
2656
23904

FE
-0.087***
(-0.118, -0.055)
0.046***
(0.027, 0.065)

HDFE
-0.014
(-0.057, 0.029)

-0.00003
(-0.0002, 0.0001)

0.0005
(-0.001, 0.002)

-0.238^
(-0.499, 0.024)

0.049
(-0.150, 0.248)

-0.0005***
(-0.0007, -0.0003)
-0.053***
(-0.072, -0.034)
0.007
(-0.003, 0.017)
0.153***
(0.099, 0.208)
-0.002
(-0.010, 0.005)
-0.006*
(-0.011, -0.001)
0.006***
(0.003, 0.008)
0.006
(-0.003, 0.014)
0.006***
(0.004, 0.009)
-88.61***
(-126.9, -50.28)
0.028
2656
23904

-0.0002
(-0.0005, 0.0002)
-0.059***
(-0.093, -0.026)
0.023*
(0.005, 0.041)
0.135***
(0.070, 0.201)
-0.006
(-0.018, 0.006)
-0.012**
(-0.020, -0.005)
0.004*
(0.0009, 0.007)
0.002
(-0.008, 0.012)
0.004^
(-0.0006, 0.008)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.004
2656
23904
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Table A3.12b: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons during after-hours per 1,000 patients (PSweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.056**
(-0.092, -0.020)
0.031***
(0.026, 0.036)
-0.002
(-0.018, 0.014)
0.00002
(-0.0001, 0.0002)
0.004
(-0.069, 0.078)
0.007
(-0.239, 0.252)
-0.040^
(-0.086, 0.005)
-0.0009***
(-0.001, -0.0006)
0.003
(-0.018, 0.025)
-0.013*
(-0.024, -0.001)
0.140***
(0.092, 0.189)
-0.010***
(-0.013, -0.007)
-0.008***
(-0.009, -0.007)
0.004***
(0.003, 0.005)
0.001
(-0.002, 0.004)
0.011***
(0.008, 0.0146)
-60.33***
(-69.55, -51.11)
0.163
2656
23904

FE
-0.073***
(-0.107, -0.039)
0.041**
(0.016, 0.065)

HDFE
-0.012
(-0.057, 0.032)

-0.000007
(-0.0002, 0.0002)

0.001
(-0.001, 0.003)

-0.245^
(-0.499, 0.010)

0.044
(-0.157, 0.244)

-0.0005***
(-0.0008, -0.0003)
-0.050***
(-0.072, -0.0275)
0.005
(-0.007, 0.018)
0.107***
(0.046, 0.169)
-0.003
(-0.011, 0.005)
-0.011***
(-0.017, -0.006)
0.006***
(0.003, 0.009)
0.005
(-0.003, 0.012)
0.007***
(0.003, 0.011)
1.914***
(0.910, 2.917)
0.026
2656
23904

-0.0003
(-0.0007, 0.00009)
-0.058**
(-0.094, -0.022)
0.024*
(0.004, 0.044)
0.111**
(0.035, 0.187)
-0.006
(-0.020, 0.009)
-0.018***
(-0.028, -0.008)
0.005**
(0.001, 0.008)
0.0002
(-0.012, 0.012)
0.002
(-0.003, 0.007)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.005
2656
23904
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Table A3.12c: Log of ED visits for mental health reasons during after-hours per 1,000 patients (EBweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.054**
(-0.095, -0.014)
0.032***
(0.026, 0.037)
0.006
(-0.011, 0.023)
-0.00006
(-0.0002, 0.0001)
0.004
(-0.079, 0.086)
-0.235^
(-0.495, 0.024)
-0.044^
(-0.091, 0.004)
-0.0008***
(-0.001, -0.0004)
-0.004
(-0.025, 0.017)
-0.009^
(-0.020, 0.002)
0.162***
(0.112, 0.211)
-0.010***
(-0.013, -0.0067
-0.008***
(-0.009, -0.007)
0.004***
(0.003, 0.005)
0.003
(-0.0007, 0.006)
0.009***
(0.006, 0.012)
-61.84***
(-72.77, -50.90)
0.147
2656
23904

FE
-0.073***
(-0.109, -0.037)
0.048**
(0.019, 0.077)

HDFE
-0.026
(-0.072, 0.020)

-0.00008
(-0.0003, 0.0002)

-0.0003
(-0.002, 0.002)

-0.264*
(-0.517, -0.011)

0.024
(-0.182, 0.230)

-0.0007***
(-0.001, -0.0004)
-0.049***
(-0.075, -0.023)
0.006
(-0.008, 0.021)
0.123***
(0.0577, 0.189)
-0.005
(-0.014, 0.004)
-0.012***
(-0.019, -0.006)
0.006***
(0.003, 0.009)
0.008^
(-0.00005, 0.016)
0.008***
(0.005, 0.012)
-92.17**
(-149.2, -35.13)
0.028
2656
23904

-0.0004^
(-0.0009, 0.00003)
-0.066**
(-0.107, -0.025)
0.034**
(0.013, 0.055)
0.097*
(0.006, 0.187)
-0.010
(-0.026, 0.007)
-0.018***
(-0.028, -0.008)
0.004*
(0.0002, 0.007)
0.004
(-0.008, 0.016)
0.004
(-0.003, 0.010)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.006
2656
23904
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Table A3.13a: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients (unweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
0.002
(-0.025, 0.029)
0.024***
(0.020, 0.027)
-0.010^
(-0.021, 0.001)
0.00008
(-0.00002, 0.0002)
0.040
(-0.014, 0.093)
-0.147*
(-0.269, -0.025)
-0.081***
(-0.116, -0.045)
-0.0006***
(-0.0009, -0.0004)
-0.004
(-0.018, 0.010)
-0.006^
(-0.013, 0.0005)
0.119***
(0.084, 0.155)
-0.008***
(-0.010, -0.006)
-0.007***
(-0.008, -0.006)
0.006***
(0.005, 0.007)
0.004***
(0.002, 0.005)
0.010***
(0.008, 0.012)
-44.77***
(-51.02, -38.51)
0.212
2656
23904

FE
-0.050***
(-0.073, -0.027)
0.031***
(0.017, 0.045)

HDFE
-0.020
(-0.052, 0.011)

0.000005
(-0.0001, 0.0001)

-0.0003
(-0.001, 0.0008)

-0.197**
(-0.337, -0.057)

-0.002
(-0.162, 0.157)

-0.0004***
(-0.0006, -0.0002)
-0.044***
(-0.059, -0.029)
0.007^
(-0.0001, 0.014)
0.131***
(0.090, 0.173)
-0.004
(-0.010, 0.002)
-0.005**
(-0.009, -0.001)
0.005***
(0.003, 0.007)
0.010***
(0.005, 0.014)
0.005***
(0.003, 0.007)
-58.47***
(-85.64, -31.30)
0.033
2656
23904

-0.0001
(-0.0004, 0.0001)
-0.038**
(-0.062, -0.014)
0.008
(-0.004, 0.021)
0.140***
(0.091, 0.190)
-0.002
(-0.011, 0.008)
-0.009**
(-0.014, -0.003)
0.002
(-0.0004, 0.005)
0.004
(-0.001, 0.010)
0.003
(-0.0008, 0.006)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.005
2656
23904
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Table A3.13b: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients (PSweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.033*
(-0.062, -0.004)
0.024***
(0.020, 0.027)
-0.004
(-0.016, 0.008)
0.00004
(-0.00007, 0.0002)
0.036
(-0.020, 0.093)
-0.103
(-0.279, 0.0719)
-0.048*
(-0.086, -0.009)
-0.0008***
(-0.001, -0.0005)
-0.004
(-0.020, 0.012)
-0.007^
(-0.015, 0.0008)
0.130***
(0.091, 0.168)
-0.008***
(-0.010, -0.006)
-0.007***
(-0.008, -0.006)
0.005***
(0.004, 0.006)
0.004***
(0.002, 0.006)
0.009***
(0.007, 0.012)
-45.22***
(-52.17, -38.27)
0.249
2656
23904

FE
-0.040**
(-0.065, -0.016)
0.024**
(0.009, 0.040)

HDFE
-0.022
(-0.054, 0.011)

0.00006
(-0.00008, 0.0002)

0.0003
(-0.001, 0.002)

-0.200**
(-0.339, -0.0602)

-0.003
(-0.161, 0.154)

-0.0004***
(-0.0005, -0.0002)
-0.044***
(-0.060, -0.029)
0.006
(-0.002, 0.014)
0.091***
(0.0467, 0.136)
-0.003
(-0.009, 0.003)
-0.008***
(-0.013, -0.004)
0.005***
(0.003, 0.007)
0.009***
(0.004, 0.014)
0.006***
(0.003, 0.008)
2.473***
(1.708,3.237)
0.031
2656
23904

-0.0002
(-0.0005, 0.0001)
-0.039**
(-0.065, -0.014)
0.008
(-0.006, 0.022)
0.100***
(0.042, 0.157)
0.003
(-0.008, 0.013)
-0.012***
(-0.019, -0.005)
0.003*
(0.0004, 0.006)
0.002
(-0.006, 0.009)
0.001
(-0.002, 0.005)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.005
2656
23904
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Table A3.13c: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients (EBweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.039*
(-0.073, -0.005)
0.025***
(0.021, 0.030)
0.002
(-0.013, 0.017)
-0.00002
(-0.0002, 0.0001)
0.038
(-0.0276, 0.104)
-0.248*
(-0.468, -0.028)
-0.048*
(-0.087, -0.009)
-0.0007***
(-0.001, -0.0004)
-0.007
(-0.023, 0.009)
-0.006
(-0.014, 0.003)
0.146***
(0.106, 0.187)
-0.008***
(-0.010, -0.006)
-0.008***
(-0.009, -0.006)
0.005***
(0.004, 0.006)
0.004**
(0.002, 0.007)
0.007***
(0.005, 0.010)
-48.71***
(-57.68, -39.74)
0.227
2656
23904

FE
-0.047***
(-0.074, -0.020)
0.031**
(0.010, 0.052)

HDFE
-0.029^
(-0.063, 0.005)

0.00001
(-0.0002, 0.0002)

-0.0002
(-0.002, 0.001)

-0.196**
(-0.336, -0.057)

-0.010
(-0.170, 0.150)

-0.0004***
(-0.0006, -0.0002)
-0.049***
(-0.067, -0.031)
0.010*
(0.001, 0.019)
0.105***
(0.059, 0.151)
-0.004
(-0.010, 0.003)
-0.010***
(-0.015, -0.006)
0.005***
(0.003, 0.008)
0.008**
(0.002, 0.014)
0.006***
(0.003, 0.008)
-57.49**
(-99.12, -15.85)
0.034
2656
23904

-0.0003^
(-0.0006, 0.00002)
-0.049**
(-0.079, -0.018)
0.018*
(0.002, 0.033)
0.090**
(0.032, 0.149)
-0.00006
(-0.012, 0.011)
-0.014***
(-0.021, -0.007)
0.003*
(0.0002, 0.006)
0.002
(-0.006, 0.010)
0.002
(-0.003, 0.006)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.005
2656
23904
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Table A3.14a: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons during regular-hours per 1,000
patients (unweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.005
(-0.031, 0.022)
0.018***
(0.015, 0.021)
-0.006
(-0.017, 0.005)
0.00004
(-0.00006, 0.0001)
0.018
(-0.034, 0.069)
-0.134*
(-0.266, -0.002)
-0.074***
(-0.107, -0.041)
-0.0006***
(-0.0008, -0.0004)
0.008
(-0.004, 0.021)
-0.009**
(-0.016, -0.003)
0.104***
(0.0706, 0.137)
-0.006***
(-0.008, -0.004)
-0.007***
(-0.007, -0.006)
0.006***
(0.005, 0.007)
0.004***
(0.002, 0.006)
0.008***
(0.006, 0.010)
-35.08***
(-41.72, -28.43)
0.157
2656
23904

FE
-0.030*
(-0.058, -0.002)
0.0230**
(0.006, 0.040)

HDFE
-0.034^
(-0.072, 0.004)

0.00001
(-0.0001, 0.0002)

-0.0007
(-0.002, 0.0007)

-0.201
(-0.447, 0.045)

-0.118
(-0.343, 0.106)

-0.0003**
(-0.0005, -0.00009)
-0.027**
(-0.044, -0.010)
0.004
(-0.005, 0.012)
0.120***
(0.074, 0.166)
-0.003
(-0.009, 0.00367)
-0.007***
(-0.011, -0.004)
0.005***
(0.002, 0.007)
0.012***
(0.006, 0.018)
0.004**
(0.001, 0.007)
-44.01**
(-76.82, -11.20)
0.014
2656
23904

-0.0001
(-0.0004, 0.0002)
-0.024
(-0.055, 0.006)
0.004
(-0.012, 0.019)
0.131***
(0.069, 0.193)
0.003
(-0.008, 0.014)
-0.011***
(-0.017, -0.005)
0.002
(-0.0006, 0.005)
0.006
(-0.003, 0.016)
0.003
(-0.0009, 0.007)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

2656
23904
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Table A3.14b: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons during regular-hours per 1,000
patients (PS-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.039**
(-0.067, -0.010)
0.019***
(0.015, 0.022)
-0.001
(-0.013, 0.011)
0.0000004
(-0.0001, 0.0001)
0.016
(-0.038, 0.070)
-0.098
(-0.265, 0.069)
-0.040*
(-0.078, -0.003)
-0.0007***
(-0.001, -0.0005)
0.009
(-0.005, 0.023)
-0.010**
(-0.017, -0.003)
0.116***
(0.079, 0.154)
-0.006***
(-0.008, -0.004)
-0.007***
(-0.008, -0.006)
0.005***
(0.004, 0.006)
0.004***
(0.002, 0.006)
0.007***
(0.005, 0.009)
-36.43***
(-44.02, -28.84)
0.199
2656
23904

FE
-0.018
(-0.048, 0.012)
0.014
(-0.005, 0.033)

HDFE
-0.035^
(-0.074, 0.005)

0.00009
(-0.00008, 0.0003)

-0.00007
(-0.002, 0.001)

-0.198
(-0.447, 0.050)

-0.11
(-0.328, 0.108)

-0.0002^
(-0.0004, 0.000004)
-0.028**
(-0.047, -0.009)
0.004
(-0.005, 0.013)
0.0694*
(0.017, 0.122)
-0.0003
(-0.007, 0.007)
-0.008***
(-0.013, -0.004)
0.005***
(0.003, 0.007)
0.011***
(0.005, 0.018)
0.006***
(0.003, 0.010)
1.443**
(0.523, 2.363)
0.013
2656
23904

-0.00009
(-0.0005, 0.0003)
-0.024
(-0.058, 0.010)
0.003
(-0.014, 0.020)
0.0715*
(0.0002, 0.143)
0.010
(-0.003, 0.023)
-0.014***
(-0.021, -0.006)
0.004*
(0.0005, 0.007)
0.002
(-0.007, 0.011)
0.003
(-0.001, 0.007)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.003
2656
23904
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Table A3.14c: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons during regular-hours per 1,000
patients (EB-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.044*
(-0.079, -0.009)
0.020***
(0.015, 0.0254)
0.003
(-0.013, 0.018)
-0.00004
(-0.0002, 0.0001)
0.020
(-0.044, 0.084)
-0.216^
(-0.434, 0.002)
-0.043*
(-0.082, -0.004)
-0.0006***
(-0.0009, -0.0003)
0.005
(-0.009, 0.020)
-0.008*
(-0.015, -0.0008)
0.130***
(0.092, 0.169)
-0.006***
(-0.008, -0.004)
-0.007***
(-0.009, -0.006)
0.005***
(0.004, 0.006)
0.005***
(0.002, 0.007)
0.006***
(0.004, 0.008)
-39.84***
(-50.01, -29.67)
0.177
2656
23904

FE
-0.026
(-0.060, 0.008)
0.017
(-0.005, 0.038)

HDFE
-0.037^
(-0.077, 0.004)

0.00007
(-0.0001, 0.0003)

-0.00007
(-0.002, 0.002)

-0.172
(-0.407, 0.063)

-0.11
(-0.321, 0.121)

-0.0002
(-0.0005, 0.00006)
-0.035***
(-0.056, -0.015)
0.009^
(-0.001, 0.019)
0.081**
(0.024, 0.138)
-0.0009
(-0.009, 0.007)
-0.010***
(-0.015, -0.006)
0.005***
(0.002, 0.007)
0.007^
(-0.0008, 0.014)
0.005**
(0.002, 0.009)
-30.58
(-72.64,11.48)
0.014
2656
23904

-0.0002
(-0.0006, 0.0002)
-0.033
(-0.074, 0.008)
0.012
(-0.009, 0.032)
0.061
(-0.015, 0.137)
0.007
(-0.006, 0.021)
-0.014***
(-0.022, -0.006)
0.004*
(0.0003, 0.007)
-0.0009
(-0.011, 0.009)
0.002
(-0.002, 0.007)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.003
2656
23904
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Table A3.15a: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons during after-hours per 1,000
patients (unweighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.0009
(-0.027, 0.025)
0.023***
(0.020, 0.027)
-0.005
(-0.016, 0.006)
0.00005
(-0.00006, 0.0001)
0.015
(-0.0376, 0.0672)
-0.115^
(-0.239, 0.0081
-0.060***
(-0.092, -0.027)
-0.0006***
(-0.0008, -0.0004)
-0.009
(-0.024, 0.004)
-0.005
(-0.012, 0.002)
0.104***
(0.070, 0.137)
-0.007***
(-0.009, -0.005)
-0.006***
(-0.007, -0.006)
0.005***
(0.004, 0.006)
0.002*
(0.0005, 0.004)
0.009***
(0.007, 0.011)
-44.80***
(-51.24, -38.36)
0.14
2656
23904

FE
-0.047***
(-0.074, -0.020)
0.040***
(0.024, 0.055)

HDFE
0.007
(-0.031, 0.046)

-0.00008
(-0.0002, 0.00006)

0.0002
(-0.00112, 0.00157)

-0.175
(-0.399, 0.048)

0.043
(-0.175, 0.261)

-0.0004***
(-0.0006, -0.0002)
-0.049***
(-0.065, -0.034)
0.008^
(-4.28e-08, 0.016)
0.118***
(0.072, 0.164)
-0.004
(-0.011, 0.003)
-0.003
(-0.008, 0.0008)
0.005***
(0.002, 0.007)
0.008*
(0.002, 0.014)
0.005***
(0.003, 0.008)
-75.99***
(-107.2, -44.72)
0.021
2656
23904

-0.0001
(-0.0004, 0.0002)
-0.049***
(-0.078, -0.020)
0.015^
(-0.0009, 0.030)
0.126***
(0.067, 0.184)
-0.005
(-0.016, 0.005)
-0.007*
(-0.013, -0.001)
0.003^
(-0.0002, 0.006)
0.00606
(-0.002, 0.014)
0.003
(-0.0008, 0.007)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.003
2656
23904
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Table A3.15b: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons during after-hours per 1,000
patients (PS-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.035*
(-0.062, -0.007)
0.023***
(0.020, 0.027)
0.0005
(-0.012, 0.013)
0.000007
(-0.0001, 0.0001)
0.014
(-0.042, 0.071)
-0.067
(-0.249, 0.115)
-0.031^
(-0.066, 0.005)
-0.0007***
(-0.001, -0.0005)
-0.009
(-0.0253, 0.00677)
-0.007
(-0.015, 0.002)
0.111***
(0.073, 0.148)
-0.008***
(-0.00991, -0.00567)
-0.007***
(-0.007, -0.006)
0.0042
(0.003, 0.005)
0.002^
(-0.0002, 0.004)
0.008***
(0.006, 0.011)
-45.00***
(-52.23, -37.77)
0.158
2656
23904

FE
-0.040**
(-0.069, -0.011)
0.039***
(0.020, 0.058)

HDFE
0.009
(-0.031, 0.049)

-0.00007
(-0.0002, 0.0001)

0.0007
(-0.001, 0.002)

-0.183
(-0.403, 0.0362)

0.0389
(-0.181, 0.259)

-0.0004***
(-0.0006, -0.0002)
-0.050***
(-0.0680, -0.0313)
0.006
(-0.003, 0.016)
0.094***
(0.043, 0.146)
-0.005
(-0.0116, 0.00195)
-0.007**
(-0.012, -0.002)
0.004***
(0.002, 0.007)
0.007*
(0.0005, 0.013)
0.004**
(0.002, 0.007)
1.988***
(1.117, 2.859)
0.019
2656
23904

-0.0002
(-0.0006, 0.0001)
-0.049**
(-0.0809, -0.0167)
0.014
(-0.004, 0.031)
0.110**
(0.042, 0.179)
-0.005
(-0.0166, 0.00725)
-0.010**
(-0.018, -0.002)
0.003^
(-0.0002, 0.006)
0.005
(-0.006, 0.017)
0.001
(-0.003, 0.006)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.003
2656
23904
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Table A3.15c: Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons during after-hours per 1,000
patients (EB-weighted)

FHO
Year
Age
Age2
Sex (Female)
Rurality
IMG
Group size
Avg. patient age
Prop. of patients >= 65
Avg. ADG score
Prop. of female patients
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Deprivation
Score
Prop. in Q1 or Q2 on Ethnic
Concentration Score
Prop. of rural patients
Prop. of patients with chronic
mental illness
Constant
R2
# of physicians
# of observations

OLS
-0.038*
(-0.069, -0.006)
0.024***
(0.020, 0.029)
0.008
(-0.007, 0.022)
-0.00006
(-0.0002, 0.00007)
0.018
(-0.047, 0.083)
-0.231*
(-0.439, -0.0231)
-0.032^
(-0.068, 0.004)
-0.0007***
(-0.0009, -0.0004)
-0.013
(-0.029, 0.003)
-0.005
(-0.013, 0.003)
0.126***
(0.087, 0.165)
-0.008***
(-0.010, -0.006)
-0.007***
(-0.008, -0.006)
0.004***
(0.003, 0.005)
0.003*
(0.000261, 0.00585)
0.007***
(0.004, 0.009)
-46.89***
(-55.74, -38.04)
0.147
2656
23904

FE
-0.042**
(-0.073, -0.011)
0.046***
(0.022, 0.071)

HDFE
-0.006
(-0.048, 0.036)

-0.0001
(-0.0004, 0.00006)

-0.0005
(-0.002, 0.001)

-0.205^
(-0.423, 0.012)

0.016
(-0.206, 0.237)

-0.0005***
(-0.0007, -0.0003)
-0.050***
(-0.071, -0.030)
0.008
(-0.002, 0.018)
0.103***
(0.0485, 0.158)
-0.006
(-0.014, 0.001)
-0.008**
(-0.013, -0.003)
0.005***
(0.002, 0.007)
0.010**
(0.003, 0.018)
0.005***
(0.003, 0.008)
-89.12***
(-137.9, -40.33)
0.022
2656
23904

-0.0004^
(-0.0007, 0.00001)
-0.055**
(-0.094, -0.017)
0.023*
(0.003, 0.043)
0.093*
(0.016, 0.169)
-0.007
(-0.021, 0.006)
-0.011**
(-0.019, -0.003)
0.002
(-0.0008, 0.006)
0.009^
(-0.002, 0.020)
0.002
(-0.004, 0.008)

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

0.004
2656
23904
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Appendix A3.3: Subgroup analyses
Table A3.16a: Coefficient of FHO on the log of the number of mental health services per 1000 enrolled patients, by physician sex

OLS
Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB-weighted

Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB-weighted

Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB-weighted
Observations
Physicians

-0.167***
(-0.217, -0.117)
-0.139***
(-0.195, -0.083)
-0.161***
(-0.216, -0.106)
-0.172***
(-0.223, -0.121)
-0.141***
(-0.198, -0.083)
-0.164***
(-0.218, -0.110)
0.150*
(0.014, 0.285)
0.101
(-0.055, 0.257)
0.063
(-0.129, 0.255)
14,409
1,601

Male physicians
FE

HDFE
OLS
Total MH services
-0.136***
-0.134***
-0.154***
(-0.169, -0.103) (-0.166, -0.101) (-0.205, -0.104)
-0.143***
-0.136***
-0.123***
(-0.187, -0.101) (-0.171, -0.101) (-0.174, -0.071)
-0.146***
-0.125***
-0.106***
(-0.185, -0.108) (-0.159, -0.091) (-0.157, -0.055)
MH services during regular-hours
-0.148***
-0.142***
-0.161***
(-0.181, -0.116) (-0.174, -0.110) (-0.212, -0.111)
-0.156***
-0.144***
-0.132***
(-0.198, -0.113) (-0.168, -0.109) (-0.183, -0.081)
-0.157***
-0.132***
-0.113***
(-0.194, -0.121) (-0.167, -0.098) (-0.165, -0.062)
MH services during after-hours
0.308***
0.149**
0.354***
(0.188, 0.429)
(0.038, 0.259)
(0.186, 0.521)
0.270***
0.127*
0.459***
(0.133, 0.406)
(0.010, 0.243)
(0.277, 0.640)
0.260**
0.121^
0.426***
(0.107, 0.413)
(-0.009, 0.251)
(0.223, 0.630)
14,409
14,409
9,495
1,601
1,601
1,055

Female physicians
FE

HDFE

-0.119***
(-0.156, -0.082)
-0.154***
(-0.191, -0.117)
-0.141***
(-0.177, -0.105)

-0.142***
(-0.180, -0.105)
-0.155***
(-0.193, -0.118)
-0.158***
(-0.196, -0.120)

-0.133***
(-0.170, -0.096)
-0.170***
(-0.208, -0.133)
-0.156***
(-0.192, -0.120)

-0.153***
(-0.191, -0.116)
-0.164***
(-0.201, -0.127)
-0.166***
(-0.204, -0.128)

0.470***
(0.333, 0.606)
0.451***
(0.309, 0.594)
0.438***
(0.285, 0.591)
9,495
1,055

0.332***
(0.201, 0.463)
0.275***
(0.137, 0.413)
0.276***
(0.132, 0.421)
9,495
1,055

MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,601 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Table A3.16c: Coefficient of FHO on the log of the value of mental health services per 1000 enrolled patients, by physician sex

OLS
Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB-weighted

Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB

Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB-weighted
Observations
Physicians

-0.196***
(-0.260, -0.132)
-0.156***
(-0.233, -0.079)
-0.186***
(-0.253, -0.119)
-0.196***
(-0.260, -0.131)
-0.155***
(-0.233, -0.077)
-0.186***
(-0.254, -0.119)
0.341**
(0.145, 0.538)
0.259*
(0.033, 0.485)
0.212
(-0.075, 0.498)
14,409
1,601

Male physicians
FE

HDFE
OLS
Total MH services
-0.182***
-0.177***
-0.197***
(-0.224, -0.139) (-0.217, -0.137)
(-0.256, -0.137)
-0.0181***
-0.180***
-0.158***
(-0.247, -0.116) (-0.225, -0.135)
(-0.220, -0.096)
-0.185***
-0.167***
-0.130***
(-0.235, -0.134) (-0.209, -0.126)
(-0.195, -0.065)
MH services during regular-hours
-0.184***
-0.178***
-0.198***
(-0.227, -0.142) (-0.218, -0.138)
(-0.257, -0.138)
-0.184***
-0.181***
-0.159***
(-0.249, -0.119) (-0.226, -0.136)
(-0.222, -0.097)
-0.187***
-0.168***
-0.131***
(-0.237, -0.136) (-0.210, -0.127)
(-0.197, -0.066)
MH services during after-hours
0.512***
0.249**
0.646***
(0.335, 0.688)
(0.081, 0.417)
(0.403, 0.889)
0.460***
0.208*
0.797***
(0.257, 0.664)
(0.031, 0.386)
(0.530, 1.063)
0.448***
0.201*
0.760***
(0.214, 0.681)
(0.004, 0.398)
(0.459, 1.061)
14,409
14,409
9,495
1,601
1,601
1,055

Female physicians
FE

HDFE

-0.173***
(-0.216, -0.129)
-0.215***
(-0.257, -0.173)
-0.201***
(-0.241, -0.160)

-0.188***
(-0.233, -0.144)
-0.200***
(-0.243, -0.157)
-0.203***
(-0.246, -0.159)

-0.175***
(-0.218, -0.132)
-0.218***
(-0.260, -0.175)
-0.203***
(-0.244, -0.162)

-0.190***
(-0.235, -0.146)
-0.201***
(-0.244, -0.158)
-0.204***
(-0.248, -0.160)

0.752***
(0.548, 0.957)
0.727***
(0.511, 0.943)
0.716***
(0.489, 0.947)
9,495
1,055

0.511***
(0.309, 0.713)
0.435***
(0.222, 0.648)
0.451***
(0.230, 0.672)
9,495
1,055

MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,601 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Table A3.16e: Coefficient of FHO on the log of ED visits for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients: Male physicians only

OLS
Unweighted
PS
EB

Unweighted
PS
EB

Unweighted
PS
EB
Observations
Physicians

-0.023
(-0.069, 0.022)
-0.076**
(-0.125, -0.026)
-0.080**
(-0.136, -0.024)
-0.025
(-0.068, 0.018)
-0.074**
(-0.121, -0.027)
-0.080**
(-0.137, -0.022)
-0.030
(-0.074, 0.014)
-0.078**
(-0.128, -0.029)
-0.078**
(-0.131, -0.026)
14,409
1,601

Male physicians
FE

HDFE
OLS
Log of total ED visits
-0.110***
-0.057*
-0.038
(-0.145, -0.075) (-0.102, -0.013)
(-0.089, 0.013)
-0.104***
-0.053*
-0.054^
(-0.139, -0.068) (-0.099, -0.007)
(-0.107, 0.001)
-0.107***
-0.061*
-0.054^
(-0.145, -0.069) (-0.109, -0.013)
(-0.112, 0.003)
Log of total visits during regular-hours
-0.095***
-0.078**
-0.044^
(-0.133, 0.057) (-0.128, -0.027)
(-0.093, 0.006)
-0.091***
-0.079**
-0.062*
(-0.131, -0.051) (-0.130, -0.030) (-0.113, -0.011)
-0.101***
-0.086**
-0.067*
(-0.143, -0.058) (-0.140, -0.031) (-0.120, -0.014)
Log of total visits during after-hours
-0.103***
-0.024
-0.034
(-0.140, -0.065)
(-0.076, 0.028)
(-0.085, 0.017)
-0.095***
-0.017
-0.049^
(-0.134, -0.056)
(-0.071, 0.036)
(-0.104, 0.005)
-0.091***
-0.026
-0.044
(-0.134, -0.048)
(-0.080, 0.029)
(-0.104, 0.017)
14,409
14,409
9,495
1,601
1,601
1,055

Female physicians
FE

HDFE

-0.072**
(-0.121, -0.022)
-0.049^
(-0.102, 0.004)
-0.062*
(-0.117, -0.008)

-0.038
(-0.105, 0.028)
-0.040
(-0.108, 0.028)
-0.047
(-0.116, 0.022)

-0.041
(-0.097, 0.015)
-0.021
(-0.080, 0.038)
-0.031
(-0.094, 0.031)

-0.058
(-0.014, 0.0020)
-0.052
(-0.132, 0.027)
-0.045
(-0.134, 0.035)

-0.070*
(-0.126, -0.015)
-0.049
(-0.111, 0.012)
-0.059^
(-0.121, 0.003)
9,495
1,055

-0.005
(-0.078, 0.068)
-0.007
(-0.083, 0.069)
-0.028
(-0.106, 0.051)
9,495
1,055

ED: emergency department; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed -effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,601 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Table A3.16g: Coefficient of FHO on the number of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons, per 1,000 patients: Male
physicians only

Unweighted
PS
EB

Unweighted
PS
EB

Unweighted
PS
EB
Observations
Physicians

Male physicians
Female physicians
OLS
FE
HDFE
OLS
FE
Log of total patients to ED
0.008
-0.063***
-0.019
-0.024
-0.035
(-0.027, 0.043)
(-0.089, -0.036)
(-0.054, 0.017)
(-0.065, 0.017)
(-0.077, 0.008)
0.038^
-0.057***
-0.014
-0.043^
-0.021
(-0.076, 0.0006) (-0.085, -0.029)
(-0.051, 0.023)
(-0.088, 0.002)
(-0.065, 0.023)
-0.045^
-0.065***
-0.022
-0.046^
-0.026
(-0.090, 0.0007) (-0.096, -0.033)
(-0.062, 0.019) (-0.093, 0.0004)
(-0.072, 0.021)
Log of number of patients who had an ED visit during regular-hours
0.001
-0.053**
-0.041^
-0.023
0.003
(-0.034, 0.036)
(-0.085, -0.020)
(-0.085, 0.003)
(-0.064, 0.018)
(-0.047, 0.053)
-0.041*
-0.047**
-0.040^
-0.043*
0.019
(-0.079, -0.003) (-0.082, -0.011)
(-0.086, 0.005) (-0.087, -0.0001) (-0.034, 0.072)
-0.045^
-0.058**
-0.051*
-0.049*
0.021
(-0.094, 0.004)
(-0.095, -0.021) (-0.100, -0.002) (-0.094, -0.004)
(-0.039, 0.081)
Log of number of patients who had an ED visit during after-hours
-0.0002
-0.056***
0.013
-0.025
-0.038
(-0.033, 0.033)
(-0.086, -0.026)
(-0.031, 0.057)
(-0.066, 0.016)
(-0.088, 0.012)
-0.043*
-0.052**
-0.021
-0.046*
-0.026
(-0.079, -0.006) (-0.084, -0.019)
(-0.025, 0.067)
(-0.090, -0.001)
(-0.080, 0.026)
-0.048*
-0.053**
0.014
-0.044&
-0.032
(-0.088, -0.007) (-0.090, -0.016)
(-0.035, 0.062)
(-0.093, 0.004)
(-0.086, 0.020)
14,409
14,409
14,409
9,495
9,495
1,601
1,601
1,601
1,055
1,055

HDFE
-0.025
(-0.081, 0.032)
-0.032
(-0.089, 0.025)
-0.039
(-0.096, 0.019)
-0.024
(-0.092, 0.043)
-0.027
(-0.096, 0.042)
-0.015
(-0.084, 0.054)
-0.003
(-0.071, 0.064)
-0.008
(-0.079, 0.062)
-0.032
(-0.105, 0.040)
9,495
1,055

ED: emergency department; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed -effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 2,656 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Table A3.17a: Coefficient of FHO on the log of the number of mental health services per 1000 enrolled patients, by physician age

OLS
Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB-weighted

Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB

Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB-weighted
Observations
Physicians

-0.180***
(-0.228, -0.132)
-0.0167***
(-0.216, -0.118)
-0.147***
(-0.197, -0.098)
-0.188***
(-0.237, -0.139)
-0.177***
(-0.227, -0.128)
-0.159***
(-0.207, -0.110)
0.328***
(0.0184, 0.472)
0.370***
(0.209, 0.531)
0.391***
(0.205, 0.577)
12,312
1,368

Younger physicians
Older physicians
FE
HDFE
OLS
FE
Total MH services
-0.143***
-0.127***
-0.145***
-0.127***
(-0.171, -0.115)
(-0.158, -0.096) (-0.199, -0.092) (-0.168, -0.086)
-0.178***
-0.138***
-0.097**
-0.125***
(-0.209, -0.147)
(-0.170, -0.107) (-0.157, -0.037) (-0.175, -0.076)
-0.169***
-0.133***
-0.125***
-0.128***
(-0.200, -0.137)
(-0.165, -0.101) (-0.182, -0.069) (-0.171, -0.084)
MH services during regular-hours
-0.154***
-0.136***
-0.150***
-0.141***
(-0.182, -0.126)
(-0.168, -0.105) (-0.204, -0.096) (-0.180, -0.101)
-0.191***
-0.148***
-0.098**
-0.139***
(-0.222, -0.160)
(-0.179, -0.117) (-0.159, -0.037) (-0.187, -0.091)
-0.181***
-0.144***
-0.123***
-0.140***
(-0.212, -0.150)
(-0.176, -0.111) (-0.180, -0.066) (-0.182, -0.098)
MH services during after-hours
0.404***
0.275***
0.175*
0.303***
(0.0291, 0.517)
(0.162, 0.388)
(0.0242, 0.326)
(0.156, 0.450)
0.387***
0.252***
0.131
0.260**
(0.260, 0.513)
(0.135, 0.369)
(-0.040, 0.302)
(0.097, 0.423)
0.390***
0.283***
0.017
0.221*
(0.242, 0.548)
(0.159, 0.407)
(-0.190, 0.223)
0.041, 0.401)
12,312
12,312
11,592
11,592
1,368
1,368
1,288
1,288

MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,288 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

HDFE
-0.157***
(-0.196, -0.118)
-0.161***
(-0.204, -0.118)
-0.156***
(-0.199, -0.113)
-0.166***
(-0.205, -0.127)
-0.167***
(-0.210, -0.124)
-0.160***
(-0.203, -0.117)
0.158*
(0.308, 0.285)
0.098
(-0.039, 0.235)
0.057
(-0.094, 0.209)
11,592
1,288
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Table A3.17c: Coefficient of FHO on the log of the value of mental health services per 1000 enrolled patients: Younger (≤ 50)
physicians only

OLS
Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB-weighted

Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB

Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB-weighted
Observations
Physicians

-0.221***
(-0.278, -0.163)
-0.202***
(-0.264, -0.141)
-0.185***
(-0.245, -0.125)
-0.222***
(-0.280, -0.165)
-0.204***
(-0.266, -0.142)
-0.187***
(-0.247, -0.127)
0.614***
(0.406, 0.821)
0.658***
(0.424, 0.893)
0.690***
(0.411, 0.969)
12,312
1,368

Younger physicians
Older physicians
FE
HDFE
OLS
FE
Total MH services
-0.197***
-0.170***
-0.178***
-0.173***
(-0.228, -0.166)
(-0.206, -0.134) (-0.245, -0.111) (-0.224, -0.121)
-0.234***
-0.182***
-0.119**
-0.167***
(-0.269, -0.199)
(-0.218, -0.147)
(-0.199, 0.039) (-0.240, -0.094)
-0.223***
-0.178***
-0.143***
-0.169***
(-0.258, -0.188)
(-0.215, -0.142) (-0.214, -0.070) (-0.226, -0.113)
MH services during regular-hours
-0.199***
-0.171***
-0.178***
-0.176***
(-0.230, -0.167)
(-0.207, -0.135) (-0.246, -0.110) (-0.227, -0.124)
-0.236***
-0.184***
-0.118**
-0.170***
(-0.271, -0.201)
(-0.219, -0.148) (-0.199, -0.036) (-0.243, -0.097)
-0.225***
-0.180***
-0.142***
-0.172***
(-0.260, -0.190)
(-0.217, -0.144) (-0.215, -0.068) (-0.229, -0.116)
MH services during after-hours
0.656***
0.425***
0.373**
0.499***
(0.487, 0.825)
(0.252, 0.598)
(0.153, 0.593)
(0.285, 0.712)
0.644***
0.390***
0.310*
0.431***
(0.449, 0.838)
(0.211, 0.570)
(0.061, 0.559)
(0.193, 0.668)
0.654***
0.437***
0.158
0.377**
(0.423, 0.884)
(0.247, 0.627)
(-0.146, 0.463)
(0.116, 0.638)
12,312
12,312
11,592
11,592
1,368
1,368
1,288
1,288

MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,368 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

HDFE
-0.205***
(-0.255, -0.156)
-0.208***
(-0.265, -0.151)
-0.199***
(-0.252, -0.146)
-0.206***
(-0.256, -0.157)
-0.208***
(-0.266, -0.151)
-0.199***
(-0.252, -0.147)
0.269**
(0.075, 0.463)
0.181^
(-0.029, 0.389)
0.133
(-0.095, 0.361)
11,592
1,288
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Table A3.17e: Coefficient of FHO on ED visits for mental health reasons: by physician age

OLS
Unweighted
PS
EB

Unweighted
PS
EB

Unweighted
PS
EB
Observations
Physicians

-0.019
(-0.067, 0.029)
-0.030
(-0.081, 0.021)
-0.029
(-0.084, 0.026)
-0.030
(-0.076, 0.017)
-0.052^
(-0.091, 0.007)
-0.042
(-0.096, 0.013)
-0.018
(-0.065, -0.029)
-0.031
(-0.082, 0.019)
-0.024
(-0.078, 0.030)
12,312
1,368

Younger physicians
FE
HDFE
OLS
Log of total ED visits
-0.096***
-0.047^
-0.017
(-0.137, -0.055)
(-0.100, 0.007)
(-0.065, 0.030)
-0.077**
-0.037
-0.089**
(-0.121, -0.033)
(-0.092, 0.018)
(-0.141, -0.037)
-0.090***
-0.044
-0.085**
(-0.137, -0.044)
(-0.100, 0.011)
(-0.141, -0.028)
Log of total visits during regular-hours
-0.078**
-0.064*
-0.020
(-0.124, -0.032)
(-0.126, -0.001)
(-0.066, 0.025)
-0.057*
-0.050
-0.090***
(-0.106, -0.008)
(-0.115, 0.015)
(-0.139, -0.041)
-0.072**
-0.054
-0.090**
(-0.124, -0.020)
(-0.119, 0.012)
(-0.145, -0.036)
Log of total visits during after-hours
-0.093***
-0.018
-0.019
(-0.139, -0.048)
(-0.077, 0.042)
(-0.065, 0.027)
-0.079**
-0.010
-0.084**
(-0.129, -0.029)
(-0.072, 0.051)
(-0.137, -0.031)
-0.088**
-0.022
-0.075**
(-0.140, -0.035)
(-0.084, 0.040)
(-0.131, -0.018)
12,312
12,312
11,592
1,368
1,368
1,288

Older physicians
FE

HDFE

-0.086***
(-0.127, -0.046)
-0.081***
(-0.122, -0.040)
-0.080***
(-0.123, -0.037)

-0.052^
(-0.106, 0.003)
-0.062*
(-0.117, -0.007)
-0.068*
(-0.126, -0.009)

-0.067**
(-0.112, -0.023)
-0.067**
(-0.114, -0.021)
-0.074**
(-0.123, -0.026)

-0.078*
(-0.138, -0.017)
-0.091**
(-0.153, -0.030)
-0.086**
(-0.150, -0.021)

-0.079***
(-0.123, -0.035)
-0.068**
(-0.114, -0.021)
-0.056*
(-0.106, -0.006)
11,592
1,288

-0.013
(-0.075, 0.049)
-0.019
(-0.084, 0.046)
-0.035
(-.104, 0.034)
11,592
1,288

MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,368 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Table A3.17g: Coefficient of FHO on the Log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients: Younger (≤
50) physicians only

Unweighted
PS
EB

Unweighted
PS
EB

Unweighted
PS
EB
Observations
Physicians

Younger physicians
Older physicians
OLS
FE
HDFE
OLS
FE
Log of total patients to ED
0.007
-0.046**
-0.012
0.002
-0.052**
(-0.031, 0.045)
(-0.078, -0.013)
(-0.055, 0.032)
(-0.036, 0.040)
(-0.085, -0.020)
-0.011
-0.034^
-0.010
-0.057**
-0.049**
(-0.052, 0.031)
(-0.070, 0.002)
(-0.056, 0.036)
(-0.097, -0.017)
(-0.081, -0.016)
-0.013
-0.041*
-0.020
-0.055*
-0.054**
(-0.058, 0.032) (-0.081, -0.0009) (-0.067, 0.027)
(-0.100, -0.011)
(-0.088, -0.020)
Log of number of patients who had an ED visit during regular-hours
-0.002
-0.023
-0.013
-0.003
-0.038^
(-0.040, 0.036)
(-0.064, 0.018)
(-0.067, 0.041)
(-0.040, 0.034)
(-0.076, 0.0001)
-0.020
-0.006
-0.011
-0.058**
-0.036^
(-0.061, 0.020)
(-0.050, 0.038)
(-0.067, 0.045)
(-0.098, -0.019)
(-0.075, 0.003)
-0.021
-0.010
-0.016
-0.058*
-0.048*
(-0.069, 0.026)
(-0.060, 0.040)
(-0.074, 0.041)
(-0.103, -0.013)
(-0.090, -0.007)
Log of number of patients who had an ED visit during after-hours
0.005
-0.045*
0.007
-0.002
-0.048*
(-0.032, 0.042)
(-0.083, -0.006)
(-0.046, 0.060)
(-0.038, 0.034)
(-0.085, -0.010)
-0.016
-0.040^
0.011
-0.056**
-0.040*
(-0.055, 0.024)
(-0.083, 0.002)
(-0.044, 0.067)
(-0.095, -0.016) (-0.080, -0.0002)
-0.014
-0.048*
-0.006
-0.052*
-0.035
(-0.057, 0.029)
(-0.093, -0.003)
(-0.064, 0.052)
(-0.094, -0.009)
(-0.079, 0.008)
12,312
12,312
12,312
11,592
11,592
1,368
1,368
1,368
1,288
1,288

MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,368 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.

HDFE
-0.033
(-0.077, 0.012)
-0.036
(-0.082, 0.010)
-0.038
(-0.087, 0.011)
-0.062*
(-0.0115, 0.008)
-0.065*
(-0.119, -0.011)
-0.058*
(-0.115, -0.001)
0.007
(-0.047, 0.062)
0.005
(-0.053, 0.062)
-0.006
(-0.068, 0.057)
11,592
1,288
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Table A3.18a: Coefficient of FHO on the log of the number of mental health services per 1000 enrolled patients by time of switch

OLS
Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB-weighted

Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB

Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB-weighted
Observations
Physicians

-0.185***
(-0.235, -0.135)
-0.141***
(-0.193, -0.088)
-0.153***
(-0.206, -0.101)
-0.187***
(-0.238, -0.137)
-0.141***
(-0.195, -0.088)
-0.153***
(-0.205, -0.100)
0.176*
(0.039, 0.313)
0.180*
(0.031, 0.329)
0.120
(-0.075, 0.299)
17,082
1,898

Early switchers
FE

HDFE
OLS
Total MH services
-0.148***
-0.120***
-0.152***
(-0.184, -0.112) (-0.156, -0.083) (-0.194, -0.110)
-0.172***
-0.133***
-0.125***
(-0.213, -0.131) (-0.170, -0.095) (-0.168, -0.082)
-0.170***
-0.125***
-0.131***
(-0.209, -0.130) (-0.164, -0.086) (-0.172, -0.090)
MH services during regular-hours
-0.153***
-0.130***
-0.161***
(-0.189, -0.117) (-0.166, -0.093) (-0.203, -0.119)
-0.178***
-0.141***
-0.134***
(-0.218, -0.137) (-0.178, -0.103) (-0.178, -0.090)
-0.174***
-0.133***
-0.140***
(-0.212, -0.135) (-0.172, -0.093) (-0.181, -0.099)
MH services during after-hours
0.267***
0.200**
0.344**
(0.142, 0.392)
(0.070, 0.330)
(0.215, 0.473)
0.239**
0.142*
0.355***
(0.102, 0.375)
(0.0008, 0.284)
(0.214, 0.495)
0.217**
0.144^
0.318***
(0.068, 0.367)
(-0.014, 0.303)
(0.158, 0.479)
17,082
17,082
17,946
1,898
1,898
1,994

Late switchers
FE

HDFE

-0.131***
(-0.163, -0.099)
-0.152***
(-0.191, -0.112)
-0.147***
(-0.181, -0.112)

-0.156***
(-0.187, -0.125)
-0.162***
(-0.195, -0.129)
-0.155***
(-0.188, -0.123)

-0.146***
(-0.177, -0.114)
-0.168***
(-0.207, -0.129)
-0.161***
(-0.195, -0.128)

-0.164***
(-0.194, -0.133)
-0.169***
(-0.202, -0.136)
-0.162***
(-0.195, -0.130)

0.424***
(0.309, 0.540)
0.405***
(0.280, 0.531)
0.391***
(0.246, 0.535)
17,946
1,994

0.247***
(0.140, 0.354)
0.214***
(0.101, 0.326)
0.214***
(0.094, 0.334)
17,946
1,994

MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,994 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Table A3.18c: Coefficient of FHO on the log of the value of mental health services per 1000 enrolled patients, by time of switch

OLS
Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB-weighted

Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB

Unweighted
PS-weighted
EB-weighted
Observations
Physicians

-0.210***
(-0.271, -0.149)
-0.158***
(-0.227, -0.089)
-0.171***
(-0.235, -0.107)
-0.210***
(-0.271, -0.148)
-0.158***
(-0.226, -0.087)
-0.170***
(-0.235, -0.106)
0.421***
(0.224, 0.618)
0.410***
(0.193, 0.628)
0.325*
(0.046, 0.603)
17,082
1,898

Early switchers
FE

HDFE
OLS
Total MH services
-0.193***
-0.156***
-0.191***
(-0.239, -0.146) (-0.200, -0.111) (-0.244, -0.139)
-0.211***
-0.168***
-0.154***
(-0.269, -0.153) (-0.214, -0.122) (-0.211, -0.096)
-0.211***
-0.159***
-0.160***
(-0.262, -0.160) (-0.205, -0.113) (-0.212, -0.108)
MH services during regular-hours
-0.193***
-0.157***
-0.193***
(-0.240, -0.147) (-0.201, -0.112) (-0.245, -0.140)
-0.212***
-0.168***
-0.154***
(-0.270, -0.154) (-0.214, -0.122) (-0.212, -0.096)
-0.212***
-0.160***
-0.161***
(-0.264, -0.161) (-0.206, -0.113) (-0.214, -0.109)
MH services during after-hours
0.485***
0.299**
0.607***
(0.295, 0.675)
(0.100, 0.498)
(0.420, 0.795)
0.457***
0.216^
0.617***
(0.249, 0.666)
(-0.001, 0.433)
(0.413, 0.822)
0.428*
0.234^
0.576***
(0.200, 0.655)
(-0.009, 0.476)
(0.340, 0.812)
17,082
17,082
17,946
1,898
1,898
1,994

Late switchers
FE

HDFE

-0.178***
(-0.219, -0.137)
-0.197***
(-0.256 ,-0.138)
-0.192***
(-0.237, -0.147)

-0.198***
(-0.236, -0.161)
-0.205***
(-0.246, -0.163)
-0.197***
(-0.236, -0.159)

-0.181***
(-0.222, -0.140)
0.200***
(-0.259, -0.142)
-0.195***
(-0.239, -0.150)

-0.200***
(-0.237, -0.162)
-0.206***
(-0.247, -0.164)
-0.198***
(-0.237, -0.160)

0.693***
(0.514, 0.853)
0.660***
(0.473, 0.848)
0.644***
(0.426, 0.861)
17,946
1,994

0.408***
(0.245, 0.571)
0.366***
(0.183, 0.527)
0.361***
(0.178, 0.544)
17,946
1,994

MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,898 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Table A3.18e: Coefficient of FHO on ED visits for mental health reasons: by time of switch

OLS
Unweighted
PS
EB

Unweighted
PS
EB

Unweighted
PS
EB
Observations
Physicians

-0.050^
(-0.081, 0.0003)
-0.070**
(-0.112, -0.027)
-0.075**
(-0.123, -0.021)
-0.050*
(-0.090, -0.010)
-0.0708***
(-0.120, -0.037)
-0.085**
(-0.134, -0.036)
-0.041*
(-0.081, -0.002)
-0.070**
(-0.112, -0.028)
-0.069**
(-0.117, -0.021)
17,082
1,898

Early switchers
FE

HDFE
OLS
Log of total ED visits
-0.109***
-0.66*
0.003
(-0.153, -0.064)
(-0.126, -0.007)
(-0.040, 0.046)
-0.090***
-0.054^
-0.039^
(-0.137, -0.093)
(-0.116, 0.008)
(-0.085, 0.006)
-0.093***
-0.061^
-0.044^
(-0.142, -0.043)
(-0.126, 0.003)
(-0.093, 0.003)
Log of total visits during regular-hours
-0.094***
-0.083*
-0.002
(-0.145, -0.044)
(-0.149, -0.018)
(-0.043, 0.038)
-0.075**
-0.069^
-0.043^
(-0.128, -0.022) (-0.137, -0.0001) (-0.085, 7.9e-06)
-0.088**
-0.065^
-0.050*
(-0.144, -0.033)
(-0.137, 0.007)
(-0.097 -0.003)
Log of total visits during after-hours
-0.104***
-0.043
-0.0006
(-0.153, -0.055)
(-0.111, 0.026)
(-0.043, 0.042)
-0.087**
-0.029
-0.040
(-0.140, -0.034)
(-0.101, 0.043)
(-0.085, 0.005)
-0.077**
-0.048
-0.038
(-0.132, -0.022)
(-0.122, 0.027)
(-0.085, 0.009)
17,082
17,082
17,946
1,898
1,898
1,994

Late switchers
FE

HDFE

-0.086***
(-0.121, -0.052)
-0.073***
(-0.109, -0.037)
-0.085***
(-0.122, -0.047)

-0.035
(-0.082, 0.012)
-0.040^
(-0.089, 0.008)
-0.054*
(-0.103, -0.006)

-0.059**
(-0.097, -0.020)
-0.045*
(-0.086, 0.005)
-0.062**
(-0.105, -0.019)

-0.053^
(-0.110, 0.003)
-0.058*
(-0.116, -0.0004)
-0.065*
(-0.123, -0.007)

-0.087***
(-0.125, -0.050)
-0.076***
(-0.117, -0.035)
-0.077**
(-0.121, -0.033)
17,946
1,994

-0.00005
(-0.053, 0.053)
-0.006
(-0.060, 0.048)
-0.025
(-0.080, 0.030)
17,946
1,994

MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,898 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Table A3.18g: Coefficient of FHO on the log of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons per 1,000 patients, by time of
switch

OLS
Unweighted
PS
EB

Unweighted
PS
EB

Unweighted
PS
EB
Observations
Physicians

-0.015
(-0.058, 0.018)
-0.043*
(-0.077, -0.008)
-0.048*
(-0.089, -0.008)
-0.025
(-0.058, 0.009)
-0.053**
(-0.088, -0.018)
-0.057**
(-0.099 ,-0.015)
-0.019
(-0.050, 0.013)
-0.045**
(-0.078, -0.012)
-0.049*
(-0.086, -0.011)
17,082
1,898

Early switchers
FE

HDFE
OLS
Log of patients to ED
-0.073***
-0.042^
0.020
(-0.111, -0.037)
(-0.092, 0.007)
(-0.014, 0.053)
-0.067**
-0.039
-0.018
(-0.106, -0.027)
(-0.091, 0.013)
(-0.053, 0.017)
-0.072**
-0.047^
-0.026
(-0.114, -0.030)
(-0.103, 0.009)
(-0.064, -0.012)
Log of unique ED patients during regular-hours
-0.061**
-0.052^
0.017
(-0.107, -0.016)
(-0.111, 0.007)
(-0.016, 0.049)
-0.047^
-0.051
-0.017
(-0.095, 0.0007)
(-0.111, 0.010)
(-0.051, 0.017)
-0.060*
-0.050
-0.024
(-0.109, -0.010)
(-0.115, 0.014)
(-0.063, 0.016)
Log of unique ED patients during after-hours
-0.066**
-0.019
0.013
(-0.110, -0.022)
(-0.080, 0.043)
(-0.020, 0.045)
-0.064**
-0.010
-0.025
(-0.110, -0.017)
(-0.074, 0.055)
(-0.059, 0.009)
-0.060*
-0.030
-0.029
(-0.110, -0.011)
(-0.099, 0.040)
(-0.064, 0.007)
17,082
17,082
17,946
1,898
1,898
1,994

Late switchers
FE

HDFE

-0.043**
(-0.069, -0.016)
-0.034*
(-0.063, -0.005)
-0.044**
(-0.076, -0.012)

-0.009
(-0.046, 0.028)
-0.014
(-0.052, 0.025)
-0.028
(-0.067, 0.012)

-0.012
(-0.045, 0.021)
-0.0005
(-0.036, 0.035)
-0.012
(_0.053, 0.029)

-0.020
(-0.068, 0.029)
-0.024
(-0.073, 0.026)
-0.030
(-0.081, 0.021)

-0.049**
(-0.080, -0.017)
-0.043*
(-0.077, -0.008)
-0.046*
(-0.083, -0.009)
17,946
1,994

0.017
(-0.029, 0.062)
0.014
(-0.033, 0.061)
-0.006
(-0.055, 0.043)
17,946
1,994

MH: mental health; OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; FE: Fixed-effects; HDFE: High-dimensional fixed-effects.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, adjusted for 1,898 clusters.
***: p < 0.001; **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05; ^: p < 0.1
All regressions include full set of control variables defined in Methods section.
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Appendix A3.4: Extra Analyses
Table A3.19: Number of enrolled patients with SMI per 1,000 patients

Fiscal year
2007/2008
2008/2009
2009/2010
2010/2011
2011/2012
2012/2013
2013/2014
2014/2015
2015/2016

Unweighted means
Switcher
Non-switcher
6.953
5.732
6.894
5.884
6.586
5.984
6.381
6.062
6.005
6.163
5.610
5.925
6.038
6.253
6.151
6.253
6.036
6.178

PS-weighted means
Switcher
Non-switcher
6.953
7.291
6.894
7.637
6.586
7.452
6.381
7.750
6.005
7.918
5.610
7.498
6.038
7.900
6.151
7.880
6.036
7.918

t-test p-value
(weighted)
0.430
0.077
0.036
0.002
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
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Table A3.20: Proportion of FPs who referred at least one patient to a psychiatrist that fiscal year

Fiscal year
2007/2008
2008/2009
2009/2010
2010/2011
2011/2012
2012/2013
2013/2014
2014/2015
2015/2016

Unweighted means
Switcher
Non-switcher
0.0169
0.0162
0.0204
0.0170
0.0204
0.0170
0.0218
0.0251
0.0176
0.0218
0.0162
0.0218
0.0204
0.0307
0.0190
0.0243
0.0176
0.0324

Observations = 23,904; Physicians = 2,656

PS-weighted means
Switcher
Non-switcher
0.0169
0.0163
0.0204
0.0135
0.0204
0.0209
0.0218
0.0293
0.0176
0.0281
0.0162
0.0334
0.0204
0.0538
0.0190
0.0429
0.0176
0.0520

t-test p-value
(weighted)
0.891
0.151
0.936
0.209
0.062
0.003
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
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Table A3.21. Percentage (%) of patients with chronic mental illness.

Fiscal year
2007/2008
2008/2009
2009/2010
2010/2011
2011/2012
2012/2013
2013/2014
2014/2015
2015/2016

Unweighted means
Switcher
Non-switcher
27.8
27.4
26.9
26.8
25.9
26.6
24.9
26.2
24.1
26.0
23.4
25.8
23.0
25.8
22.7
25.9
22.7
26.0

Observations = 23,904; Physicians = 2,656

PS-weighted means
Switcher
Non-switcher
27.8
28.3
26.9
27.8
25.9
27.6
24.9
27.3
24.1
27.2
23.4
27.1
23.0
27.1
22.7
27.3
22.7
27.5

t-test p-value
(weighted)
0.123
0.015
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
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Chapter 4
4

Conclusions and Future Research

4.1 Summary
Mental illnesses affect approximately one in five people around the world; yet in most countries,
there is a significant gap between the need for mental health services and the number of people
who receive treatments.1–3 Providing mental health services in primary care setting can improve
accessibility for people who need them, and also encourage mental health care to be provided
before a patient’s condition escalates to the point of crisis, requiring ED or hospital-based
services.4 Early primary care improves outcomes for patients and also helps reduce the costs to
the healthcare system.5–8 Determining what factors encourage FPs to treat mental illness may
help towards the integration of mental healthcare in primary care. One factor may be how FPs
are remunerated: in traditional FFS models, FPs tend to avoid time-consuming services such as
counselling so that they can provide more services to obtain higher revenues. By comparison,
capitation does not discourage time-consuming services. However, it may discourage FPs from
enrolling patients with complex conditions, such as mental illness, and instead may selectively
enroll healthy patients, known as ‘cream-skimming’.9,10 It has been suggested that blended
models that combine aspects of the ‘pure’ remunerations may help to attenuate the negative
effects while enabling provision of quality care.11,12 In the early 2000s, blended remuneration
models have been introduced for FPs in Ontario, and research assessing the impact of these
models on patient health is ongoing. However, there has been a paucity of research assessing the
impact of these models on the provision of mental health services.
A literature review was conducted to synthesize currently available evidence on the impact of
remuneration (capitation versus FFS) on provision of mental health services. Usage in primary
care was assessed to examine the direct effect of remuneration model on provision of mental
health services by physicians, whereas ED visits for mental health reasons provided some insight
into the quality of care provided in primary care. Then, the impact of physician switching from
blended FFS to blended capitation on mental health service provision in primary care and the ED
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in Ontario was assessed, using administrative data and a retrospective cohort study design
combined with propensity score based inverse probability weighting and fixed-effects regression
models. Inverse probability weighting and fixed effects analyses helped to reduce selection bias
and control for unobserved physician-specific confounding.13
4.1.1 Literature Review Findings
Previous research comparing capitation and FFS on mental health service utilization in primary
care and EDs were presented in Chapter 2. The existing literature was found to be mixed, and
complicated by differences across studies and populations assessed, as some studies assess the
general population while others looked at only patients with serious mental illness (psychosis or
bipolar disorder) as well as variations in how service utilization was measured.
In the general population, current evidence indicates no difference between capitated payment
versus FFS payment on the number of patients who use mental health services. 14 When looking
at volume of mental health services, one found it to be lower in capitation 15 and another found no
difference.16 In studies of patients with SMI, some have found capitation to be associated with
fewer patients using mental health services, 17–19 while others have found no difference;20–22 for
volume of services, one found no difference23 while others found capitation to be associated with
fewer services.24,25 Only three studies were found comparing remuneration models and number
of ED visits for mental health reasons: one assessed the general population and found capitation
to be associated with fewer ED visits, 26 while two studies assessed patients with SMI and found
no difference.21,25
Overall, capitation is associated with fewer mental health services in the general population as
well as patients with SMI, though the effect of remuneration model on the number of patients
who utilize mental health services in primary care is ambiguous. There was also very limited
research assessing the association between remuneration model and ED usage for mental health
reasons, though current evidence suggests that capitation is associated with fewer ED visits for
mental health reasons other than patients with SMI.
Notably, there is relatively limited evidence, and most studies are from the US: only one non-US
study was found, using Ontario data and focusing on patients with SMI. 25 Thus, it is not fully
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clear how provision of mental health services differs between capitation and FFS, particularly on
Ontarians outside of those with psychosis or bipolar disorder. To assess the impact of blended
capitation compared to enhanced FFS on mental health services, we used a natural experiment
framework to compare enrolled patients of FPs who remained in FHG (non-switchers), to
enrolled patients of FPs who began in FHG but switched to FHO (switchers). Propensity scores
were generated and then incorporated into multivariate regression analyses using the inverse
probability weighting method. Fixed-effects analyses were used to control for unmeasured
physician-specific confounding such as altruism.13
4.1.2 Comparison of Blended Capitation and Blended Fee-For-Service on Mental Health
Services in Primary Care and Emergency Departments in Ontario
In Chapter 3, switchers and non-switchers were compared on their provision of mental health
services in primary care, enrollment of patients with serious mental illness, and referrals to a
psychiatrist, as well as their patients’ usage of the ED for mental health reasons. Switching to
FHO was associated with a decrease in the number of billed mental health services in primary
care overall and during regular hours, compared to physicians who remained in FHG, but an
increase in billed mental health services during after-hours was also observed. The value of
services aligned with the number of services provided: FHO was associated with reduced value
of services, driven by fewer services during regular hours, but also associated with an increase in
the value of services provided during after-hours. The decrease in volume of services provided is
consistent with one previous US study,15 but in contrast with another that found no difference.16
One potential reason for this discrepancy could be the difference in timing of the studies, as the
study that did not find a difference was based on data from 1991-1994, while the study that
found a difference was based on data from 2010-2012. Mental health service utilization may
have been low in the past due to higher levels of stigma, and thus changes in physician payment
did not lead to major changes in usage at that time. Reduced mental health-related visits to
primary care was also found in a previous Ontario study of patients with SMI, 25 suggesting that
reduced service provision occurs for patients with common and severe mental illnesses. We did
not find significant differences in referrals to a psychiatrist, suggesting that patients under FHO
FPs are not being offloaded to psychiatrists. While FPs under FHO enrolled slightly fewer
patients with SMI, this difference was not statistically significant in the fixed-effects models.
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Finally, switching to FHO was associated with a slight decrease in the total number of ED visits
for mental health reasons, driven primarily by decreases during regular hours; there was no
difference between switchers and non-switchers in the number of after-hours ED visits. The
number of patients who used the ED for mental health reasons did not differ significantly
between switchers and non-switchers, though there was a significant decrease specifically for
patients during regular-hours. This is consistent with a previous study that assessed the general
population,26 but inconsistent with previous studies of the SMI population, including in
Ontario.21,25 One potential explanation is that capitated payment can lead to better quality of care
for patients with common mental illnesses and hence they are less likely to use the ED, but this
benefit may not extend to patients with more severe mental illnesses, perhaps due to the
difficulty of treating these patients in primary care.
Overall, our findings indicate that blended capitation appears to be associated with fewer mental
health services and thus reduced value of services compared to blended FFS based on billings
database. We did not find evidence of FHO FPs offloading care to psychiatrists, nor did we find
evidence of a detrimental effect of this reduced service provision, as ED visits for mental health
reasons did not differ between groups.

4.2 Future Research
This study provides evidence on differences in overall mental health service provision between
two of the most popular remuneration models for FPs in Ontario today. One area of further
research is to examine whether there are differential effects by d iagnostic category – most studies
have focused either on SMI or mental health overall, so research is lacking on the specific effects
of remuneration models on patients with other mental disorders, such as anxiety disorders, mood
disorders, and substance use disorders. This may help to identify if specific patient groups are
less likely to receive needed services under different physician payment models. Another area for
future research is to assess aspects of these models that may influence mental health service
provision in primary care, as well as ED usage for mental health reasons. One aspect of interest
is the impact of team-based models. Approximately half of the physicians in FHO are teambased, and some teams include a mental health worker.29 It is thus likely that some mental health
services are provided by the mental health worker instead of the FP, in which case patients in
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FHO may not be receiving fewer services, but simply fewer services from the FP and more
services from the mental health worker in the team, especially during regular-hours. Patients
with SMI in team-based capitation with a mental health worker have been found to have slightly
higher ED visits for mental health reasons, compared to patients who were enrolled in blended
FFS.25 However, it is not known if these differences apply to patients with mental disorders other
than psychosis or bipolar disorder. Finally, usage of other mental health services not billed to
OHIP, such as community services and private psychologists/psychiatrists, should be assessed.
In conclusion, this study adds to the currently limited body of research on the association
between physician payment (blended capitation versus blended FFS) and mental health service
provision in primary care and ED settings, specifically in a universal healthcare system. Our
findings indicate capitation leads to reduced service provision in primary care, but does not
appear to lead to increased ED visits for mental health reasons, indicating substitution of care in
the ED is not occurring. This suggests that capitation model like FHO may help reduce costs to
the healthcare system without affecting the quality of care. However, further studies are needed
to better understand what aspects of the blended capitated model are associated with these
beneficial effects (e.g. teams with a mental health worker versus teams without), if specific
patient groups are benefiting but not others, and patients’ usage of other sources of care (e.g.
community services). Developing a clearer understanding of what leads to better quality of care
for these patients can help guide policymakers to refine these payment models so that more
patients can receive appropriate mental healthcare in primary care.
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Dataset Creation Plan
Appendix B: Data Creation Plan
Initiation
This Section must be Completed Prior to Project Dataset(s) Creation
Project Title:

Use of Mental Health Services in Primary Care, Emergency Departments, and Hospitals:
Comparison of Ontario’s FHGs and FHOs

Project TRIM number:

20190906097005

Research Program:

PCPH

Site:

ICES Western

Project Objectives:

Insert Project Objectives as listed in the approved ICES Project PIA

1.
2.
ICES Project PIA Initial Approval
Date:

To compare patterns of mental health service utilization by patients enrolled to
physicians practicing in FHGs and FHOs
To compare mental health related emergency department use and psychiatric
hospitalizations in FHGs and FHOs

The ICES Employee or agent who is responsible for creating the Project Dataset(s) is responsible for ensuring
there is an approved ICES Project PIA and verifying the date of approval prior to creating the Project Dataset(s)

yyyy-mon-dd
Principal Investigator (PI):
Check the applicable box if the PI
☒ ICES Student ☐ ICES Fellow
is an ICES Student/Trainee
Responsible ICES Scientist:

☐ ICES Post-Doctoral Trainee

☐ Visiting Scholar

Name the Responsible ICES Scientist if the PI is not a Full Status ICES Scientist

Sisira Sarma
Project Team Member(s)
Responsible for Project Dataset
Creation and/or Statistical
Analysis and date joined (list all):

All person(s) (ICES Analyst, Appointed Analyst, Analytic Epidemiologist, PI, and/or Student) responsible for
creating the Project Dataset(s) and/or statistical analysis on the Research Analytics Environment (RAE) and the
date they joined the project must be recorded

Sisira Sarma (Responsible ICES Scientist)

2018-NOV-5

Thy Vu (Principal Investigator)

2018-NOV-5

Kelly Anderson (Co-investigator)

2018-NOV-5

Other ICES Project Team Members All other Research Project Team Members (e.g., Research Administrative Assistants, Research Assistants,
Project Managers, Epidemiologists) and the date they joined the project must be recorded
and date joined (list all):
Amardeep Thind
2018-NOV-5
Confirmation that DCP is
consistent with Project
Objectives:

The following individuals must confirm that the ICES Data provided for in this DCP is relevant (e.g., with respect
to cohort, timeframe, and concepts) and required to achieve the Project Objectives stated in the ICES Project
PIA prior to initial Project Dataset creation: 1) PI; 2) Responsible ICES Scientist if the PI is not a Full Status ICES
Scientist, or a second ICES Scientist or the Scientific Program Lead if the PI is creating both the DCP and the
Project Dataset[s]; 3) ICES Research Practice Staff creating the DCP; and 4) ICES Analytic Staff (ICES Employee
or agent responsible for creating the Project Dataset[s]). This may be delegated either verbally or via e-mail.

NOTE – Project cannot start if this
Principal Investigator
section is not complete.
Responsible ICES Scientist or Second ICES Scientist/Lead

☒

2018-NOV-5

☒

2018-NOV-5

ICES Research Practice Staff Creating the DCP

☐

yyyy-mon-dd

ICES Analytic Staff

☐

yyyy-mon-dd

ICES Faculty Scholars Program 2017-2019 Cohort DCP Template
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Dataset Creation Plan
Initiation
This Section must be Completed Prior to Project Dataset(s) Creation
Designated ICES Research Practice
Staff accountable for Project
Documentation:

The person named (ICES staff) is accountable for ensuring that the approved ICES Project PIA, ICES Project PIA
Amendments, and DCP are saved on the T Drive, ensuring ICES Project PIA Amendments are submitted as
required, ensuring DCP Amendments are documented, and sharing the final DCP with the PI/Responsible ICES
Scientist at project completion

DCP Creation Date and Author:

Date DCP was finalized prior to Project
Dataset(s) creation

Name of person who created the DCP

Date

Name

2018-November-04

Thy Vu

ICES Data
This Section must be Completed Prior to Project Dataset(s) Creation
The ICES Employee or agent who is responsible for creating the Project Dataset(s) must ensure that
this list includes only data listed in the ICES Project PIA
Mandatory for all datasets that are available by
Changes to this list after initial ICES Project PIA approval require an ICES Project PIA Amendment individual year

General Use Datasets – Health Services

Years (where applicable)

ODB

2006 to 2016

NACRS

2006 to 2016

OHIP

2006 to 2016

OMHRS

2006 to 2016

CIHI DAD

2006 to 2016

CIHI SDS

2006 to 2016

General Use Datasets – Care Providers
IPDB

2006 to 2013

CPDB

2006 to 2016

General Use Datasets – Population
RPDB

2006 to 2016

CENSUS

2006, 2011, 2016

General Use Datasets – Coding/Geography
PCCF

2006 to 2013

LHIN

2009

General Use Datasets - Facilities
See list
General Use Datasets - Other
CAPE

2006 to 2016

ONMARG

2006, 2011

ICES Faculty Scholars Program 2017-2019 Cohort DCP Template
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ICES Data
This Section must be Completed Prior to Project Dataset(s) Creation
See list
Controlled Use Datasets
See list
See list
Other Datasets
ESTSOB

2006-2015

PCPOP

2006-2016

Project Amendments and Reconciliation
ICES Project PIA Amendment
History:
PIA Amendment
History Template.docx

DCP Amendment History:
DCP Amendment
History Template.docx
The person(s) creating the dataset and/or analyzing the data are responsible for ensuring that the final DCP
reflects the final program(s) when the project is completed

Date Programs/DCP reconciled

yyyy-mon-dd

Study Design and Project Time Frame Definitions
Study Design

☒ Cohort study

☐ Matched cohort study

☐ Cross-sectional study

☐ Other (specify):

Project Timeline
Accrual Window

Max Follow-up Date

Observation Window
(in which to look for outcomes)
Index Event Date

Look-back Window

Accrual Start/End Dates
Max Follow-up Date
When does observation window
terminate?
Lookback Window(s)

April 1 st, 2006/March 31 st, 2016
March 31 st, 2016
March 31 st 2016 (Window: April 1 st, 2006 to March 31 st, 2016)

ICES Faculty Scholars Program 2017-2019 Cohort DCP Template

☐ Case-control study
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Dataset Creation Plan
Cohort Build
Note: Include a cohort build table in appendices.

Index Event / Inclusion Criteria Overall cohort description:
Rostered patients in Ontario’s Family Health Group (FHG) and Family Health Organization
(FHO) primary care models from April 1 st, 2006 to March 31 st, 2016
For each year
▪ Using Client Agency Program Enrollment (CAPE) registry, identify all Ontario
family physicians (FPs) in Family Health Groups (FHGs) as of April 1 st 2006 and
follow these FPs and their enrolled patients in each fiscal year until March 31 st
2016. Within the window of April 1 st, 2006 to March 31 st, 2016 (i.e., 10 fiscal
years), identify:
o FPs who remained in Family Health Groups (FHGs) and
o FPs who switched from the Family Health Groups (FHGs) to Family
Health Organizations (FHOs)
Estimated Size of Cohort
(if known)
Exclusions (in order)

N/A
Step
1

Exclusions of FPs’ rostered patients (in order, assessed at start of each fiscal year)
Data cleaning:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Missing or invalid IKN
Missing age
Missing or invalid sex
Death on or before the index date
Non-Ontario residents
Invalid age (< 16 years or > 105 years)

Concept Definitions (add additional rows as needed)
Note: Include concept definition details in appendices.

Main Exposure or Risk Factor

Primary Outcome Definition

Main exposure is rostered patients’ physician who switched from FHG to the FHO
model, exposure will be defined using STRTCAPE and ENDCAPE from the CAPE database
• STRTCAPE and ENDCAPE will be used to determine whether a patient
is enrolled to a physician during each fiscal year of the study and the
model type
1.

Primary care services (OHIP)
1a. Number and value of mental health services provided at primary care
• Calculate per physician: (1) the annual number of services, and
(2) annual values of mental health services (in 2006 dollars), provided
to rostered patients
• Primary care visits for mental health reasons will be identified using
OHIP billing codes (see Appendix A: OUT_PRIM_CARE_MH for specific
codes)
1b. Number and value of after-hours and regular-hours mental health
services provided at primary care (subset of 1a)

ICES Faculty Scholars Program 2017-2019 Cohort DCP Template
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Concept Definitions (add additional rows as needed)
•

•

From the services identified in 1a, identify the services that were billed
with the after-hours premium incentive code (FEECODE=Q012) and
those without Q012 code.
Calculate per physician: (1) the annual number of after -hours services
(2) the annual average number of regular-hours services, and (3) the
corresponding value of mental health services during after -hours and
regular-hours

1c. Referrals to a psychiatrist
• Identify per physician (1) the annual number of referrals FPs made to a
psychiatrist (provided to rostered patients), and (2) the annual
number of rostered patients who received a referral to a psychiatrist
2.

Emergency department (ED) use for mental health reasons (NACRS)
• Calculate per physician, including only rostered patients: (1) the
annual number of ED visits for mental health reasons, and (2) the
annual average number of unique patients who used the ED for
mental health reasons , provided to rostered patients
• ED visits will be identified using the EDVISIT and appropriate codes
from the NACRS database (see Appendix A: OUT_ED_VISIT)
• ED visits will be grouped into two categories: (1) regular-hours defined
as 8:00AM – 5:00PM on weekdays without statutory holidays, and (2)
after-hours defined as 5:00PM – 8:00AM on weekdays, weekends and
statutory holidays.

3.

Hospitalizations for mental health reasons (DAD, OMHRS)
• Calculate per physician: (1) the annual number of hospitalizations for
mental health reasons, and (2) the annual average number of unique
patients who were hospitalized for mental health reasons, including
only rostered patients
• Hospitalizations will be identified using appropriate codes from DAD
and OMHRS (see Appendix A: OUT_HOSP. Note that in the case of
prefixes provided, e.g. F1x includes F10, F100)

4.

Physician follow-up within 14 days of discharge from a hospitalization for a
mental health reason (DAD, OMHRS, OHIP)
• Calculate per physician the proportion of hospitalizations for mental
health reasons that had a follow-up visit with the FP within 14 days of
discharge (see Appendix A: OUT_FOLLOWUP14) , including only
rostered patients
• Calculate the proportion of follow-up visits that had the incentive
billing code applied (FEECODE = E080)

5.

Usage of pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives for registering patients with
serious mental illness (OHIP)
• Calculate per physician the annual number of rostered patients with
serious mental illness (FEECODE = Q020 or Q021 for FHG; FEECODE =
Q020 or diagnostic code 295 for FHO)
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Concept Definitions (add additional rows as needed)
Secondary Outcome Definition(s) N/A
Baseline Characteristics
Assessed at each fiscal year starting from 2006 to 2016.
Baseline characteristics of Ontario FPs in FHGs and FHOs
1. Encrypted physician billing number (PHYSNUM)
2. Average number of FPs per practice (CPDB)
3. Age (BDATE from IPDB)
4. Sex (IPDB)
5. Canadian or international medical graduate status (IMG from IPDB)
6. Year of graduation (GRADYEAR from IPDB)
7. Physician’s practice location (LHIN from IPDB)
8. Primary care model (PROGTYPE from CAPE)
9. Expected gain in income (based on algorithm used at ICES Western)
10. Within the year FHO physicians switched from FHG, the date FHO physicians
switched from FHG (i.e. adjust the first year of switching to appropriate
fractional)
11. Rurality (IPDB)
12. Number of patients rostered (CAPE)
Baseline characteristics of PCPs’ patients in FHGs and FHOs
1. Mean age (RPDB)
2. Proportion of senior patients (65+) (RPDB)
3. Proportion of female patients (RPDB)
4. Proportion in lowest two quintiles of Residential Instability Score (CENSUS)
5. Proportion in lowest two quintiles of Material Deprivation Score (CENSUS)
6. Proportion in lowest two quintiles of Dependency Score (CENSUS)
7. Proportion in lowest two quintiles of Ethnic Concentration Score (CENSUS)
8. Proportion in lowest two neighbourhood income quintiles from INQUINT
(RPDB, CENSUS)
9. Proportion from Rural areas (RPDB, CENSUS)
10. Mean comorbidity using John Hopkins Adjusted Clinical Groups (ACG)
methodology (i.e. average ADG score)
11. Proportion with a chronic mental illness (over last two years) (PCPOP)

Propensity Score Definition
Propensity Score Weighting

NOTE: Organizing your baselines by the timeframe in which they will be captured is
helpful. E.g. at index, 120d, in the last year, etc.
Construct a propensity score model using baseline variables (i.e. pre -treatment
covariates)
Inverse probability weighting (IPW) approach will be used to derive propensity score
weights. Weights will be used in multivariable regression analyses
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Analysis Plan and Dummy Tables
(Below is a guide – please MODIFY/EXPAND as appropriate)
Step 0: Cohort Codes
I.

Review cohort code list.
a. Use %assign to obtain the cohort code list.
***STOP FOR REVIEW***

Step 1: Cohort Build
I.
II.

III.

Apply inclusion criteria.
a. Keep all records.
Obtain data for exclusions.
a. Use %getdemo to obtain demographic variables from RPDB: bdate, dthdate, sex, prcddablk, pstlcode,
prcdcsd
Apply each exclusion in order and track number excluded at each step.
a. Complete exclusion flow table (Appendix B: S0_ExcInc_Flow)
***STOP FOR REVIEW***

Step 2: Define Baselines, Exposures, and Outcomes
I.
II.

Define baseline characteristics: details provided in Appendix C, Table C2.
Define outcome concepts: details provided in Appendix C, Table C3.
***STOP FOR REVIEW***

Step 3: Descriptive Analyses
I.
II.

Create baseline tables reporting requested information for each baseline characteristic, sorted by exposure group
(FHG vs FHO): details provided in Appendix B: S1_Baseline_Pat.
Create baseline tables reporting the characteristics of FPs included in the study: details provided in Appendix B:
S2_Baseline_Phys.
a.
Compare differences across groups using t-tests and Chi-square tests.
***STOP FOR REVIEW***

Step 4: Primary Outcomes Analysis
I.

II.

Use a logistic regression model to assess the FPs who switched from FHG to FHO, compared to those who
remained in FHG, while accounting for observed physician and practice characteristics, on outcomes: details
provided in Appendix B: S3_Out_PrimCare, S4_Out_Hosp, S5_Out_FollowUp, S6_Out_ED, S7_RegSMI, and
S8_Multivariate.
a. Propensity score matching will be used to adjust for systematic differences between FPs that remain in
FHG and FPs that switch from FHG to FHO.
All analyses will be performed by STATA 13.1 (StataCorp, 4905 Lakeway Drive, College statation, TX 77845)
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Analysis Plan and Dummy Tables
(Below is a guide – please MODIFY/EXPAND as appropriate)
Step 6: Sensitivity / Additional Analysis Under Consideration, if applicable
I.
II.

Repeat analysis, but restrict data to physicians with a relatively high proportion of patients considered to have
chronic mental illness (using PCPOP, CDC_MH indicator).
Compare primary care service provision and hospital/ED outcomes between (subject to sufficient sample size):
a.
Urban versus rural physicians
i. If too few rural physicians: Repeat analysis, but restrict data to urban physicians
b. Male physicians and female physicians
c.
Younger physicians versus older physicians
d. More recently graduated physicians (within less than 10 years) compared to physicians who graduated at
least 10 years ago
e. Early switchers versus later switchers
f.
CMGs versus IMGs
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Quality Assurance Activities
RAE Directory of SAS Programs
RAE Directory of Final Dataset(s)

The final analytic dataset for each cohort includes all the data required to create the baseline tables and run
all the models. It should include all covariates for all models such as patient risk factors, hospital
characteristics, physician characteristics, exposure measures (continuous, categorical) and outcomes. It
should include covariates that were considered but didn’t make the final cut. This would permit an analyst
to easily re-run the models in the future.

RAE README file available:
☐Yes ☐No
Date results of quality assurance tools for final dataset shared with project team (where applicable):
%assign
%evolution
%dinexplore
%track / %exclude
%codebook
Additional comments:

yyyy-mon-dd
yyyy-mon-dd
yyyy-mon-dd
yyyy-mon-dd
yyyy-mon-dd

Appendices (add appendices as needed)
Appendix A: Codes

Refer to the “DCP - Appendix A” document

Appendix B: Output Tables

Refer to the “DCP - Appendix B” document

Appendix C: Additional detail for inclusion, exclusion, baseline, and outcome definitions
Table C1. Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria
Concept
Data
Code Type
Sources
Inclusion Criteria for FP cohort
FP enrolled in FHG
CAPE
PROGTYPE = FHG
FP enrollment in FHG CAPE
PROGTYPE = FHG,
or FHO
FHO
Exclusion Criteria for patients
Missing or invalid IKN RPDB
Missing age

RPDB

Age (algorithmn)

Missing sex

RPDB

SEX = Sex on RPDB

Death on or before
the index date

RPDB

DTHDATE = Death
date from
Admin+RPDB data
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Window

Notes
(including algorithm details)

April 1 st 2006
Accrual Window

Each fiscal year starting
from 2006 to 2016
Each fiscal year starting
from 2006 to 2016
Each fiscal year starting
from 2006 to 2016
Each fiscal year starting
from 2006 to 2016

See the tab of
Appendix A
See the tab of
Appendix A
See the tab of
Appendix A
See the tab of
Appendix A

“EXC_IKN” in
“EXC_MAGE” in
“EXC_MSEX” in
“EXC_DEATH” in
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MOHDATE = Death
date from RPDB
data
OTHERDTH = Most
recent death date
from Admin data
Non-Ontario
residents
Invalid age

RPDB
RPDB

Table C2. Baseline Characteristics
Characteristic
Data
Sources
Patient characteristics
Age
RPDB

Sex

RPDB

Income quintile

RPDB

Rurality (Rurality
Index)

RPDB

Material Deprivation
Score

CENSUS

Residential
Instability Score

CENSUS

Dependency Score

CENSUS

Ethnic
Concentration Score

CENSUS

Comorbidity

Johns
Hopkins
ACGs
PCPOP

Chronic mental
illness

Age (algorithmn)

Code
Type

CDC_MH

Each fiscal year starting
from 2006 to 2016
Each fiscal year starting
from 2006 to 2016

Window

Each fiscal year
starting from
2006 to 2016
Each fiscal year
starting from
2006 to 2016
Each fiscal year
starting from
2006 to 2016
Each fiscal year
starting from
2006 to 2016
Each fiscal year
starting from
2006 to 2016
Each fiscal year
starting from
2006 to 2016
Each fiscal year
starting from
2006 to 2016
Each fiscal year
starting from
2006 to 2016
Each fiscal year
starting from
2006 to 2016
Each fiscal year
starting from
2006 to 2016
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Reporting
Detail

See the tab of “EXC_NOR” in
Appendix A
Exclude patients < 16 and > 105.
See the tab of “EXC_IAGE” in
Appendix A.

Notes
(including algorithm details)

Mean (SD),

N (%) female

N (%) in
lowest two
quintiles
N (%)

N (%) in
lowest two
quintiles
N (%) in
lowest two
quintiles
N (%) in
lowest two
quintiles
N (%) in
lowest two
quintiles
Mean number
of ADGs (SD)

One of the four dimensions from
the Ontario Marginalization Index.

N (%) yes

Defined as at least two outpatient
visits or one hospitalization for
mental health within the last two
years

One of the four dimensions from
the Ontario Marginalization Index.
One of the four dimensions from
the Ontario Marginalization Index.
One of the four dimensions from
the Ontario Marginalization Index.
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Physician characteristics
Age
IPDB

Each fiscal year
starting from
2006 to 2016

Sex

IPDB

April 1 st 2006

Years since
graduation

IPDB

Each fiscal year
starting from
2006 to 2016

International
medical graduate

IPDB

April 1 st 2006

Rurality (rural vs.
urban)

RPDB

LHIN

RPDB

Each fiscal year
starting from
2006 to 2016
2009

Number of rostered
patients

CAPE

Table C3. Outcome Definition
Concept
Data
Sources
Primary care
OHIP
mental health
services (Cost and
number)

Primary care
mental health
services provided
during after-hours
and billed with
after-hours
premium (cost
and number)

OHIP

Each fiscal year
starting from
2006 to 2016

Code Type
FEECODE = OHIP
Fee Code
DXCODE =
diagnosis code
CPI_HEALTH_COST
FEECODE = OHIP
Fee Code
DXCODE =
diagnosis code
CPI_HEALTH_COST
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Window
Each fiscal
year
starting
from 2006
to 2016

Each fiscal
year
starting
from 2006
to 2016

Mean (SD),
Median (IQR)
N (%) age
groups:
<30, 30-39,
40-39, 50-59,
60+
N (%) of each
category
(Male,
Female)
N(%) of each
category ( <11
years, 11-24
years, >=25
years)
N (%),
Missing, Yes,
No
N (%) rural,
urban, missing

Year-gradyear

N (%) each
category
N

Reporting
Detail
Mean (SD)

Notes
(including algorithm details)
Rostered patients only.
See Appendix A, sheet
OUT_PRIM_CARE_MH
Cost calculated from the services
provided and the CPI_HEALTH_COST

Mean (SD)

Rostered patients only. A subset of
all primary care mental health
services. From all the billings for
mental health services provided in
primary care, identify the billings
that include the after hours
premium feecode Q012 alongside
eligible codes (Appendix A:
OUT_AFTERPREM).
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Number of
referrals to a
psychiatrist

OHIP, IPDB

OHIP FEECODE =
Q630 (code for
referral)
OHIP REFPHYS =
encrypted number
of the referring
physician

Emergency
department use
for mental health
reasons (number
of visits: total and
after-hours)

NACRS

IPDB
MAINSPECIALTY =
19 (Psychiatrist)
TRIAGETIME=
Triage time
TRIAGEDATE =
Triage date

Each fiscal
year
starting
from 2006
to 2016

Mean (SD)

Cost calculated from the services
provided and the CPI_HEALTH_COST
Rostered patients only. For
physicians identified as the referring
physician, include only referrals to
psychiatrists.
See Appendix A: OUT_PSYCHREF

Each fiscal
year
starting
from 2006
to 2016

Mean (SD)

DX10CODE1 to
DX10CODE10 =
diagnosis code

Rostered patients only. Any ED visit
with any of the listed diagnostic
codes (see Appendix A:
OUT_ED_VISIT). Exclude scheduled
ED visits (INCLSCHEDULED = “F” in
%getnacrs). For visits that have any
of the listed X or Y codes in
DX10CODE2 to DX10CODE10, only
include if DX10CODE1 is not
between F04 to F99.
Identify visits that occurred during
after hours (see Appendix A:
OUT_ED_AFTER).

Hospitalizations
for mental health
reasons (number
of visits and
number of unique
patients)

DAD,
OMHRS

FP follow-up with
14 days of
discharge from
hospital/ED
(Number of follow
up visits, number
of follow-up visits
that used the
incentive code)

OHIP,
OMHRS

DX10CODE1 to
DX10CODE10 =
diagnosis code

DAD DDATE = date
of discharge from
hospital
OMHRS DDATE =
date of discharge
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Each fiscal
year
starting
from 2006
to 2016

Each fiscal
year
starting
from 2006
to 2016

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Rostered patients only. Number of
hospitalizations with any of the
listed diagnostic codes (see
Appendix A: OUT_HOSP).
For visits that have any of the listed
X or Y codes in DX10CODE2 to
DX10CODE10, only include if
DX10CODE1 is not between F04 to
F99.
Rostered patients only. From all of
the hospitalizations for mental
health reasons found (above),
determine how many of these
hospitalizations were followed by a
visit to the FP within 14 days of
discharge using discharge date and
OHIP billing date (see Appendix A:
OUT_FOLLOWUP14).
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from hospital for
psychiatric reasons

Of the follow-up visits found,
determine if the feecode for the
incentive was utilized or not
(FEECODE = E080; see Appendix A:
OUT_FOLLOWUP14_P4P).

OHIP SERVDATE =
date of visit to FP

Registration of
patients with
serious mental
illness

OHIP

OHIP FEECODE =
OHIP fee code
OHIP FEECODE =
OHIP fee code

Each fiscal
year
starting
from 2006
to 2016

N (%)

Rostered patients only. For
physicians in FHG: determine the
number of billings and unique
patients that are billed with either
the fee code Q020A or a diagnostic
code of 295

For physicians in FHO: determine
the number of billings and unique
patients that are billed with either
the fee code Q020 or Q021
See Appendix A: OUT_REG_SMI
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